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This thesis attempts to analyze British policy towards Transcaucasia in the period of 1917 to 1921. It firstly deals with the impact of the Russian Revolution on Britain and her Allies in general and on the Russian Caucasian front in particular. Secondly, it tries to assess the value of Caucasia, militarily and economically, for the Central Powers as well as the Entente Powers. It, furthermore, endeavours to analyze the involvement of Germany and Turkey in the Caucasus. Thirdly, it searches for counter measures taken by Great Britain to overcome a perceived danger from Germany and Turkey for her Eastern Empire through Transcaucasia. Then the thesis undertakes to study British policy at the end of war in Caucasia which now came under British military occupation. It moves on to investigate British policy in Caucasia in the face of the Russian question dominated by a civil war between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolshevik forces supported largely by Britain and her Allies in the postwar period. It, moreover, examines the reasons for British withdrawal and Britain's efforts to find some other country to replace her authority in the region for the sake of maintaining general order. Finally, the thesis studies the Bolshevik threat in Caucasia and its impact on Britain in recognizing Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as de facto Republics, and the causes of her failure to support these Republics against Bolshevik invasion. The thesis then concludes that Britain was in a unique position to shape the future fate of the Caucasian Republics but her problems at home and in more vital parts of her Empire as well as a general unwillingness to become involved in future conflicts with a future renewed Russia prevented her from taking any decisive action in the region.

The responses of British people to the French Revolution have recently received considerable scholarly interest. Their views on the ensuing wars have been much less well covered, however, and this thesis seeks to provide a wide-ranging examination of these. Using government and parliamentary papers, pamphlet literature, printed ephemera, printed and manuscript letters, novels, poetry, newspapers, periodicals and graphic satires, the thesis considers the attitudes of various groups of people to the conflict. It attempts to highlight the debate in England and Scotland provoked by the war, both as distinct from the polemic on the French Revolution itself and, more substantially, as the sequel to the Revolution debate, though integrally linked to it. This debate concerned the grounds, aims, nature and conduct of the war, the issues surrounding negotiations for peace with France, and especially the effects of the conflict on British society. Groups of people across the whole political spectrum took part in the controversy. Edmund Burke's views were crucial to its development, and the thesis begins with a discussion of his analysis. Succeeding chapters examine the attitudes of various political groups. The second chapter studies the opinions of members of the government (particularly those of Pitt, Grenville and Dundas) and of George III. This is followed by a chapter on the war-time activities and attitudes of loyalists inside and outside Parliament and of the 'war crusaders' (those conservatives who sympathised with Burke's interpretation of events, such as the government pamphleteer John Bowles). The next two chapters consider the opposition to the war: the Foxite Whigs in Parliament and their supporters, and radical politicians and 'Friends of Peace' out-of-doors. Each of these four chapters is to some extent organised around a coherent and unified view of the war, but the thesis attempts to show the dialogue within each group as well as their disagreements with other groups.

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No description available.

No description available.

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No description available.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 heightened British interest in Egypt. Because the canal shortened considerably the existing British lines of communication with India and the East, the security of this route thereafter became of paramount concern to the British Government. In 1882 a rebellion of the Egyptian A~ threatened not only British interests in Egypt but also the security of the canal. As a result, in September of that year. a British force It. was sent to Egypt to put down the rebellion. Thus began the British occupation of Egypt. Although not intended to be permanent. the occupation. nevertheless, was to last well beyond thepperiod under consideration. The almost oontinuous threat to Egypt and the canal after 1882 f~~ Britain, although reluctantly, to extend the period of the military occupation. The occupation of Egypt had far-reaching consequences on British foreign policy, on Military and naval policy and on Imperial defence planning. In fact, throughout most of the period from 1882 until 1914, the defence of Egypt was one of the principal concerns of the defence planners. The need to defend Egypt and the canal against attack had a pronounced effect on naval policy. On one oaeasion it actually brought about a significant change in the direction of that policy. A study of British military policy and the defence of Egypt in this period must, therefore, of necessity, take into consideration the interrelationship between policy at home and planning in Egypt. It must also deal with the personalities involved in policy-making and planning. For these reasons this study on military policy in Egypt reveals a number of important features of British defence policy and planning in the period before the First World War.