India and the Mediterranean world have been in contact since prehistoric times. However India remained shrouded in mystery until the Portuguese established direct contact at the end of the fifteenth century. Accurate information on Hinduism still was not forthcoming, for two reasons - the Christian prejudices of Europeans, and the caste prohibitions and prejudices of the Brahmans - which kept their religion and literature locked behind the barrior of the Sanskrit language. Two factors worked to change this situation. In Europe, the Enlightenment softened prejudices and transformed cultural arrogance into interest. In India, Britain assumed political sovereignty and Warren Hastings instituted a policy of ruling the Indians through their own institutions and languages. Induced by official patronage, East India Company officials learned Indian languages and published on Indology. Sanskrit. remained the obstacle, but overcoming tremendous difficulty, Charles Wilkins, William Jones, H.T. Colebrooke, William Carey and a few others managed to learn it, and present to Europe accurate information on Hinduism. The foundation of the Asiatic Society in 1784 spurred research and for a period of twenty five years British Indology blossomed and bore fruit in a multitude of areas. But the demands of empire and the Industrial Revolution, coupled with the fervor of Evangelical revival, changed Enlightenment toleration into Utilitarian hostility, and after 1810 British Indology withered. After Britain won political dominion in India, Europe was forced to view India through the work of the British Indologists. Use was made of their information by leading Enlightenment and Romantic figures, as well as Continental scholars working in narrow academic disciplines. After the British Evangelical-Utilitarian alliance established the English language as the medium of education and government in India, all practical motivation for study was eliminated and British Indology was destroyed.

No description available.

No description available.

Through two major crises ln 1943 and 1944, the British Ambassador, Miles Lampson, backed by Churchill, maintained the practice of intervenlng to keep the Wafd in power against King Faruq's wishes. But that policy grew less and less popular in London, and the Wafd, sensing the change, chose to provoke the crisis which wrecked that mode of British control ln Egypt. One of the reasons for the change was British reluctance to be drawn into Egyptian party politics; another was the tactic of nationalist agitation, used by the parties in opposition to challenge the British and the parties in power. The nationalist claims and aspirations, thus formulated, came to constitute a challenge to British plans for the future of the position in Egypt; particularly so in the light of Egypt's post-war expectations and Egypt's new diplomatic horizons - the Arab League, the recognition of the Soviet Union, and expanding relations with the U.S. Following the assassination of Ahmad Mahir (whom they had means of influencing) the British found their hold on Egyptian affairs loosening, as his successor, Nuqrashi, adhered to a cautious but dogmatic interpretation of Egypt's national aspirations. The tensions which arose between the Ambassador and Nuqrashi came to a head early in 1946; and following the crist, which led to Nuqrashi's replacement by Sidqi and Lampson's replacement by Campbell, the British hoped to establish cooperation with the Palace. That hope was short lived; nor could the policy of seeking to encourage Egyptian goodwill - ~ pursued by Britain's chief negotiator in 1946, Lord Stansgate - resolve the difficulties created by the nature of Egyptian politics. Following the failure of negotiations, Nuqrashi came back to power; since intervention against him was ultimately rejected as impossible, the decisive confrontation took place at the U.N., where American attitudes denied the British government the victory it sought. The result was a stalemate.

This thesis examines the influence of British and Japanese mercantile circles and other pressure groups upon the formation of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the period, 1894-1902. Contrary to the contemporary conception that the Alliance was concluded largely for the benefit of Japan, the thesis argues that Britain needed the Alliance more than Japan from a commercial perspective. The varied support for an alliance, incorporating business groups, naval experts and the press, provides evidence for this interpretation. Examination of the influence of such sectors has been somewhat neglected in the existing literature, owing to the alliance being assessed largely in strategic and diplomatic terms. The thesis argues that it was within the context of great power rivalry that such groups acted in fostering an atmosphere of Anglo-Japanese cooperation. British mercantile circles generally supported Japanese imperial policies in East Asia, especially in opening up new markets in East Asia and improving infrastructure in Korea and Taiwan. Compared to Britain, Japan's economic development was in her infancy. Together with the absence of serious commercial rivalry, this contributed towards the view held by many in Britain that an alliance would be beneficial in terms of protecting British interests. Whilst the Alliance was enthusiastically welcomed in Japan, the thesis argues that this owed little to Japanese mercantile circles, who, owing to the lack of substantial commercial interests in China, failed to recognize the Russian threat to Japanese interests. As a consequence, they did not see the necessity of an alliance with Britain. Nevertheless, the thesis argues that at official and commercial levels, Japan always wished to receive Britain's political and financial support for Japan's further development. The fundamental thrust of the thesis, based on an extensive primary source research in Japanese and British archives, is that commercial opinion and activities did contribute towards the conditions that made the Anglo-Japanese alliance possible.

The historiography demonstrates that the Royal Navy's (RN) role in upholding and defending Britain's overseas interests in the middle years of the zo" Century, through what is defined as the 'coercive use of naval power', has been extensively analysed. By contrast, very little attention has been paid to what is referred to in this study as the RN's 'provider/client naval partnerships' with friendly nations. It is argued that partnerships of this kind, with Britain as the provider, have represented a significant component of the country's foreign relations as well as contributing to the nation's status as a leading exporter of naval vessels and equipment. The thesis uses the links between the Royal Navy and the Chilean Navy as a case study to explore this form of association. It will be shown that success depends on the working of a number of factors if the provider nation is to exert a lasting influence on the client navy and the relationship is to remain healthy. The time-span chosen demonstrates that even if such partnerships endure, they are likely to experience not only periods of relative prosperity but also of difficulty caused by fluctuating internal and external political influences and differences. The US-Chilean relationship in the two decades following the end of World War II is analysed by way of comparison in order to illustrate this point. The historical period covered also coincides with Britain's passage from an imperial to a post-imperial world power. The importance of the RN as an instrument of foreign policy is shown to evolve during these years rather than to decline. The primary source evidence for this study has been drawn from Foreign Affairs and Navy records mainly located in Britain but also in Chile and the United States.

When Sir Eric Drurnmond. arrived In Rome in October 1 933 to begin his duties as His I1ajesty's Ambassador to the Quirinal, he had just completed IL1. years service as the first secretary general of the league of nations. At Geneva he earned a reputation as a skilled administrator, a model civil servant and an accomplished statesman. By the end of his tenure In Rome In 1939 he was widely accused of being an active symphatiser of the Italian regime end Its style of government. Instead of explaining the Duce's policies to the foreign office, the ambassador's detractors claim that he tried to justify and even advocate them. A statement that the Italian foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, recorded in the privacy of his dairy - that the British ambassador had come "to understand and even to love fascism" while in Rome -- Is used both as a conclusion to this school of thought as well as evidence in its support. And this view has become firmly established as the verdict of history. The ambassador himself was satisfied with his record In Rome snd was convinced that the documents would bear him out. The documents to which he referred are now re'eased and. It is indeed clear from them that the case against him must be called into question and. a reappraisal made of his years In Rome. The motives behind Sir Eric Drummond's actions in Rome were far different than those which have been attributed to him by his detractors. He arrived at the policies he advocated not from any sympathy for Italian fascism but from a pragmatic appraisal of Britain's strategic position In the Mediterranean. He cultivated Ciano's friendship by faittering him so that he might improve his effectiveness as an en His advice was generally sound and he followed his instruclkns faithfully. The success of his diplomatic mission must be judged by the fact that when war came In 1939, Italy remained neutral.

By 1819 trade on the Niger was so competitive that Goldie Taubman {later Sir George Goldie) induced the traders to amalgamate, in order to achieve a monopoly. But the amalgam was soon faced with competition trom Frenoh oompanies, supported by their Government. Goldie saw the solution in obtalning political power; through treaties with the Chiefs, and by acquiring a charter. The British Government wished to prevent the Niger becoming French, but was not prepared to pay the cost. To g~ye a charter to Goldie's company provided the ideal way of fUlfilling British obligations incurred at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, where Goldie's timely purchase of the French companies allowed Britain to appear alone on the Niger. The chartered company evaded the restrictions placed placed upon it, and used its powers to exclude competitors. The main oppOSition came from Liverpool. The Foreign Office encouraged a plan to amalgamate the rivals and extend the Charter to the Oil Rivers, but the Liverpool shipowners were irreooncilable, and the German Government forced an inquiry by Major MacDonald, who condemned the scheme. The Liverpool traders sold out their Niger assets in 1893. Thereafter the coastal Africans were left without support, and they attacked the headquarters of the Company at Akassa 1n 1895. Since 1893 Goldie had disl~ked the monopoly. He had been concerned largely with political affairs, helping to negotiate the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890 and the Anglo- German Agreement of 1893. He now, through Kirk, appointed in 1895 to investigate the Brass uprising, put forward a scheme whereby the Company ceased to trade. But Chamberlain was bent on Colonial Office rule of Nigeria, and blocked reform of the Company, which thus faced the Niger-8udan war and French encroachments on the Niger Bend without knowledge of'its future. When the West Af'rican Frontier Force was organised to face the French, the Company wa.s no longer of use to the Government. The revocation of the Charter in 1900 recognised this fact.

No description available.

No description available.