<p>This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis looks at the Confrontation Clause from the Sixth Amendment in light of the decision made in Maryland v. Craig. It examines the opinions of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, and determines if their judicial philosophies were consistent with their opinion. It does so by examining the history of the Confrontation Clause from ancient history to the present, and by enumerating the judicial philosophies of O'Connor and Scalia. In conclusion, while O'Connor's majority opinion is consistent with her pragmatic philosophy, Scalia's dissent is not consistent with his originalist views.

Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.

This thesis explores the historical development of personal status law, which governs a person’s marriage, divorce, and custody rights. It is significant because it is part of a framework that has defined women’s rights for centuries. I will argue that personal status law is a patriarchal framework that has been reinforced over time, leading up to the creation of nation-states in the Middle East. As such, this is the “institution” of personal status that will be traced using historical institutionalism theory. In this thesis I will argue that personal status has undergone a critical juncture, or crucial moment of potential to change, in both Jordan and Iraq’s founding, and that this has consequentially affected personal status law development and responses to the women’s movement throughout the 20th century in both countries. This thesis briefly reviews the role of women’s rights and the development of law in pre-Islam era, Islam and the Qur’an, and the Ottoman Empire in order to describe the institution of personal status law. Next, I review the history of Jordan and then Iraq and identify the critical juncture of personal status in historical context. In each chapter I will also explore the matter of de facto, or what women’s rights are like in practice, as an example of the institution at work in the patriarchal protection paradox.

<p>This qualitative study looks at the experiences of youth reentering their communities after serving a custodial sentence. Interviews were conducted from the perspectives of five key informants, including youth counselors and probation officers. Based on these conversations, the nuances of youth reentry were explored in-depth. These pages contain personal stories regarding the successes and challenges that come with reentry and reentry programming. Based on the findings and relevant literature, recommendations and suggestions on how to improve reentry are made. Further, in contrast to dominant recidivism-based understandings of success, this study promotes a more holistic understanding of successful reentry outcomes.</p> / Master of Social Work (MSW)