This thesis is an extensive analysis of the roles of the board of directors of the joint stock company in Kuwait. The main focus will be on the duties, powers and liabilities of the directors. The area is examined under Kuwait Company Law and at the same time where there is no regulation under Kuwaiti Law comparison with other laws is also provided. The analysis of this area will be broken down and developed through seven parts. In the introductory chapter the types of business organisations in Kuwait and types of Islamic companies will be considered. Chapter one will examine the formation of the board of directors. Chapter two will consider the rules that govern the board meetings. In chapter three, directors' duties will be highlighted. Chapter four will consider directors' powers. Chapter five will discuss directors' remuneration. Chapter six will focus on directors' liability. Assessment of these issues and the resulting suggestions will take place in the conclusion of this thesis.

This thesis discusses issues affecting contemporary nuisance law from an historical standpoint. It is recognised that there is a considerable volume of literature relating to the nineteenth century antecedents of the law today. Yet nuisance is a most ancient tort, dating back almost a thousand years, and likewise the environmental problems it addresses date back to antiquity. Thus there is scope for a deeper historical analysis of this area of the common law which looks beyond industrialisation and the revolutionary nuisances of that period to the developments in the law applicable to environmental nuisances of feudal and post-feudal agrarian times. That is the aim of this thesis. It examines the lessons scholars and practitioners can learn by revisiting the origins of the law, and by critically reflecting on key evolutionary milestones which have shaped the law up to the present day. Four specific areas of current debate regarding nuisance doctrine are the focus of attention. Standing is one, concerning who has the right to sue in private nuisance. What types of injury are remediable with private nuisance is another, with particular reference to the question of the actionability of personal injury. The relationship between private nuisance and negligence is another, with reference to the issue of ‘reasonableness’ within private nuisance. The remedy of an injunction is the fourth area. Throughout the discussion of each of these issues the discussion follows a common pattern, beginning with identification of a leading late twentieth or early twenty-first century case which is the subject of debate and exploring the law at issue from an historical perspective, including the ‘original position’ in medieval case law. Nuisance law is currently encountering difficulties which not only prevent it from having a stable doctrinal identity in relation to other torts (and in relation to ‘its own’ history), but which also cast doubt on its scope for it continuing to provide worthwhile environmental protection in a modern age characterised by the emergence and proliferation of environmental regulatory bodies. It is not argued that the solution to nuisance law’s problems lies in returning to an original position and re-applying it to changing political realities. Nonetheless, it is argued that there is a ‘simple form’ of the law to discover from within a millennia of case law, and it is in many – but not all – respects different from the law as it now stands (or is thought to stand). Many judges and scholars have misunderstood and even to some extent misused history and this has contributed to the difficulties the law is faced with today. This research advocates that when the tort is considered from a historical perspective – where we can find its simplest form - there is scope for its traditional ‘green credentials’ to again be realised.

The 1855/6 adoption of limited liability as a standard feature of companies incorporated under English law has puzzled historians. Members of a limited liability company have the reassurance of knowing that if the company gets into trouble, their personal financial assets will not be liable for company debts. Yet historians have found relatively little enthusiasm expressed by the investors or businessmen who might have been expected to benefit from the 1855/6 endorsement, prompting several to echo Philip Cottrell’s observation that, 'it is extremely difficult to account for this sharp and dramatic change'. This thesis provides a first, sustained attempt to examine this historical question in detail, and identifies neglected reasons why change came to seem important when it did. Opinion shifted seismically under the economic and social pressures of the late 1840s, when commentators, of whom John Stuart Mill was the most influential, interpreted railway 'mania', the 1847 financial crisis and then the 1848 French revolution in terms of a wider need for limited liability, as a means of expanding participation in companies and capital. Calls for financial democratisation acquired further momentum from the example of the United States and the large number of lawyers who joined Parliament following the election of July 1852. Political and commercial interest came together in a covert campaign organised by solicitor Edwin Field, shipowner Robert Lamont and politician Robert Lowe, who joined forces in early 1853 to try and effect legislative change. Knowing more about these events casts fresh light on the route that wider changes, grounded in steam-power and joint stock companies, took to limited liability. This helps illuminate a pivotal moment in British finance, when older-established intuitions about capital and companies, rooted in physical individuals, gave way to abstract, recognisably modern conceptions.

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There is an increasing recognition within the international system, of the need to understand Islamic law and legal system. This is due to the realisation that it either underpins or at least influences to some degree not only the legal but also the socio-cultural outlook of about a quarter of the world’s population. In line with this reality, this study investigates delictual liability of the state under Saudi law. It evaluates what is the position of the Saudi courts in determining the liability of public authorities for delict and the extent to which the applications of the current principles of delictual liability are useful and sufficient for effectively tackling the growing number of cases that are confronting the public bodies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A focal point of this study is the focus on a system of law which claims universal applicability, even more, a law for all times. For Muslims, the Shar’iah is a code that covers all aspects of life and is applicable to all situations. It governs individual and social relations and as such is claimed to be applied, to various degrees, all across the Muslim world and beyond even where Muslims live as minorities. However, a persistent concern, with advocates and sceptics of the system, remains the viability of a legal system steeped in a specific historical and even contextual setting, in societies and climes across the world. This study has sought to engage an aspect of that issue; namely the applicability of Shar’iah principles to state liability for delictual conduct through an interrogation of the experience in Saudi Arabia, commonly perceived to be a conservative Islamic society. The exploration in this study hopefully provides a useful insight on the veracity or otherwise of the adaptability of Islamic law to all aspects of life and in the contemporary period. The position argued in this study is that Shari’ah does contain mechanisms that make its application viable even in complex areas of law like the delictual liability of the state.

This thesis is mainly concerned with the expansion of limited liability within partnerships in the UK, US, and China and the concomitant need to strengthen creditor protection. Limited liability used to be a privilege largely restricted to shareholders of corporations, who are liable for corporate debts only to the extent of their capital contributions in the corporation. Recent years have witnessed an innovative combination of limited liability and the partnership structure. In this thesis, the hybrid entities of limited liability and partnership structure will be referred to as partnerships with limited liability, which include the limited partnership, the limited liability partnership (LLP), and the limited liability company (LLC). As limited liability induces opportunism against creditors, corporate law contains many stringent rules to mitigate risks for creditors. However, despite having the liability shield similar to that of corporations, partnerships with limited liability have a much lighter regime for creditor protection. This allows businesses to utilise limited liability while circumventing the creditor protection rules under the corporate law. This thesis will highlight such regulatory asymmetry of creditor protection between corporations and partnerships in the UK, US, and China and consider whether it is necessary to transpose corporate rules for creditor protection to partnerships with limited liability. Further, this thesis will make an overall evaluation of the creditor protection regime in China and propose further improvements, drawing on the experience of the UK and US. It is worth noting that “UK law” in this thesis refers to the law of England and Wales, excluding law in Scotland unless otherwise indicated.

This thesis seeks to answer the primary question as to whether Product Liability Claims are socially desirable by reference to three Product Liability case studies and a survey of 132 archived Product Liability claims. These constitute a representative random sample of Product Liability cases handled by the Author’s Legal Practice. This practice has provided a window through which serious failings are identified in (i) the strict liability based Product Liability Directive; (ii) tort itself as a mechanism for compensating injured persons; and (iii) the procedural infrastructure in which claims are made, as recently reformed in accordance with Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations. This thesis tests Product Liability claims against the objectives of tort: deterrence; corrective justice; retribution and vindication; distributive justice and compensation. It is found that Product Liability claims fail to meet the defined standard of social desirability. There is nothing special about products to necessitate or justify a bespoke system of liability. Product Liability claims for damages represent in microcosm the broader picture of personal injury claims as a whole. This thesis highlights the failings of a system which relies heavily on gambling upon outcomes; perpetuates a ‘have a go’ culture; rewards the lucky few; builds in an unacceptable element of moral hazard and tolerates and generates the costs of a high volume of claims which serve no practical or legal purpose. It is concluded that 1. The Product Liability Directive was introduced as an emotive response to the Thalidomide tragedy but it would fail to provide a remedy in a similar disaster. Instead it treats sufferers of minor mishaps as victims and contributes to a litigation industry that inculcates in society a false and unnecessary sense of entitlement. 2. The Product Liability Directive should be repealed as a flawed and misconceived piece of legislation that fails to achieve its key goal of protecting consumers and harmonising the law. 3. Support is found in this practical research for much of what Atiyah advocated in his seminal work The Damages Lottery. The possibility of an all-embracing no-fault liability system should be reconsidered subject to strict controls, including thresholds, to ensure that it compensates and rehabilitates only those with genuine needs. 4. A first party insurance market would have to develop to fill the gaps.

L’arrêt de la Cour de cassation du 2 décembre 2005 a énoncé qu’une sûreté réelle consentie pour garantir la dette d’un tiers n’implique aucun engagement personnel à satisfaire à l’obligation d’autrui et n’est dès lors pas un cautionnement,lequel ne se présume pas.La formule de la Cour de cassation,conduit à rejeter toute analogie entre les sûretés réelles pour autrui et le cautionnement personnel.Elle invite également, à ne pas appliquer aux sûretés réelles pour autrui, le régime du cautionnement, car différence de nature, signifie aussi différence de régime. Mais le législateur par sa réforme du droit des procédures collectives a réajusté la solution de la Haute Juridiction. En effet, la jurisprudence postérieure à l’arrêt du 2 décembre 2005, a très souvent manqué de nuance. Les solutions apportées aux différends litiges, résultent le plus souvent d’un raisonnement purement déductif, de la solution tirée de l’arrêt du 2 décembre 2005, de la Haute Juridiction.Les textes qui mentionnent le cautionnement personnel sont systématiquement écartés, au constituant de sûretés réelles pour autrui. Il faudrait maintenant que l’amorce annoncée par le législateur en droit des procédures collectives permette à la jurisprudence d’affiner sa solution. Le droit des procédures collectives de 2008, et de 2014 met en évidence la nécessité de faire apparaître dans la science juridique,la catégorie des sûretés pour autrui, et la catégorie des sûretés pour soi-même. Les sûretés pour autrui, qu’elles soient personnelles ou réelles, devraient obéir à un régime partiellement, puis totalement commun, ce qui signifie finalement qu’il n’y a pas une totale différence de nature entre le cautionnement personnel et les sûretés réelles pour autrui. Les sûretés réelles pour autrui devraient avoir un rôle fondamental dans la vie économique.Pour cela,il faut s’écarter du débat de la nature purement réelle ou mixte des sûretés réelle pour autrui, et s’orienter principalement sur la personne de la caution réelle,qui en l’état actuel de notre droit positif et en tant que tiers à la dette n’est pas protégée.La caution personnelle et la caution réelle sont des sûretés identiques,car elles sont avant tout des garanties de la dette d’autrui, elles sont l’accessoire de la dette du débiteur principal.La seule différence entre ces deux sûretés pour autrui réside dans l’étendue de leur engagement. La caution réelle étant un tiers à la dette et n’étant pas le débiteur, le seul droit des sûretés réelles ne peut répondre que partiellement à la technique de la garantie réelle pour autrui.Car il y a une différence entre celui qui garantit sa propre dette par des sûretés réelles appelé le débiteur,de celui qui garantit la dette d’un tiers par des sûretés réelles appelé la caution réelle. Il serait intéressant pour protéger la caution réelle,d’envisager la création d’une sûreté unique pour garantir réellement la dette d’autrui, en s’inspirant du succès du droit des sûretés Canadien et Américain qui sont des droits souples, réfléchis, modernes et uniformes. La sûreté réelle pour autrui française doit être efficace juridiquement et économiquement pour toutes les parties du contrat. La caution réelle qui engage son unique bien pour garantir la dette d’autrui prend un risque important tout comme la caution personnelle. L’avant-projet de réforme de sûretés de 2017, réintroduit dans un article 2291 le cautionnement réel comme étant une variété de cautionnement. Mais l’avant-projet de réforme de 2006 avait déjà essayé d’introduire le cautionnement réel dans un article 2285, comme étant une variété de cautionnement qui n’avait pas été retenu. Un régime primaire devrait donc être consacré aux garanties pour autrui;puis un droit spécial serait réservé au cautionnement personnel et à la sûreté réelle pour autrui.Cette solution est claire et précise et mettrai enfin un terme à l’amalgame créé par le mécanisme de la garantie réelle pour autrui, par la jurisprudence et la doctrine. / A collateral debt can be garantee personnaly or on sombody else property. The collateral guarantor which commits its only property to guarantee a debt takes a huge risk just like a personal guarantee. The pre reform of securities of 2017, reintroduced in an article 2291 the collateral garantee on property, like in the pre reform of safeties of 2006 in its article 2285, as being a variety of personal garantee. The article 2285 of the 2006 pre reform of securities has not been retained by law. To solve the problem on the protection of the collateral porperty garantor, a primary solution is to establish common rules for both collateral garantees, personal and on properties. And, the special rules of the personal garantee and the collateral garantee on goods. This solution will put an end on the conflict created by the search of the real qualification of the collateral guarantee.

This thesis seeks to justify on moral grounds the existence of tort systems. The argument is that corrective justice is necessary but not sufficient to succeed at this task. Corrective justice is necessary because it is the only principle that can adequately justify the bilateral structure of tort litigation between claimants and defendants, and full compensatory damages as the default remedy in most tort systems. However, it is argued that the critiques to corrective justice lead us to the important lesson that tort law is more than just corrective justice. Three gaps of corrective justice are identified: the equivalence between gains and losses, the definition of what counts as a tort, and the diversity of remedies. The thesis offers a solution to these problems based on the values of restorative and distributive justice. It is argued that restorative justice plays an important role in tort law, providing an apologetic framework for material compensation (the message that money awards communicate), but especially for symbolic remedies, such as apologies, nominal damages, non-pecuniary damages, punitive damages, and gain-based damages, solving the diversity of remedies problem. This restorative framework of tort remedies is compatible with corrective justice. Distributive justice also plays an important role in tort law. Even though corrective and distributive justice are conceptually separate concepts, in the context of tort law they cannot be separated. It is argued that the definition of what counts as a tort involves a distributive task. Following this argument, the thesis argues that there is a distributive uneasiness in tort law, because tort law protects some interests regardless of how they were acquired, and regardless of whether their distribution amounts to an unfair distribution of resources. It is suggested that the distributive mechanism of insurance can solve, or at least ameliorate, this uneasiness.