This work is the result not only of research conducted in fulfillment of degree requirements of the University of Buckingham/BUCSIS but also of my experiences in the field of law enforcement, police intelligence and counterinsurgency over the past twenty three years. It has been my privilege to serve with and advise the police forces of a number of nations beset by insurgencies. These include the highly visible conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in other unhappy locations where the stakes were equally high but the coverage considerably less. The opportunity to observe, practice and learn in such environments has done much to inform my thinking and writing about police intelligence in a counterinsurgency. This effort is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of all -aspects of the subject. Instead, my aim has been to inform both the policy expert and the academic of the existence and potential uses of police intelligence in counterinsurgency. Given that my target audience is largely non-specialists I have opted to present my thoughts and research in a more general, strategic level format and have delved into the specifics of methodology only where such information appeared to me to be a prerequisite for comprehension of the application. The method I have selected to articulate my thoughts has been to present first an overview of what I believe are the salient points regarding the most efficacious uses of police intelligence in a counterinsurgency. Following this I have elected to present separate sections, each dealing with an overview and application of that area of police intelligence. These areas were selected as being ubiquitous in the field. Other quite interesting efforts such as pseudo- operations were not examined due their inclusion in a given counterinsurgency being driven more by tactical opportunity than universal strategic applicability. I have also included a short examination of a current counterterrorism effort which I feel illustrates some important aspects of our topic. The final section is a presentation of the most salient points of the previous sections as well as a summary of the applicability of police intelligence to counterinsurgency. The existence of police intelligence and its unique but all too often marginalized capacity for uncovering and destroying the prime movers of an insurgency is, in my opinion, something which must be re-examined and enabled in all counterinsurgencies. It is by no means a panacea for civil strife but as an integral component of a combined counterinsurgency strategy, it provides a weapon which is more feared by insurgents than any number of missiles, armored vehicles or boots on the ground. Knowing who they are and where they may be found renders the insurgent visible and touchable. This is the natural role of police intelligence as this work is intended to demonstrate. It is my hope that this work will lead to additional discussion and thought on the integration and application of police intelligence to counterinsurgency. Randy Wilson Kabul, Afghanistan 2011 2.

It is claimed that the National Intelligence Model (NIM) consolidated intelligence-led policing principles in investigative practice and decision making in British policing. Subsequently, encouraged by the Home Office, the NIM was adopted by a number of other public services with an investigative capability. However, that transfer took place without a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the model’s value to the police service and without any meaningful analysis of its relevance to the investigative functions of other public sector agencies. This research examined the adoption of the NIM by three public sector bodies: The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), The Identity and Passport Service (IPS) and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA). It drew on archival materials, associated literature and the analysis of semi-structured interviews with the personnel of these and associated agencies. Research respondents also assessed a simplified version of the NIM that was designed to remove many of the original model’s inconsistencies and ambiguities. The research identified that the reviewed public services are not compliant with the NIM minimum standards and that the model has not delivered any meaningful improvement in the consistency of process, investigative efficiency, improved partnership working, or in fraud reduction in those agencies. The NIM failed because of perceived complexity, the language of the model and supplementary guidance; its exclusive ‘fit’ with the police; and a suspicion by the agencies’ personnel that its adoption was intended as a performance management and governance tool. Moreover, the revised version of the NIM’s minimum standards did not improve comprehension or conformity, or resolve the model’s perceived police bias. It was concluded that the model is not fit for purpose for the agencies studied and that an alternative model that is more finely tuned to the needs of those agencies is required.