In 2016 a new temporary asylum law was introduced in Sweden which limited the chance of being granted asylum. This law was most hard hitting on unaccompanied young people who no longer received fair asylum processes. The government changed part of the temporary law in 2018, and this amendment is referred to as the Upper Secondary School Act. The purpose of this change was to allow certain groups of unaccompanied young people the chance to gain asylum by granting them a residence permit to study in Sweden.   The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the Upper Secondary School Act provides unaccompanied young people enough human dignity and respect. To do this, elements of two immigration laws are examined to see how the differences between the laws affects unaccompanied young people in the asylum process and in order to gain an understanding of why the new high school law was introduced into legislation. This thesis also conducts a qualitative study to find out what effects the law have had on unaccompanied young people. The Upper Secondary School Act is then reviewed from an ethical and critical standpoint, where the thesis's theoretical approach is based on the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib and Elena Namli.   The study shows that the Upper Secondary School Act has been criticized from many different directions, and points out that the law is inadequate and lacking a humane perspective. This study also concludes that the law has led to negative consequences for unaccompanied young people because they are not provided with the right conditions for a good life in Sweden. This has led to them being neglected. In order to change this the law must respect human dignity and express an equal respect for all people. This will then counteract repressive structures that prevent the possibility of integration, which the Upper Secondary School Act does not achieve. The main problem with the present law is that there is not enough respect for unaccompanied young peoples’ human dignity.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)