The study examines and evaluates the oral agitation and propaganda work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1974. It looks-at four aspects of their theory and practice: (a) the definition of their objects; (b) the organisational structures created to embody these objects; (c) the administration of these structures; and (d) their effectiveness. In order to examine the latter of these four aspects, the study also contains an analysis of the main elements of the ideology which is currently disseminated by agitation and propaganda. To this extent, the scope of the present work is wider than its title indicates. The principal arguments of the study are two in number: Firstly, it is argued that there were two paradigms of agitation and propaganda during the period under study, and that these paradigms coincided with, and reflected the specificity of, the regimes of Khrushchev and Grezhnev respectively: Secondly it is argued that the ineffectiveness of agitation and propaganda which is the major empirical discovery of the study, is not a passing phenomenon, but is endemic to their projects. The study concludes that their ineffectiveness can be interpreted as one index of the absence of a civil hegemony in the contemporary Soviet Union.

This thesis examines a little studied aspect of the Soviet Union’s history, namely the activities of the mass membership of the Communist Party during the interwar period, specifically 1926-1941. Based on extensive research in central and regional party archives, it revisits a number of specialised scholarly debates by offering an account of key processes and events of the period, including rapid industrialisation and mass repression, from the viewpoint of rank-and-file communists, the group of people who had chosen to profess active support for the regime without however acquiring positions of political power. The account provided is in the form of an in-depth case study of the party organisation of the Red Putilov – later Kirov – machine-building plant in the city of Leningrad, followed by a shorter study of communist activism in another major Leningrad institution, the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet. It is shown that all major political initiatives of the leadership generated intense political activity at the bottom levels of the party hierarchy, as the thousands of rank-and-file members interpreted and acted on central directives in ways that were consistently in line with their and their colleagues’ interests. As these interests were hardly ever in harmony with those of the corresponding level of the administrative state apparatus, the result was a nearly permanent state of tension between the executive and political branches of the Soviet party-state at the grassroots level. The main argument offered is that ultimately, the rank-and-file organisations of the communist party were an extremely important but contradictory element of the Soviet Union’s political system, being a reliable constituency of grassroots support for the regime while at the same time placing significant limits on the ability of state organs to actually implement policy. This thesis therefore challenges interpretations of Soviet state-society relations based on binary narratives of repression from above and resistance from below. It identifies instead an element of the Soviet system where the line between society and the state became blurred, and grassroots agency became possible on the basis of a minimum level of active support for the regime. It is further argued that the ability of the mass membership to influence the outcome of leadership initiatives was predicated on the Marxist-Leninist ideological underpinnings of most major policies. In this way, this thesis also contributes to the recent literature on the role of ideology in the Soviet system. The concluding chapter considers the value of the overall findings of this thesis for the comparative study of 20th century socialist states.

One of the great opportunities afforded to the political scientist since the fall of the Soviet Union has been that of examining politics ‘on the ground’ in non-metropolitan areas. The current study addresses the development of regional and local political party organisations in post-communist Russia. Focusing on the six movements which won representation in the 1999 election to the State Duma, it uses three case study regions in the middle Volga - the Republic of Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul’yanovsk - to examine party activity at the regional and district levels. Based on extensive fieldwork in Russia, the investigation utilises a broad range of local sources and interviews in its analysis. However, in order to avoid the danger of simply providing an observational study of local politics, wide use is also made of national opinion survey and focus group data. The study begins by examining the context of party activity in Russia, giving a brief history of the party system and its institutional framework. Thereafter, examination is made of the role of parties in regional and local politics, based mainly on official electoral statistics from 1995-2001. This analysis begins by looking at the Russian Federation’s eighty-nine regions in a comparative context, before narrowing the focus to the three case study regions. Parties’ activities, and their interactions with the respective political systems in each region, are examined in detail. Thereafter, the functioning of parties at three levels - federal, regional and district - is examined, using both theoretical and empirical methods. The study goes on to examine the role played by members in Russia’s political parties, most specifically at a regional and local level, utilising survey and focus group material (undertaken specifically for this study) to case new light on the entry patterns, bases of activism, and attitudes of party members in the middle Volga. Furthermore, parties are examined in the context of the 1999-2001 electoral cycle. This analysis concludes that, in the federal elections, particularly that to the State Duma in December 1999, regional nuances dominated over the national campaign; but that party participation was limited in region-specific elections.

Cette thèse vise à interroger les enjeux et les modalités de la construction d’une majorité politique en Russie à partir des années 2000, après une décennie marquée par la faiblesse de l’exécutif central et l’éclatement de l’offre politique. Créé en 2001 pour soutenir Vladimir Poutine, la situation du parti politique Russie unie dans le paysage politique peut sembler paradoxale. Dominant à tous les échelons du pouvoir depuis 2003, il demeure néanmoins un instrument entre les mains des dirigeants de l’exécutif, sans réelle autonomie ou influence. Fort officiellement de 2 millions d’adhérents, Russie unie est peu ancré dans la société russe et compte très peu de militants. L’analyse de la tension créée entre la dynamique d’institutionnalisation du parti et, en même temps, son maintien sous le contrôle de l’Etat se présente comme un point d’entrée privilégié pour envisager, dans une perspective comparative, la production des mécanismes d’assujettissement d’une partie du personnel politique russe. Cela implique de s’intéresser à la mise en place et aux modalités concrètes de fonctionnement de Russie unie, d’observer les pratiques des acteurs engagés dans ces activités et de s’interroger sur les significations qu’ils leur donnent. Cette démarche suggère alors de montrer comment l’étude de ce processus spécifique de fabrication partisane est susceptible de nourrir une réflexion plus générale et comparative sur la façon dont les dynamiques de différenciation ou de rapprochement entre les partis et l’Etat contribuent à produire différentes formes d’investissements politiques. Pour cela l’étude des partis en tant qu’institution ainsi que de la sociologie historique comparative permet de montrer les tensions créées par le processus de différenciation sous contrôle de Russie unie et la façon dont celui-ci accompagne la mise en place de nouveaux mécanismes de domination. / This thesis aims to examine the issues and modalities of building a political majority in Russia from the 2000s, after a decade marked by the weakness of the Central Executive and party system fragmentation. Created in 2001 to support Vladimir Putin, the situation of the political party United Russia in the political landscape may seem paradoxical. Dominant at all levels of power since 2003, it still remains a tool in the hands of leaders of the Executive, without any real autonomy or influence. United Russia, including officially 2 million members, is not rooted in Russian society and has very few militants. The analysis of the tension between the dynamics of the party’s institutionalization and, at the same time, its maintaining under control of the State appears as a privileged entry point for analyzing, in a comparative perspective, the production of mechanisms of subjections of Russian elected officials. This implies to study the establishment of United Russia and its concrete functioning, the practices of the actors involved in these activities and the meaning they give to these practices. Thus this approach suggests to show how the study of this specific process of party construction is likely to feed a more general and comparative reflection on how the dynamics of differentiation or reconciliation between parties and the State contribute to produce various forms of political investments. For this purpose, studying the party as an institution as well as the comparative historical sociology can show the tensions created by the process of differentiation under the control of United Russia and also how it supports the establishment of new domination mechanisms.