This study aims to account for the high degree of influence and intensity displayed in bi-lateral relations between Russia and the other post-Soviet states - specifically Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (BUK.) It seeks to do so by employing an analytical framework based around the concept of 'post-Imperialism,' arguing that persistent legacies of the imperial past have both ensured a high degree of intensity in bilateral relationships as well as providing pathways of influence over certain policy areas - primarily for Russia, but in some instances for BUK as well. It also seeks to examine imperial legacy issues as distinct 'types' - from physical economic and military infrastructure, to cross-border constellations of elite personnel to the normative and cognitive inheritances of imperialism amongst both the elite and the population at large. It concludes that Russia has been able to mobilise and employ power resources not available to alternative actors in order to 'punch above its weight' when competing with other powers for influence in the post-Soviet space, and preserve certain Soviet era patterns of relations. It is not the focus of this study, but it is to be hoped that the framework will prove useful for researchers in other former imperial polities in future.

This thesis investigates relations between five Russian energy companies – RAO UES/Inter RAO (electricity), Minatom/Rosatom (nuclear energy), Lukoil (oil), Transneft (oil pipelines) and Gazprom (gas) – and the Russian state from 1992 to 2012, with particular regard to state-company interaction over Russian foreign policy and companies’ activities in the post-Soviet region. The argument is that, due to the institutional legacies of the Soviet system, state-company interaction over foreign policy and energy operations abroad was part of their interaction over the Russian state’s institutional development. The study is based on the conceptual framework of social orders developed by North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW). State-company relations are seen to vary according to their informality and formality, and how closely the companies, and their rent streams, are tied to the state and the ruling coalition, or regime. The thesis concludes that the institutions that structure companies’ relations with the Russian state at home make them more or less available as foreign policy tools. In particular, domestic state-company relations influence the companies’ role in maintaining post-Soviet energy dependence on Russia. The thesis highlights the energy companies’ importance for state infrastructural power, and for the durability of Russia’s authoritarian regime.