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This thesis provides an organising framework for the recent and growing debate on ‘the basis of equality’. This debate is concerned with the question of whether there is any empirical feature that people possess, in virtue of which they count as equals, and are due an equal share of goods. Liberal writers, especially, appeal to the claim, as a grounding premise, ‘Each person has the same basic moral status’. Does this statement serve as a platitude, or is it a substantive truth that forms the foundation of our ideas about a just society? Certain non-egalitarian positions deny it altogether, and instead emphasise the descriptive differences between persons. I argue that there is a problem in justifying ‘basic equality’, and that appeals to religion, humanity and respect are unsuccessful in this regard. However, I show how the successful resolution of this debate lies in a more thorough understanding of the concept of what makes a person’s life go well. The principal finding of the project is that scepticism about equality can be assuaged if we give central importance to a more sophisticated understanding people’s interests.

Equality rights have the potential to play an important role in realizing social rights, as well as in preventing and eliminating poverty. All governments have undertaken legal obligations - both international and domestic - to protect and promote the rights to equality and nondiscrimination. Yet, our societies are generally characterized by growing economic and social inequalities that adversely impact on many dimensions of people's lives, including health, life expectancy, personal security and political participation, implicating a myriad of human rights. This thesis examines the relationship between equality and social rights in the International Bill of Human Rights. It argues that minimum threshold approaches that focus on basic capabilities or core obligations are insufficient to fully realize social rights and eliminate multi-dimensional poverty. Because inequality prevents full enjoyment of social rights, as well as other human rights, invoking equality rights is a logical step toward realizing these rights. Considerable scholarship and jurisprudence addresses status-based inequalities, however, it generally fails to address economic status. Moreover, there is little discussion of the right-based equality in the context of social rights. Drawing on the drafting history and the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants, as well as the work of the United Nations human rights bodies, scholarly commentary and domestic law, the thesis proposes that the International Bill of Human Rights should be reinterpreted to encompass the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of economic status as well as the right to social equality. Examining specific examples of unequal health care and education systems, it argues that both status-based and rights- based equality are necessary complements to social rights in the holistic framework of the International Bill of Human Rights guaranteed under article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This thesis examines the electronic investigations and its human rights implications, both under English law and in Egypt, drawing parallels and highlighting differences between the two jurisdictions. It considers whether the right balance has been achieved between the State's right to investigate crime and the protection of fundamental individuals' rights. It analyses (I) general rules of human rights and rights compromised in the electronic investigations both at national and international levels (chapter 2); (Il) the interception of communications, i.e. content and communications data (chapter 3); (Ill) the search and seizure of data (chapter 4); and (IV) the obligation to produce data and its key where it is encrypted, and the effect of non-compliance with such requirement (chapter 5). Particular attention is given to specific themes related to various procedures, such as the person authorising them, their justification, defining their scope as to the place/s, the person/s and the material, the conditions governing their execution, and the use made of acquired data. The thesis goes on to consider exceptions to the general rules relating to these procedures. Finally, it discusses the admissibility of material obtained by these procedures as evidence, the feasibility of copying electronic material rather than seizing it and the retention of data. The research finds that: (a) both the English and the Egyptian legal systems need to adopt approaches more protective of human rights than they currently do with regard to some measures; (b) English law needs to admit intercept evidence as it is very advantageous for investigation of crime; and (c) Egyptian law also needs to update its provisions for the effective electronic investigations, because having been written with tangible data in mind, the current arrangements now seem outdated.

Le système juridique français est très protecteur des libertés de la personne et il dispose de nombreux instruments de protection en la matière. Parmi ceux-Ci, la notion de droits fondamentaux n’est apparue en France que récemment et sa définition ne fait pas consensus. S’inscrivant dans la lignée des droits de l’homme et des libertés publiques, les droits fondamentaux apparaissent de prime abord comme des normes visant à la protection de la liberté juridique et dotées d’une valeur juridique supérieure. Le but de notre étude est de comprendre quel est le sens de ce concept en droit public français. Pour atteindre cette finalité, nous avons opéré plusieurs choix épistémologiques. Le domaine de notre travail est volontairement restreint au droit public interne, ce qui nous a conduit à nous concentrer sur l’étude de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel et du Conseil d’ Etat, excluant de notre approche de la fondamentalité les jurisprudences tant de la Cour de cassation que celles des cours de droit externe. Face à l’absence de définition normative de la fondamentalité, seule l’analyse de la jurisprudence peut nous apporter des éléments de réponses sur ce que recouvre ce concept. Nous avons également fait le choix de traiter ces données jurisprudentielles sous l’angle de la détermination possible d’une stratégie du juge mais en refusant l’idée de la mise en oeuvre d’une politique jurisprudentielle sur la base la fondamentalité La complexité de cette notion réside dans le fait que la fondamentalité n’est pas uniforme, elle se décline sur une pluralité de supports normatifs, droits, libertés, principes, garanties ou règles ce qui rend la compréhension de ce concept difficile. Aussi, nous avons cherché à comprendre les points de convergences entre ces occurrences distinctes puisque toutes peuvent répondre au qualificatif « fondamental. » Notre volonté est d’étudier la réalité du droit, c’est-À-Dire déterminer à quelle réalité juridique correspond le concept de fondamentalité en droit public français. / The French legal system is very protective of freedom and it disposes of manyinstruments of protection in this area. Among these, the concept of human rights has emergedonly recently in France and there is no consensus about its definition. In the tradition ofhuman rights and civil liberties, fundamental rights appear at first glance as standards for theprotection of legal freedom and with a higher legal value. The aim of our study is tounderstand what is the meaning of this concept in French public law. To achieve this goal, wehave made several epistemological choices. Our work’s framework is deliberately restrictedto public law. It led us to focus on the study of jurisprudence of the Constitutional Counciland the Council of State. We excluded from our approach the interpretation of fundamentalrights by the Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) and by Europeans Courts. Given the lack ofnormative definition of the fundamentality, analysis of case law is the only way to getanswers about this concept. We also chose to determine if case law about fundamentalitycould be a strategic tool for the judge and not a political instrument. The complexity of thisconcept lies in the fact that the fundamentality is not uniform. It comes on a plurality ofnorms, rights, freedoms, principles, guarantees and rules which makes difficult theunderstanding of this concept. Therefore, we sought to understand the points of convergencebetween these different occurrences because all these occurences can be qualified by the word"fundamental". Our ambition is to study the reality of law, to determine what is the legalreality of the concept of fundamentality in French public law.

This thesis focuses on the Centre for Education for Racial Equality in Scotland (CERES), based in Edinburgh, which was funded by the Scottish Executive and Scottish Government to develop several programmes to promote equality in education. Drawing together the disparate approaches to anthropology of organisations, the methodology has included both a focus on a small core group of workers as well as the flow of the materials produced throughout a larger network. Rather than conduct fieldwork at various locations as network or policy studies emphasise, I chose to work for two years with CERES due to their geographic and creational centrality to the ‘mainstreaming equality’ initiative. Beginning at a time when questions of identity in Scotland flourished as a result of devolution, increased immigration and the UK publication of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the mainstreaming equality projects signify the Scottish Executive’s attempt to uphold its duty of promoting race equality. CERES managed three of the seven funded mainstreaming equality projects. The production of these resources contributes to a campaign through which the Scottish Government has worked to reformulate understandings of what it means to be Scottish. This is achieved by drawing upon the myths of a new and egalitarian Scotland in order to displace the myth that there is no racism in Scotland. Within this context, the research’s central questions revolve around this creation in the stages undertaken at CERES. Examining the Centre’s daily tasks, this research demonstrates that although commissioned to contribute to the same overall initiative, the way in which CERES depicts equality is ultimately very different than the approaches developed within the government. The materials created by CERES, which unlike One Scotland, do not include national symbols, have engaged with the complexities of equality and discrimination more than the media campaigns yet have had a smaller audience. Once the idea is developed it encounters further manipulation, both physical in the case of teaching tools and ideological in working to make the identities included reflect Scotland through statistics and discussions of subjects already embedded in the national curriculum. From the vantage point of the creation process, this ethnography contributes to the anthropology of organisations and highlights the legal and policy negotiations undertaken across various levels of governance.

Cette recherche sur le principe de liberté tend à interroger la liberté en tant qu'elle est un principe, pour tenter de déterminer son sens, sa valeur et sa portée. La première partie («Un principe positivement mal assuré») repose sur une observation du droit positif, spécialement sur la façon dont celui-ci pose la liberté comme principe, afin de saisir le ou les sens qu'il lui donne, tout en observant ses évolutions réelles ou possibles. D'une part, le principe est appréhendé en tant que fondement de l'ordre juridique. D'autre part, il est considéré en tant que norme qui prévaut par principe. Mais tout au long de cette première partie, l'observation et la réflexion s'attachent à déceler les raisons de l'absence de reconnaissance explicite du principe de liberté comme tel. Ces raisons tiennent certainement à certains contextes doctrinaux ou théoriques, à des craintes pratiques, et à une évolution du sens commun de la liberté, qui s'éloigne de son sens initial, celui donnée par la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789. La seconde partie (« Le principe de liberté : un principe juridiquement nécessaire») entend d'abord démontrer la nécessité de pleinement reconnaître le principe de liberté comme principe de droit, c'est-à-dire comme norme de droit positif. Cette reconnaissance permettrait en effet une meilleure saisie du fonctionnement de l'ordre juridique, du fondement des normes, et de l'engendrement de nouvelles normes, notions ou mécanismes procéduraux. Cette reconnaissance assurerait également une reconsidération de l'encadrement du principe de liberté. Ensuite, et plus fondamentalement, cette seconde partie vise aussi à attester que la liberté est un principe du droit, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est, plus généralement, nécessaire à l'existence du droit en tant que tel et à la reconnaissance totale d'un principe positif de liberté. Le principe de liberté est alors considéré d'un point de vue ontologique. / This research on the principle of freedom explores freedom as a principle, and endeavors to determine its meaning, value and scope. The first part ("A positively uncertain principle") draws on an observation of substantive law, particularly the way in which it lays down freedom as a principle, in order to grasp the meaning(s) this gives it, while observing its actual or possible developments. First, the principle is explored as a basis of the legal system. Second, it is considered as a standard that prevails on principle. But a series of observations and thoughts throughout the first part aim to explain why there is no explicit recognition of the freedom principle as such. The reasons for this certainly stem from various doctrinal or theoretical contexts, practical fears, and changes in the commonly-perceived meaning of freedom, which has moved away from the original sense given to it by the1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens. The second part ("The principle of freedom : a legally necessary principle") sets out initially to demonstrate the need to acknowledge the freedom principle fully as a principle of law as it is laid down, i.e. as a standard of substantive law. This recognition would enable a better grasp of the way the legal system works, the rationale for standards, and the generation of new procedural standards, concepts and mechanisms. This recognition would also ensure a reappraisal of the framework of the freedom principle. Following this, the second part aims to show that, more fundamentally, freedom is also a principle of ontological Law, i.e. that it is necessary as a whole to the existence of law itself, and to the total recognition of a positive principle of freedom. The freedom principle is then examined from an ontological standpoint.