<p>Human rights as codified in international documents are claims every human being have by virtue of being a human. Meaning that every state must ensure, through its laws, that each individual is guaranteed these claims or rights equally. Islamic principles like other religions are obligations that its members (Muslims) must perform rather than claims. Therefore, it is possible that individual rights may not be respected within Islamic principles because, of the differences in their origin and emphasis, one is a claim and the other a duty of believers.</p><p>The concern of violating rights of other people within Islamic law calls into attention how Islamic principles can be applied in a state while guaranteeing human rights as universal principles.</p><p>This study discusses various approaches proposed by Muslim authors on how human rights can be justified in Islam. Since human rights are political concepts, in the sense that each state must ensure that human beings go about their life freely, they should be the focus of consensus among different doctrines in a modern state. That is a principle to justify human rights in Islam must consider the fact of pluralism of religious doctrines and how all are included in the political process of the state.</p>

Human rights as codified in international documents are claims every human being have by virtue of being a human. Meaning that every state must ensure, through its laws, that each individual is guaranteed these claims or rights equally. Islamic principles like other religions are obligations that its members (Muslims) must perform rather than claims. Therefore, it is possible that individual rights may not be respected within Islamic principles because, of the differences in their origin and emphasis, one is a claim and the other a duty of believers. The concern of violating rights of other people within Islamic law calls into attention how Islamic principles can be applied in a state while guaranteeing human rights as universal principles. This study discusses various approaches proposed by Muslim authors on how human rights can be justified in Islam. Since human rights are political concepts, in the sense that each state must ensure that human beings go about their life freely, they should be the focus of consensus among different doctrines in a modern state. That is a principle to justify human rights in Islam must consider the fact of pluralism of religious doctrines and how all are included in the political process of the state.

George Klosko attempts to solve a problem put forth by Rawls, namely how to create a persisting, just and stable liberal democracy in light of pluralism. He believes Rawls has failed at this task through the employment of political constructivism. Klosko claims that since Rawls does not utilize actual views within the existing public to form principles of justice, his method would fail to reach an overlapping consensus. As an alternative, Klosko proposes the method of convergence, which utilizes actual societal views to find overlapping concepts that inform the principles of justice. My argument is that Klosko misconstrues the method and aims of political constructivism. Klosko seems to incorrectly believe that stability is primary to establishing a liberal democracy, whereas it is secondary to the achievement of justice. Because of this error, Klosko’s method of convergence potentially has the consequence of creating a society which is stable but unjust.

The purpose of this essay is, in a political philosophy perspective, to offer an illumination of John Stuart Mill¡¦s thoughts on modernity. In this essay, firstly, in the first chapter, I will try to elaborate the reason why I write this essay and take a perspective of history and political philosophy as my analytic viewpoint. Moreover, I also briefly introduce Mill¡¦s writings and the frameworks of this essay. In the second chapter, I describe the events, movements, and thoughts that gradually shape the modernity. From the standpoints of Weber, Hume and Romanticism, I also refer to one of the most important characteristics of modernity in political philosophy: value pluralism. In Mill¡¦s thoughts, how to response to the problem derived from value pluralism is my most important discourse. In the following chapter, I offer an exposition to detail Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, focusing on his utilitarianism and liberalism. I mainly discuss how Mill¡¦s principles of utility and liberty response to the problem derived from value pluralism. I also discuss two contemporary thinkers¡¦ thoughts to find Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, namely John Rawls and John Gray. In the fourth chapter, I assess and review the criticisms on Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity. In the conclusion chapter, I briefly go through the major viewpoints of this essay.

<p>An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus.</p><p>The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.</p>

An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus. The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-09-28T16:48:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Analice Cabral Costa Andrade_.pdf: 544151 bytes, checksum: 520fbd750df60e0c64804793014968c7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-28T16:48:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Analice Cabral Costa Andrade_.pdf: 544151 bytes, checksum: 520fbd750df60e0c64804793014968c7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-11 / Nenhuma / Essa dissertação se prende a analisar a teoria da justiça de John Rawls e seus conceitos de véu da ignorância, consenso sobreposto, justiça como equidade e contrato social, compreendendo qual o significado do direito das minorias e analisando a teoria da justiça de Rawls frente ao ordenamento atual de direito (direito geral), verificando a relação desta com o direito das minorias. Para o Direito, precisa-se proteger a minoria da possibilidade de discriminação. A importância, portanto, desse assunto é analisar os princípios jurídicos e os ideais filosóficos da teoria de justiça de John Rawls a fim de esclarecer a relação entre os direitos das maiorias( geral) e o direito das minorias e a aplicação do consenso sobreposto como meio de diminuir as diferenças que o direito quer instituir. / This dissertation relates to analyze the theory of justice of John Rawls and his concepts of veil of ignorance, overlapping consensus, justice as fairness and social contract, understanding the meaning of the rights of minorities and analyzing the theory of justice Rawls against the land current law (general right), verifying its relation to the rights of minorities. To the right, one must protect the minority of the possibility of discrimination. The importance, therefore this issue is to analyze the legal principles and philosophical ideals of John Rawls theory of justice in order to clarify the relationship between the rights of the majority (general) and the rights of minorities and the application of the overlapping consensus as a means to reduce the differences that the right wants to impose.

Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.

本文羅爾斯社會整合理論研究旨在探索羅爾斯整合理論之穩定性及其 整合性格的問題,全文分為社會聯結(social union)與社會整合(social unity)二個場域討論,在縱剖面上,以穩定性的問題為中心貫穿二個場域; 在橫剖面上,以對的優先性(the priority of theright)為支架吸納所欲 討論的子題. 就穩定性的問題來說,在社會聯結中羅爾斯訴諸於道德人的 自律與完序社會的正義感來確保正義制度的穩定性;在社會整合中羅爾斯 修正以各種整全性學說所形成的交疊共識(overlapping consensus)來保 障穩定性的達成 .最重要的是,筆者認為包含式公共理性(inclusive public reason)為促使交疊共識與穩定性達成的最主要力量.而就整合性 格來說,社會聯結純粹是為了避免成為私有社會(private society)的設 計;至於社會整合,筆者認為是羅爾斯面對當代多元主義事實下所欲完成的 政治哲學任務.而筆者特別要強調,雖然羅爾斯一再否認其學說為目的論式 的主張,然而筆者認為其社會聯結與社會整合的設計是有著公共善(public good)的概念,筆者認為羅爾斯的公共善就是一個正義社會的達成,此不僅 僅是公民們所分享的終極目標,亦是羅爾斯社會藍圖的終極理想.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)