This thesis examines the role of Iraq in Russian foreign policy from the first Gulf crisis in 1990 to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular, it identifies the main internal and external factors influencing Moscow's policy toward Baghdad, as well as Russia's objectives in this country. The aim of the thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it is to use the historical study of Russian-Iraqi relations to illustrate the evolution of Russian foreign policy throughout the 1990s, to provide an understanding of the mechanism of Russia's foreign policy formation and to highlight the interplay between domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, the objective is to provide a new perspective of Russian policy in the Middle East by focusing on Russian-Iraqi relations as a means of drawing conclusions about the Moscow's Middle East policy in general. Despite a large volume of academic work, both in the West and in Russia, on Russian policy in the Middle East during the 1990s, no study focuses exclusively on Russian-Iraqi relations. The thesis therefore fills this knowledge gap by providing a detailed study of bilateral relations between the two countries. By identifying the variety of factors that influenced Russia's policy toward Iraq, the thesis hopes to provide a new perspective on Russia's relations with Iraq away from the simplistic explanations of Russia's pro-Iraqi stance, towards the complexities of Moscow's international and international policies. The thesis integrates events in Russian domestic politics and developments in the international fora, in particular the United Nations Security Council, focusing on the role of the United States, Britain and France in influencing and shaping Moscow's approaches to Iraq. It argues that Russia's Iraq policy is primarily a function of Russia's relations with the US and the only place where the Moscow's and Washington's interests are not simply at cross-purpose, but essentially in rigid opposition to each other.

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This thesis examines assumptions about state and identity in constructivist IR theory and the analysis of Russian foreign policy through the looking glass of Russian representations of "state identity" - representations of the Russian state as "Russia" - in the political discourse of the Russian elite since the end of the Soviet Union, Drawing on empirical research into the discursive representation of the new Russian state, it shows that categories of statehood and identity are more variable in meaning and indeed more ambiguous than allowed for by current dominant conceptions of state identity in IR, which revolve around the categories of the Westphalian system. This becomes evident when studying Russia - a country which is at the same time outsider and insider, a constitutive part of the Westphalian system, defining the state in strongly Westphalian terms, and yet excluded from the West. In the case of Russia, instead of the clear-cut categories and binary distinctions of the Westphalian system there emerges a conceptual field in which inside and outside, identity and difference are inherently ambiguous and diffuse. It is argued that constructivist assumptions about identity face a problem of the relationship between theory and substantive research, insofar as theoretical commitments may obscure actual representations of identity in Russia, neglecting where and why categories of identity are actually produced, and equating categories of identity with identifications. They also face a normative problem, given that IR constructivism reinforces a problematic account of subjectivity inherent in the Westphalian narrative and is in danger of reifying a binary choice between identity and difference as the only possible relationship between the West and the non- Western world. The thesis develops a conceptualization of identity drawing on Gadamerian hermeneutics and a framework for empirical research based on conceptual history that allows for an investigation of the context-dependent meaning of categories of statehood and identity and can go some way to escaping the logic of binary oppositions that has characterized conceptions of identity in IR.

In order to appreciate the wider implication of EU foreign policy and the role of the EU as a global actor, it is essential to consider how constructions of EU foreign policy are accounted for, by practitioners, within EU institutions. To examine such constructions is the focus of this thesis. In the remit of European foreign policy, the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy's (ENP) strategic engagement is linked with the continuous quest to define a European identity, purpose and borders, especially most recently on its eastern European boundaries. Although there are studies conceptualising identity, by examining European foreign policy, these accounts either focus on EU's capability of developing policy instruments that demonstrate her global actorness (or lack of it), or on the social norms that constitute EU identity, or on evaluating the moral obligations EU policy prescribes. However, there has been little attention in the academic literature on their interdependency. Neither has much attention been paid to consider the eastern European region as a collective. This present study addresses several gaps in the existing research literature. It treats the eastern European region as a collective and focuses on EU practitioners, who formulate the policy vis-à-vis these eastern neighbours. More importantly, it focuses on how identity, normativity, morality and interest formations are actually managed in talk, and their interdependency. Semi-structured research interviews with 62 participants from the Council of the European Union DG Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) policy unit and the presidency secretariat, the Commission's External Relations DG (DG Relex) and the Commissioner's secretariat, and the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee were recorded and transcribed. For the analysis, I applied a form of discursive psychology informed by category membership analysis. This analytical approach, novel to IR and to EU studies, examines the social function of talk in interactions, the personal accountability of the speaker, as well as the categories that practitioners build up. The findings have significant theoretical, methodological and practical implications for IR and for foreign policy practice and research. First, the application of discursive psychology led to new understandings of how EU practitioners construct EU policy vis-à-vis the East, the distinct interest in the region with respect to the cultural and historical ties, border security and energy security, and how these practitioners manage identity, normative, moral and interest concerns. Thus this thesis contributes to the theoretical developments in IR on identity formation through talk. The analysis reveals the relevance of how participants build on various discursive accounts such as: the way they construct the ‘European' (1); they account for the normative role/power the EU plays in the eastern region (2); the way they attend to the vocational or moral aspect of EU policy vis-à-vis the East (3); and justify the EU's collective interests of energy security (4). Furthermore, the analysis reveals a competing construction according to which the closer ties with eastern European countries is not merely a moral concern or is clarifying issues of identity for the EU, but very much a normative one, as it serves the EU's own interest, especially concerning energy security. In short, these notions are connected and exist in parallel to each other, when practitioners consider EU foreign policy, rather than favouring one notion over the other. The findings also demonstrate that in understanding European foreign policy in the East, participants draw upon dichotomised categories combined with various discursive devices that effectively work to fragment ‘European' identity. This will have implications for practices of EU foreign policy as well as perceptions of a ‘European' identity in general. Second, this thesis forms an important contribution to discursive studies in IR and EU studies, by applying a specific analytical approach. I discuss the methodological issues that the application of discursive psychology raises, such as the use of interview data and the ethics of obtaining such data for analysing foreign policy. The introduction of this method to IR also challenges those cognition focused models that have been previously widely accepted. The final set of implications is more of a practical nature. Some of the findings contribute to potential policy recommendations on EU policy vis-à-vis the East, as well as the way EU practitioners manage issues of personal accountability. The findings also allow for the development of specific teaching material to assist with training EU practitioners.

Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, born in 1764, after beginning his political career in his native Corsica, became a deputy to the French Legislative Assembly, being on four occasions elected to its diplomatic committee. On returning to Corsica in 1792 he exercised considerable executive power until, in 1795, forced into exile. After 1805 the Russians employed him on missions to Naples, Vienna and Constantinople. In 1812, after four years of enforced retreat, the Czar recalled him to serve at Swedish, and later Russian, headquarters. During the campaign of 1814, his influence with the Czar having grown greatly, he advised the occupation of Paris, this precipitating the fall of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration ended the conferences of Troppau, Laibach’and Verona. Early in

The most serious foreign policy challenge that the Russian Federation faced from 1991 to 1996 was whether and how to respond to outbreaks of conflict within its neighbouring states. Unlike under the Soviet Union, there were open, diverse and complex debates about whether Russia should react to these conflicts, and if so, by what means. These foreign policy debates among the political elite and the ensuing policies form the subject of this thesis. The thesis asks what the dominant ideas expressed in these debates about foreign policy were, and whether they were reflected in Russia's policies towards specific military conflicts in the CIS States. To answer these questions, the thesis first derives insights about the role of ideas and debates within international relations literature which are helpful for the subsequent analysis of Russian foreign policy debates. It then identifies the dominant foreign policy ideas and foreign policy orientations, traces the major stages in the debates and the policies, and compares Russia's political debates, policies and actions towards the Moldova- Transdniestria, Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts. Using interviews and both primary and secondary sources, the general finding of the thesis is that broad foreign policy ideas and orientations provided the backdrop against which debates occurred and policies were formulated or pursued. Ideas and debates were crucial factors in developing and defining an official pragmatic nationalist foreign policy orientation that crystallised in the later period. On the whole, there was congruence between the dominant ideas within the debates and the foreign policies enacted towards specific conflicts. Specific foreign policies towards the conflicts developed in response to the general debate (clash of ideas), which in turn responded to the domestic conditions and particular events in the near abroad. Military actions tended to start independently as local initiatives, and then fall in line with government policy.

Being at the confluence of two worlds – East and West – has had long-term influence on how Russia has thought of its national identity, in particular prompting the question: to what extent is it joining or resisting these two worlds? This thesis argues that Russia’s self-perception of being a great power – greatpowerness - defines its status and position in the world. This ‘greatpowerness’ is a central element of Russia’s national identity and exerts huge influence in the country’s foreign policy making. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia has established a long-term project to develop and improve living conditions in Asiatic Russia, and advance its integration into Northeast Asia. This thesis pursues a research study focusing on these problems: Russia’s insistence on its great power status and the idea of Russia as a great power straddling the West and Asia as a key demand of national identity. The thesis tries to explain how Russian foreign policy reflects this; but also how Asiatic Russia remains a central element defining and promoting this national identity and its quest for great power status. This thesis aims to examine how the aforementioned ideas relate to the apparent necessity of Russia to develop Asiatic Russia and integrate it into Northeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region, pointing out to the dilemmas between cooperation and security issues. The function and perception of Asiatic Russia has never been exclusively internal or external but has always arisen out of the interaction of the two. Therefore this thesis does not only study changes in Asiatic Russia in the post-Soviet period; but also the new external conditions in Northeast Asia. This thesis attempts to connect three aspects—national identity, geographical settings, and external strategy, to determine the place of Siberia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic in Russia’s contemporary relations with Northeast Asian countries.

This thesis studies variation in Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet region. The concept of changing hegemony is used as a starting point to examine how regional hierarchy has changed in the post-Soviet period. Russian hegemony tightens and loosens depending on the time, territory and type of power logic being exercised. This systemic condition characterised by change arises not only because the way that Russia exercises its power changes, but also because the responses of the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to that power fluctuate. Depending on the consent and dissent shown by the other CIS countries to the attenuation of their sovereignty, Russia’s regional hegemony either grows or lessens in intensity. This study uncovers dissent from those who do not fit within or are unprepared to adapt to the status quo of hegemony, and consent from those who accept diminishing sovereignty. Thus, hegemonies in the context of this study are characterised by regular and open-ended dialogue between states that remain independent enough to constantly negotiate the system through their consent and dissent to hierarchy. In making these claims, this study examines concepts such as sovereignty, hierarchy and legitimacy in the context of the CIS region as well as key developments in the CIS region. Specifically, it makes conclusions on how regional hierarchy around Russia is perpetuated, the factors that determine the extent of that hegemony, how bilateral and group relationships have developed between other CIS countries and Russia, and how the CIS system of states is best classified at different periods in time.

ABSTRACT Subnational foreign activities are a new and relatively unexplored aspect of the international system. The absence of clear and universal rules creates an ambiguous political playground that can be misused by both states and their subnational governmental units for reaching their foreign policy and foreign trade goals. Worldwide, different patterns for subnational foreign activities in federal states have emerged. For example, in the United States, member states of the federation are fighting over foreign investments mainly. In Germany, on the other hand, members of the federation have delegated their rights in terms of foreign activities to the federal government. In general, federations with long democratic traditions have managed to introduce the formulas for containing subnational foreign activities. In Russia, in contrast, the breakdown of the Soviet Union confronted both the federal centre and members of federation with a fundamentally new situation. In Soviet times, the territorial units of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR), were of administrative nature only, i.e. they lacked the political dimension. Some of the Russian regions were using their newly-gained freedom for the purpose of challenging the federal centre. Pskov region of Russia has been one of the most active subnational actors.