This thesis is an examination of external and domestic constraints to the capability of the small island state to prioritise and conduct its foreign policy in the Cold War international system, focusing on the English-speaking Caribbean and in particular, Grenada and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It offers the proposition that the foreign and security policy of the small island state has been influenced by the demands of economic and political survival, the legacy of colonialism, and has been constrained by great power rivalry. In examining the case of Grenada and the OECs, it offers the proposition that the small island state needs a regional political and economic framework for it to survive, maintain stability, and achieve political and economic progress. Such was missing when Grenada and OECs neighbours became independent in the 1970-1980 period, the Federation of the West Indies having already irreparably collapsed. This was one of the principal factors responsible for the breakdown of political stability in Grenada in 1970-1979, leading to the overthrow of a Government which had lost legitimacy through its abuse of the political system, yet was tolerated in CARICOM. The thesis finds that the Grenada revolution represented a challenge by a younger generation of political leaders who had become disillusioned by the excesses and abuses of power and government, including corruption, and ultimately with the Westminster model. The revolution also challenged United States hegemony in the region by charting an independent foreign policy, refusing to compromise principle in deference to US demands. Consequently, the US immediately moved to isolate Grenada, particularly its economy, the PRG having identified economic development as its main priority, and having initiated an aggressive foreign economic policy. American isolation of the PRG had three key effects: first, it influenced sources of bilateral and multilateral aid to deny the PEG; second, it pressured CARICOM and especially OECS members to declare a Cold War allegiance; and finally, it forced a schism between Grenada and its neighbours.

The <i>Responsibility to Protect</i> offers a morally based policy that places a new responsibility on the international community to protect populations from extremes of harm caused by governments. From the policy’s text, the reason for action seems to lie, most fundamentally, in an expression of ‘<i>our common humanity</i>’. However, <i>The Responsibility to Protect</i> does not offer any justification for its proposals. It responds to the question ‘what ought to be done?’ but answers the question ‘what can be done?’ leaving in between a gap in the moral credibility of action. The thesis explores what this lack of philosophical underpinning means to the persuasive power of the policy. The thesis then examines the claim of sovereignty as responsibility and finds it confused and incomplete and lacking the detail necessary for coherent implementation. It uses the Aristotelian square of opposition to investigate the tripartite nature of the new responsibilities to prevent and rebuild. Finally, the thesis investigates the policy’s apparent assumption that an ethically based policy of humanitarian intervention can be appropriately guided by the ethical rules of war. It asks if war and humanitarian intervention are the same thing and finds that they are not. It then explores the incoherence created by using the Just War Tradition for guide R2P. If The Responsibility to Protect offers no greater generation of will and effective action to humanitarian intervention than the current ad hoc process does, its establishment as UN policy becomes a pyrrhic victory. It will result in further anomalies in response by the UN, and consequent damage to the reputation and credibility of the UN as the guardian of international peace and security.

The thesis considers two former colonial powers, Britain and France, as interested states involved in contemporary peace support operations. It examines these states' pursuit of their perceived national interest through the exercise of their national military capability, but within the bounds of international operations. It also considers the particular dilemma which such action poses for the international community. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first part, the two broad contexts of decolonization and peace support operations are depleted and the relationship between them is explored. The second part consists of four case studies of former colonial powers intervening in post-colonial territories within the multilateral context of the United Nations. Two cases of British involvement - in Cyprus and Rhodesia - are included, as well as two cases of French intervention - in Cambodia and Rwanda. The third part of the study, comprising a comparative analysis of the foregoing cases, examines both the national role of the interested state, and the UN response to it. Five groups of factors conditioning the extent of national involvement are examined: national interests and those of the states' domestic constituents; as well as diplomatic, military and financial capabilities. Each factor's impact on involvement is assessed, and it is determined that national roles can be both extended and constrained by these factors. This, in turn, has important ramifications for UN responses. Because the UN finds the roles of interested states problematic but necessary, a particular dilemma exists. The UN responds to that dilemma by seeking to adjust the roles in various ways. These UN responses are examined and evaluated with the aid of an original taxonomy which categorises them according to the size of the role sought and the sort of pressure applied. The responses are found to be inadequate in overcoming the UN's dilemma, which can only be resolved, not by expanding and reducing the roles of interested states, but by making them less problematic, as well as less necessary.

This dissertation examines women’s rights provisions in peace agreements in the post-Cold War period. Its central research questions are: ‘Why are women’s rights included in so many contemporary peace agreements?’ and ‘Why are they framed almost exclusively in human rights language?’ The dissertation is situated at the nexus of four literatures. It speaks to international relations literature on norm diffusion by illuminating the impact of international norms on peace processes – a topic which has so far been neglected. It contributes to gender and conflict literature by advancing a theory of women’s mobilization in response to war and by specifying the causal pathways by which women’s networks gain access to peace processes. It offers theoretical refinement to mediation/negotiation theory by demonstrating that civil society groups use peace processes to achieve particular objectives not directly related to peace. Finally, it reveals causal mechanisms that may explain how liberal democratic norms are reproduced in peace processes, contributing to war termination and peacebuilding literatures. The dissertation includes three major components. The first is a large-n analysis of 135 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005. I explicate references to women in those agreements, assessing the degree to which they reflect international standards. The second part consists of the three case studies of Burundi, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia. Here, I trace the processes by which women’s rights were included or excluded in each of the three peace settlements. In the third section, I test the findings from the case studies on the large-n data set used in the first section.

This thesis is a study of dominant global discourse. The whaling issue provides a discrete case for analysing a <i>powerful</i> discourse, that is, both traversed by relations of power, and conferring power upon the actors wielding it. The main line of enquiry is how discourses mark actors’ identities, and establish them as subjects of international relations. The actors implicated here are states and NGOs. Forty years ago, whaling was widely synonymous with national interest; it was the hallmark of ‘whaling nations’. The first global whale discourse, then, was a <i>state</i> discourse, entrenching states as the primary subjects of international co-operation. Today, whaling is banned by an international moratorium, and it attracts criticism worldwide. This owes to the rise of a new, <i>anti</i>-whaling discourse, that has posited NGOs, on par with states, as international policy-makers. How did this change come about? The thesis begins by exposing the theoretical entailments of (and reasons for) studying a discourse, including the importance of examining together the discursive and the non-discursive, as components of a broad ‘regime of practice’ (Part I). The two, opposite, ‘regimes of practice’ centred on whales, and their abrupt succession in the 1960s, are at the heart of the thesis. The thesis is structured around this rupture. Part II delves into a world where whaling was widespread and unquestioned (the ‘before’). An analysis of the economic importance of whaling (II.1), as well as it political significance (II.2), tease out the first global whale discourse, an inter-state, exploitative, discourse (III.3). The genealogical method is deployed to unearth the conditions of possibility that allowed for the irruption, and subsequent flourishing, of an anti-whaling discourse.  Part III (the ‘after’) identifies three broad sets of factors: the consolidation of the norm of endangered species protection in a budding UN environmental system (III.1); the evolving position of science (III.2); and the actions and strategies of NGOs themselves (III.3). The final part explores the configuration of forces locking in this global order (IV.2 and IV.3). It examines in detail how the anti-whaling discourse operates - through what constructions of meaning and processes of exclusion it perpetuates itself (IV.1). The thesis provides an analysed example of the centrality of discourse in the constitution of political subjects - from the individual to the international level.

This dissertation examines the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China, and the security implications of this migration for the US-China-Taiwan relations, as a basis for a reappraisal of the impact of globalisation on security. Results from more than 140 interviews with business and government heavyweights in the US, Taiwan and China are combined with findings from secondary data and review of literature. The thesis first argues that a country’s semiconductor industry is central to its national security because of its contribution to national economy, high-tech development, and military modernisation. It contends that the scope of the industry migration across the Taiwan Strait is extensive, the direction complicated, and the causes manifold. Empirical data support the argument that the outcome of the migration is significant in boosting the development of China’s chronically weak semiconductor sector through the cross-border transfers of investment, talent and technology inherent in Taiwan’s competitive industry. The thesis further dissects the following security repercussions, some of which have been associated with the unexamined Realist vulnerability claims propagated by the Pentagon: economic insecurity; security concerns over the prospect of China’s rising semiconductor capability, its contribution to the PLA modernisation, and the resultant shift in the balance of power in Beijing’s favour; technological insecurity over the prospect of semiconductor-targeted information warfare (i.e. chipping) and over the narrowing semiconductor technology gap; fear over the prospect of the denial or disruption of critical chip supply on account of foreign dependency. Conclusions are two-fold. Firstly, the scale and direction of globalisation of semiconductor production activities in the context studied has challenged some of our previous understanding of the under-studied economic phenomena. Secondly, the impact of the migration on the US-China-Taiwan security ties is less clear-cut than the original unexamined Realist claims have suggested.

This study aims to account for the responses of the United States, Britain and France to the rise of Palestinian/Arab terrorism in the years between 1968 and 1974. The work charts the legacy of Western approaches to terrorism before 1968, and examines the initial responses of governments in these countries to the emergence of Palestinian international terrorism in the late 1960s. The first aircraft hijackings and hostage-takings that ominously signalled the future intent of groups like al-Fatah, the PFLP, and Black September met initially with a confused and incoherent response from the West, and this study shows that disagreements between the allies on this subject took place from the very beginning. Thereafter, a selection of case studies contrasts and compares the range of responses by Washington, London, and Paris to some of the most infamous terrorist outrages of the era. Thus, this study seeks to examine and explain the differing approaches to the three great Western powers to the challenge posed by Palestinian terrorism. The divergent nature of these responses is shown to have been an important factor in transatlantic politics at this time, and as such, the study assesses the impact these disagreements had upon the relationship between these three great powers. Finally, the work seeks to address the extent to which the increasing divergence of views on the best solution to the problems of the Middle East can be directly attributed to the malign influence of Palestinian international terrorism. In so doing, this study will shine new light on long-standing Western disagreements regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and help us to better understand the influence of Palestinian terrorism in shaping the history of the Middle East in the latter half of the twentieth century.

This thesis examines the evolution of European Union (EU) migration and asylum policy cooperation from 1992 to 2004. Using an analytical framework derived from the main tenets and recent applications of historical institutionalism, it identifies the sources of pressures that contributed to the decisions by the European heads of state and government to engage in and advance external migration regulation within an institutional setting that is itself an instance of the transformation of the modern state, the factors that determined which decision-making procedures were to be used for the cooperation, and the efficacy of the asylum and migration measures adopted <i>vis-à-vis</i> declared objectives. Three arguments are advanced. First, the historical context shapes the preferences of the member states for European cooperation in asylum and migration by containing a specific set of political, economic and social conditions. These conditions are sources of external pressure for change; they become pressures for change when they affect national and supranational governance. The responses from the member states to these diverse conditions in turn inform their decisions through a specification of desired objectives for European asylum and migration cooperation. Second, the institutional context impacts upon the strategies of EU member states and the central institutions by providing the formal rules which act as the ‘source’ of expected behaviour and contributes to ‘modifying’ expected behaviour. As the source of expected behaviour, the institutional context is the frame of reference – it affects the political actors’ strategies by explicitly specifying their assigned tasks and obligations whilst outlining consequences of non-compliance. As the structure within which interactions occur, the institutional context contributes to ‘modifying’ expected behaviour and affects the political actors’ strategies by re-calibrating their power differential relative to one another. The European institutional framework is a significant source of endogenous pressures for change. Third, European asylum and migration cooperation is constantly and incrementally changing as the result of endogenous factors and exogenous shocks speed up this change process when there is no convergence between the two sets of pressure.

The expectation in some quarters before the UK joined the EC in 1973 was that there would be closer co-operation between Britain and Germany, as the two countries have many things, especially Atlanticism and the principle of free trade in common. But the reality was quite different and co-operation was limited. So, the central question of my research is: what factors prevented them from forging closer co-operation? Among the factors identified as determinants of the bilateral co­operation, this dissertation specifically seeks to determine the relative importance of the long-term factors (history, geography, and relations with the US and France) and certain short-term elements (personalities, personal relations between political leaders, party political links, and economic factors) and examine their inter-relatedness. My findings are that, in marked contrast to the strategic Franco-German relationship, relations between Britain and Germany have been principally contingent upon short-term factors. Even though the mix of the factors has varied over time and case by case, domestic political considerations; were consistently of primary importance. In particular, owing to the divisive character of ‘Europe’ in British politics, the impact of domestic politics on its relations with Germany was considerable. In addition, external factors such as the United States’ policy towards the Soviet Union and Germany’s relations with France were also important. From the findings, it follows that the oft-used term ‘silent alliance’ is only partially apposite. For this research, I employed a qualitative methodology, interpreting primary and secondary materials and conducting semi-structured interviews with both British and German decision-makers from the period under research. I also gained access to the Helmut Schmidt Papers in Germany to investigate the German perception of the UK as a partner. In order to demonstrate the complexities of Anglo-German relations, I took a case study approach.  Four major events in the Community were chosen: the British Budgetary Question (BBQ), the Single European Act (SEA), German Unification, and the Treaty on European Union (TEU).  Each case was systematically examined to answer the core questions of my research.

Much research has focused on the official government policies of India and Pakistan towards Kashmir. Many choose to focus on the political process, prospects for a peaceful resolution, diplomatic hurdles, or the impact that the stalemate has on the economies of the parties involved. Surprisingly little attention in the West has been paid to several notable Pakistani non-state actors who are increasingly operating on their own and who have the potential to greatly inhibit, if not derail, the peace process between India and Pakistan. This research project will focus on Dawood Ibrahim and D-Company for a variety of reasons. For one, D-Company is the largest organised criminal syndicate in Asia. Its network spans the globe and has operations in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and South Africa, amongst others. Secondly, D-Company controls much of the smuggling activity at key ports such as Mumbai, Karachi, and Dubai. Further, D-Company is unique in that it is one of the only criminal syndicates to only include members from a particular religious background (Islam), to have its most senior leadership based overseas (primarily in Karachi), to consist of members ready and willing to attack their own country (India), and to have blurred the line between an organised criminal group and a terrorist network. In-addition to narcotics and weapons trafficking, extortion, racketeering, money laundering and contract killings, D-Company has permitted Al-Qaeda and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to use its smuggling routes. The decision was made to focus on the activites of LeT over other Kashmir-centred militant groups because LeT is often referred to as the largest group operating within Indian territory and has the stongest links with D-Company, a relationship facilitated and nurtured by the ISI. This research challenges the conventional wisdom that TTP and Al-Qaeda are Pakistan's most serious security challenges. LeT has benefitted from decades of state patronage and military training, enjoys strong relationships with criminal syndicates and other terrorist groups (Pakistani and otherwise) and, critically, enjoys a favourable perception amongst everyday Pakistanis due to its carefully crafted image of being on the frontline against a hostile India. Neither Al-Qaeda nor the TTP have the level of domestic sympathy of LeT. This research is highly relevant to policymaking in that it attempts to focus attention on a dynamic of the Kashmir impasse that receives an inadequate amount of attention. Although the role of regular military forces are not to be discounted, many of the non-state actors in 1HK, such as LeT, are also very powerful but are not confined by the same restraints as state forces, thus allowing them engage in more violent actions without as much fear of reprisal. LeT is unlikely to be affected by economic sanctions or arms embargoes and neither is D-Company. In order for lawmakers, security personnel, and other Kashmir watchers to develop a sound, comprehensive policy, this underworld relationship and its potential to undermine political initiatives must be fully appreciated.