This thesis is a chronological case study into the origins, operation and consequences of the Lib-Lab Pact 1977-1978. Cross-party co-operation in British politics since 1945 is assessed. David Steel’s election as Liberal Party leader, his political philosophy and strategy are examined. Concepts of realignment, ‘co-operation strategy’ are explored. The parliamentary and political events together with a detailed assessment of the inter-party negotiations which led the Pact are examined. New perspectives include: the significance of the leader-led nature of the negotiation process; the Labour-Ulster Unionist understanding which ran concurrent with the Pact; the importance of Lib-Lab discussions on devolution which pre-dated the Pact in influencing Steel’s subsequent decision-making. Analysis focuses on the Lib-Lab negotiations into if the Direct Elections to the European Parliament Bill should include a proportional voting system and whether the parliamentary Labour party should be compelled to vote for PR. A key finding of the thesis is that rather than allowing a free vote, as was agreed, the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was prepared to offer the Liberals a ‘pay roll’ vote; the significance of Michael Foot in this process is also noted. The structure of the Lib-Lab consultative mechanism is reviewed. Case studies include a review of on Liberal policy influence on the Budget 1977 and 1978. The nature of intra-party dissent is reviewed with the difference between Labour and the Liberal parties noted. An examination of the serious internecine conflict is complemented by a reassessment of the role of Christopher Mayhew in this process. The Lib-Lab Pact is reviewed, assessing its affect in influencing Callaghan’s decision not to call a General Election in 1978; its influence on Liberal/Liberal Democrat party strategy, and its importance in the subsequent formation of the triple-lock, as such the thesis highlighting the Pacts relevance to subsequent cross-party understandings.

The following pages are devoted to Members of Parliament - Labourites, Liberals, Nationals, Independents - who expressed dissent at the National Government's handling of foreign and defence affairs. Each of these groups was studied separately, but care was taken to view the Opposition in toto, so that similarities of view or approach were ascertained. Any efforts made to effect a united opposition were traced, as were the inter-party movements that originated in these years. Finally, research was undertaken to discover what factors - sociological, economic, electoral - differentiated dissidents from loyalists in the governing coalition or rival factions within the Opposition Parties. It appeared that the Government's opponents, despite divergencies, began to move towards a common goal of limited collective security. Nevertheless, so divided were they by rival creeds and calculations that little co-operation was affected until the outbreak of war. Separately, however the dissidents achieved little, primarily because each group was crippled by a lack of cohesiveness within its own ranks. The end result was that the Government had a freer hand than it would otherwise have had. The counsel offered by the Opposition looked to the fortification of peace to deter the dictators or to overawe them if aggression occurred. Although insufficient thought had been given to how the allies would have fared in the event of war, the grand alliance policy was - and was recognised by the public to be - an alternative to appeasement. As to the flimsy dividing line between both Coalition loyalists and dissidents and groupings within the opposition Parties it would seem that the only significant difference was that of aggregate experience. In effect, dissent or specialism in foreign or defence matters was found to be primarily connected with members being placed in close relations with overseas interests or serving either in the Forces or in a related department.

This thesis seeks to develop a conception of the British Political Tradition as an idea of democracy and apply it to explain the constitutional development of the House of Lords. The British Parliament is one of the oldest Parliaments in the world and is characterised both by the stability of its governing institutions and its capacity to absorb change. Academic literature of the British Political Tradition offers a plethora of arguments aimed at explaining which idea(s) have underpinned governing institutions and sustained their longevity in the constitution. The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how the stability of Britain’s governing institutions and its history of strong authoritative government emanate from a dominant though contested idea of democracy founded upon a limited liberal idea of representation and a conservative idea of responsibility. The House of Lords is examined from the 1688 Glorious Revolution through to the modern day House of Lords Reform process (2012). The aim is to demonstrate through empirical practice how the British Political Tradition has been the dominant idea shaping the development the constitution and defining the powers of the Crown and the Houses of Lords and Commons.

This thesis provides a reinterpretation of J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture ‘The Political Constitution’—a reinterpretation that stresses the commitment Griffith expressed in that lecture to the normative dimension of legal positivism. I call this normative dimension ‘normative positivism’. Identifying Griffith as a normative positivist serves to clarify a number of debates surrounding Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ and serves to clarify our understanding of the concept that has come to be known in UK public law scholarship in recent years as ‘political constitutionalism’, of which Griffith is regarded as a leading exemplar. The thesis argues that Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a form of normative positivism and is very different from some more recent defences of political constitutionalism available in the scholarly literature. The thesis also considers how the big constitutional questions of the age in the UK—questions relating, for example, to bills of rights and devolution—play out in the light of our discovery and appreciation of Griffith’s normative positivism.