This socio-legal thesis explores the highly topical and underexplored issue of the legal regulation of gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting in England & Wales, drawing on British Columbia (Canada) as a jurisdiction where this issue has been considered in more detail. These families involve reproductive collaborations between single or partnered lesbians and gay men where a child is conceived through assisted reproduction and each of the adults remain involved in the child’s life. Collaborative co-parenting can take a variety of forms, each of which is distinguishable from gamete donation or surrogacy because each of the adults continues to exercise some sort of parental role in relation to the child. Since the adoption of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, it has been possible for two female parents to appear on a child’s birth certificate following birth and for two male parents to be registered following a court parental order. The UK parliament has not, however, gone so far as to allow more than two parents to be legally recognised. This contrasts with the approach in British Columbia, which allows three parents to be registered on the birth certificate in cases of same-sex parenting involving assisted reproduction. In both Canada and the UK, however, courts have struggled to balance the interests of those involved in these collaborative co-parenting arrangements with varying degrees of success. This thesis combines detailed, comparative doctrinal analysis with a series of case studies of collaborative co-parenting families gathered from in-depth interviews with co-parents and legal professionals in Canada and the UK. In doing this, a typology of collaborative co-parenting families is advanced. The conclusion the thesis draws from this is that gay and lesbian collaborative co-parents are not an homogenous group and the law’s adherence, in England & Wales, to a one-size-fits-all, dyadic approach to parenthood based on the intimate couple does not adequately reflect the needs of the adults in this situation nor what is in the best interests of the child. One of the key findings to emerge from this study and the typology of collaborative co-parenting it advances is that the legal framework in England & Wales risks overlooking the interests of gay men who are involved in collaborative co-parenting in its attempt to protect women-led homonuclear families, even where this is not consistent with their agreed role in the child’s life. Therefore, a central recommendation is that any reform to this area of law should move away from a prescribed dyadic parenting model as the basis for regulating parent-child relationships in collaborative co-parenting families. Instead, it should require a careful consideration of pre-conception intentions, recorded where possible in a parenting solidarity agreement.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005, and the domestic law surrounding it, is currently in a state of instability, having undergone rigorous scrutiny by the House of Lords Select Committee. At an international level, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 has cast substantial doubt over the very basis of this legal framework. The recommendations made by the Select Committee, and any resulting action by the government to address these, will be hoped to have an impact on the implementation of the legislation on those falling within its remit. On a deeper level, however, this thesis seeks to critically engage with the theoretical underpinnings which inform and guide this legislative framework. This entails a questioning of the ways in which those with disabilities and their carers are responded to under the statute. Exploring the theoretical debates in this context leads to a conclusion that the Act promulgates an individualistic approach to the concept of mental capacity, and does not adequately reflect the reality and lived experiences of those deemed to lack capacity or their informal carers. The papers in this thesis interrogate these issues through a focus on three distinct areas- carers interests under the best interests test; the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards though a social model lens; and capacity to consent to sex. In doing so, this thesis suggests that more relationally and contextually focused approaches can inform a legal framework which is attentive and responsive to the interwoven interests of those with cognitive impairments and their carers, and which facilitates the enjoyment of rights through a focus on the societal, structural and institutional barriers which have historically worked to exclude these individuals.

The dissertation solves the empirical puzzle why similar regimes such as Morocco and Jordan vary in their engagement in family law reform between 1999 and 2013. Differences with respect to family law reform in the two monarchies are threefold: the way the reform processes were carried out, the content of the new family codes that were issued in Morocco in 2004 and in Jordan in 2010, and the way the laws were applied. Using Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice as a theoretical framework the dissertation establishes the links between the designs of the legal systems, how reform processes are carried out, the family laws countries end up with, and the way the laws are applied. French and British colonialism had shaped the legal systems of Morocco and Jordan to different degrees, producing a legal system that was unified after independence in Morocco whereas the Jordanian one continued to be divided into regular and religious courts. As a result, Moroccan family courts are less autonomous and more subjected to political decisions than Jordanian sharia courts. The institutional design of both judicial systems affected how family law reform was carried out because those systems contain biases towards different actors who are seen as competent of reforming family law and thus came to influence the reform process. The different access criteria to the juridical fields promote different types of cultural capital, so that actors participating in the process have different preferences regarding the development of the content of family law. In Jordan, the absence of the Jordanian king allowed the sharia court administration to exploit the structural bias in its favour and come to dominate both the process and content of family law reform. For this reason the 2010 Jordanian family law reflects to a lesser extent the demands of women's groups. The absence of the Jordanian king from the reform process demonstrates that change in authoritarian states is not necessarily imposed from above nor is it predetermined from the beginning. The Jordanian reform process saw little engagement from the top-level of the regime and could be classified as a mid-level process. It was led by a government body, the sharia court administration, which however enjoyed relative autonomy from the upper echelon of the regime. By contrast, the Moroccan family law reform was a textbook example of authoritarian politics, the reform being imposed from above and the king playing a leading role during the process. In contrast to the process and content of reform, the application of the reformed law in Morocco challenges the notion of the omnipotent authoritarian regime. While the monarch could impose legislative change, the state is at best partially able to enforce this very law or to impose a consensus over its interpretation. The designs of the legal systems again had an impact here. International law occupies different places in the Moroccan and Jordanian constitutions: Jordanian sharia courts enjoy greater autonomy, reject international law, and thus were able to resist its intrusion.

With the world's fourth-largest Muslim population, Bangladesh is an important case study in the exploration of what it means to be a 'secular' country with Islam as a state religion. One important mechanism through which to analyse the relationship between religion and the state is through the country's laws, and family laws are especially significant in that they represent the state's determination of which long-standing social and religious practices find their way into legislation as a representation of societal values. As with many other countries with significant Muslim populations, personal status legislation has remained relatively static in the years following independence, despite attempts at change. Inspired by studies of negotiations between state and civil society actors in bringing about changes in law, this study analyses the evolution of family laws for Muslims in Bangladesh, revealing a range of voices using such laws in their negotiations between competing notions of 'Islam' and 'secularism' and their role in governance. Using parliamentary and Supreme Court records, newspaper archives, expert interviews, and secondary literature, I show that there has been little change in personal status legislation beyond procedural simplification, and that the judiciary and policymakers have had a tendency to support freedom of religious practice except in family laws. This study explores why this is the case, and focuses on the discourse around the National Women Development Policy and its clause on property and inheritance as the greatest point of contention in enhancing women's rights in family laws.

This thesis examines the Indian system of personal laws (‘the PLS’), under which the state applies a version of religious doctrine to the family matters of citizens whom it identifies as belonging to different religious groups. There has been a lengthy and persistent debate over the PLS, particularly in relation to its discriminatory effects upon women. However, another problem with the PLS has been little commented-upon. Supporters of the PLS emphasise its positive impact on religious freedom to such an extent that there is a pervasive assumption that the PLS is, indeed, good for religious freedom. But there has been surprisingly little critical assessment of the truth of this claim in either academic or political debates. This thesis, a work of applied normative legal theory, attempts to fill this important gap in the literature on the PLS. The thesis addresses the question of how the PLS affects one conception of religious freedom, namely religious autonomy. Its principal findings are that the PLS interferes with the religious autonomy of those subject to it by affecting their religious options (by interfering with their freedom from religion and their freedom to practice religion) and by harming their self-respect (by discriminating on the grounds of sex and religion, and by misrecognising their religious identities). Furthermore, the thesis finds that the PLS cannot be defended in the name of religious autonomy based on the possibility of exit from the system, the advantage of having the ‘option of personal law’, the power it gives people to bind their future selves, the expressive potential of the personal laws, the contribution it makes to membership in a religious community, the contribution it makes to religious group autonomy, or the recognition or validation it provides for religious identities. These conclusions imply that concerns relating to religious autonomy constitute an important set of objections to the PLS. The thesis then considers several reform proposals, including certain modifications of the PLS, a move towards a millet system, ‘internal’ reform of individual personal laws and the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code. It particularly focusses on one reform possibility – religious alternative dispute resolution – which has not been considered closely in the Indian context.

The introduction of Education, Health and Care (EHC) plans proposed in the Children and Families Act 2014 has aimed to give parents and children who are going through the assessment process greater control and choice in decisions, and enhance the multi-professional collaboration between education, health services and social care. This research seeks to evaluate to what extent parents’, children and young people’s, and professionals' experiences correspond to these values at an early stage of implementation. The methodology of this thesis is based on a realistic evaluation framework informed by the work of Pawson and Tilley (1997). Realistic evaluation aims to construct a programme theory which links three distinct broad aspects of a programme: its context, mechanisms and outcomes (C-M-Os). This research employs a programme theory of how an EHC assessment is conducted and has been developed from the current literature on person-centred theory. Person-centred theory has been chosen because of its corresponding value base to the SEND reforms and the recommendation of its use in a number of government policy documents including the SEND Code of Practice (DfE, 2014). The programme theory has been used to devise questionnaires that have sought to gain professionals' experiences of the assessment process, particularly in relation to multi-agency working, and their perceptions of the person-centred nature of the assessment. In addition, five case studies have explored these issues in more depth to ascertain whether the EHC assessment process in this authority is meeting the core aims of the Children and Families Act 2014. Semi structured interviews and card sorting tasks were devised using the programme theory and conducted with a total of one child, five families and five professionals from five individual EHC assessments. This analysis goes beyond a description of the facilitating factors and barriers to person-centred support and examines how person-centred outcomes arise from specific contexts and mechanisms. Findings suggest that experiences of face-to-face multi-professional collaboration were positive within the EHC assessment group. Nevertheless, professionals expressed frustration that in some cases colleagues were not able to attend meetings due to time constraints, capacity within their services and the commissioning arrangements of their services. Parental and professional experiences of the process appear to be positive. The research demonstrates one case study where a person centred planning approach was utilised very successfully from the perspective of all involved. However, there are significant concerns raised in both phases of this study as to the way in which children and young people are provided with opportunities of contributing to their EHC assessment. The findings are relevant to the development of the EHC assessment process in the local authority (LA) in which I am employed, and will contribute to the debate about the role of educational psychologists (EPs) in evaluating this national policy.

La qualification juridique de harcèlement moral est indissociable d’une atteinte à la dignité du salarié au Brésil. En France, l’atteinte à la dignité du salarié n’est qu’une conséquence éventuelle et non systématique des faits de harcèlement moral. C’est là une différence fondamentale entre le droit du travail brésilien et le droit du travail français. Dans la première partie, la thèse aborde les notions de dignité, santé et environnement de travail du salarié. En effet, le harcèlement moral se situe au croisement de ces trois notions et la dignité est la notion principale. La deuxième partie repose sur le harcèlement moral en tant que tel, dont le régime procède d’une variété de sources en France et au Brésil, appréhendé en tant que notion juridique dont les caractéristiques et les manifestations sont multiples. Il traduit un manquement de l’employeur à l’obligation de sécurité de résultat en France et à l’obligation de protection de la santé et de la sécurité du salarié au Brésil. Dans les deux pays, ce manquement peut être sanctionné sur le plan de la responsabilité civile et pénale, sans exclure la mise en œuvre du droit disciplinaire.Il s’agit d’étudier (par l’analyse de l’interprétation du Tribunal supérieur du travail brésilien et de la chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation française), la place du harcèlement moral, à la lumière de la dignité du travailleur tout en prenant en compte le contexte propre à chaque pays. Cette comparaison permettra d’identifier la place que le droit brésilien et le droit français réservent à la protection de la dignité dans la lutte qu’ils mènent contre le harcèlement moral. / The legal definition of moral harassment cannot be disassociated from an attack on the personal dignity of an employee in Brazil. In France, an attack on the personal dignity of an employee is only one of the possible outcomes resulting from moral harrassment. This is a fundamental difference between labor laws in Brazil and France and one therefore must measure the importance.The first part of the thesis focuses on the obligation to ensure the health and safety of a worker. Personal harassment is placed at the crossroads of three notions: health, safety, andpersonal dignity. Dignity is by far the most essential of these elements. The second part of the thesis focuses on moral harassment on its own, presented as a legalnotion. It highlights the lack of awareness by the employer of his obligation to ensure thesafety in France and the obligation to protect the health and safety of the employee in Brazil. In both countries, not taking the necessary precautions can be sanctioned either in the civil orpenal courts, and result in possible disciplinary actions.It is therefore necessary to study (by analysing the similarities and differences between theinterpretations by the judge of the Superior Labor Court of Brazil and a judge from the Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation in France, the place of moral harassment, notably inview of the dignity of the worker, while taking into account the individual context of eachcountry. Finally, this comparison allows one to identify the place that Brazilian law and French law reserve for the protection of dignity and combat that they lead against moral harassment.

Le contexte de la rupture du couple, qu’il soit marié, uni par un pacte civil de solidarité, fiancé ou en concubinage, est un moment propice à la lésion des intérêts de ses membres. La question de la réparation des préjudices subis surgit alors, et la tentation est grande d’en imputer la responsabilité à l’autre membre du couple, surtout s’il est à l’origine de la rupture. Le droit commun de la responsabilité civile délictuelle, fondé sur l’article 1382 du Code civil, est une voie empruntable par chacun pour obtenir réparation ; demeurait la question de son adaptation à la matière. L’analyse des décisions qui le mettent en application à un cas de rupture de couple révèle une tendance nette, celle de l’utilisation à titre de sanction d’un mécanisme en principe réparateur. Cette résistance jurisprudentielle au mouvement d’objectivation et à la neutralité croissante du législateur dans l’organisation des rapports de couple se devait d’être précisée et expliquée. La présente étude vérifie, d’abord, la réalité du phénomène : l’article 1382 du Code civil est utilisé comme peine privée, ce qui met en avant la fonction répressive de la responsabilité civile. Elle s’attache ensuite à déterminer les valeurs que le juge cherche à protéger par la mise en œuvre de cette sanction. Au-delà de la diversité des comportements sanctionnés, c’est le travail d’équilibre réalisé par le juge entre droit à réparation et liberté de rupture que la thèse vise à souligner / The context of a couple’s break-up, whether they are married, in a civil partnership, engaged or cohabiting, is conducive to prejudice the respective interests of either person in the couple. As the issue of compensation for damages emerges, the temptation is to blame the other person, especially when this one can be regarded as the cause of the break-up. An action can be brought on the basis of tort liability in the section 1382 of the French civil Code. The question of its implementation was still open. A detailed analysis of the case-law shows that this legal basis, which is supposed to award compensation, is actually used as a punishment. This resistance to the development of objectification and to the increasing legal neutrality in the organization of the couple’s relationships had to be clarified and explained. The first objective of the study was to grasp the reality of the phenomenon : tort liability is used as a “private penalty”, which highlights its repressive function. The second purpose was to determine the values that judges are trying to protect through this particular way of application of the law. Beyond the diversity of sanctioned behaviours, the thesis aims at bringing out the role of judges in finding a right way between the right to compensation and the freedom to break-up.