The modern world is witnessing a revival of the role of the soldier/diplomat in the military operational context. This is mainly due to the inclusion of non-combative imperatives in some modern Mission mandates, different rules of engagement and operating procedures, as evinced on peacekeeping operations in particular. In such directives, stress is laid upon Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter that emphasises the relevance and importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as preferred ways to resolve disputes. Today's soldier may be expected to resolve conflicts by using negotiation, rather than immediately resorting to the use of armed force. Thus, the soldier needs to possess and display a multiplicity of responses within a conflict zone, ranging from 'traditional' outright warfare (where there is a complete negation of negotiation), to a seemingly antithetical skill in the form of negotiation (where armed conflict is avoided). Such a range of response creates a complex decision making context for the modern soldier. However, the fundamental question concerning the nature of tactical level military negotiation has not been asked, and answered, to date. Tactical level military negotiation has not been analysed as an important specific form of negotiation. This thesis explores the context of the negotiating soldier, and the dilemmas faced when negotiating in a volatile environment, together with an exploration of the process itself. The main hypothesis within this thesis is that military tactical level negotiation, whilst not possessing unique traits and features, combines certain factors in unusually high degrees, and with different emphasis and imperatives from those evinced in other types of negotiation. This is a form of negotiation that is very different in degree, rather than in kind. The consequences of poor performance, or weak agreements, in a combative environment, can result in significant, if not deadly, ramifications. A thorough investigation of the negotiation process and essential decision making factors for a soldier, together with a proposed model of analysis and training, is long overdue. Existing scholarship tends to concentrate on generic forms of negotiation. This thesis examines the applicability of such theories to tactical level military negotiation, and whether the factors discussed in these theories affect the military negotiation context. It will be argued that force, mission, time, and restrictive rules of engagement, together with the influence of elements such as culture, communication, power, personality and competitiveness form the essential elements of tactical level military negotiation. None of these factors is unique. However, the combination and interplay, and the emphasis placed upon these factors, appears to be unusual, and that they are reliant on the specific context within which they are found and employed. The originality of this thesis lies in the analysis of delineating factors in a form of negotiation that takes place in a volatile, aggressive context, and which has been neglected to date. Through direct, and personal, access to examples of such work 'on the ground', and the inclusion and examination of pertinent case studies, including Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, exemplification and exploration of the key negotiating factors on military operations is undertaken. This is an investigative, and systematically analytical examination of a I form of negotiation which has received little attention, but, since it is an important function of the modern soldier in the post Cold War environment, the aim is the delineation and development of a discrete multi-variable framework for this form of negotiation that will both represent the practicalities of the process, and serve to inform and help to train personnel deploying and encountering tactical level military negotiation in the future. This research reveals the predominance of negotiation in the 'arsenal of response' for the modern soldier. Even in more obviously aggressive military operations, such as the operation mounted in Afghanistan in 2002, some military units continue to work as discrete liaison teams, and negotiate with locals on a daily basis to help to re-build a shattered infrastructure. All the personnel encountered in the course of this research emphasised the importance they place on negotiation in the field. What troubled some of them was the lack of sufficient, pertinent, pre-deployment training in the subject, with the chance to hone their competency. This thesis will be used to re- design the delivery of such required training, by providing a contextually specific framework for this form of negotiation, and places a significant military skill in the analytical 'spotlight' at last.

Almost nothing is known about the treatment of the British military dead of the Second World War. It is one of the few aspects of the conflict that has not been afforded attention by scholars. This is remarkable given that death is the most profound and important consequence of war. Drawing on extensive and previously unused sources in the National Archives and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, the thesis endeavours to correct this oversight by examining the treatment of the military dead in the European, Mediterranean and African theatres of the 1939-45 conflict. It does this in parts, reflecting the three stages of the burial process. In the first part British burial policy and frontline burial practice are examined. The operations of the army and air force graves services, which were responsible for confirming the location and identity of the dead, are studied in the second part. The third part considers first the manner in which the Imperial War Graves Commission commemorated the British dead in battlefield cemeteries, and then the pilgrimages undertaken to these cemeteries by bereaved relatives in the early post -war period. The successes and failures of the burial process cannot be assessed without this perspective. The research shows that shortcomings in the planning and administration of burial and graves operations resulted in the loss of the remains and identities of thousands of British servicemen. The fact that the bodies of so many others were recovered, and accorded identified interment, is credit to the work of the military graves services and the thesis seeks to recognise their contribution to this hitherto- unexplored aspect of the 'People's War'.

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.

Shortly after gaining independence in the summer of 1945, the Syrian government set about to form the Syrian Air Force (SAF). Though devoid of personnel and aircraft and lacking experience and tradition since France, the mandatory power in Syria in 1920-45, had been reluctant to train Syrians in the art of air warfare, the nascent SAF scored some limited successes in the 1948 war but lost its momentum after a mere three months of fighting. A lengthy period of restructuring followed, during which Syria underwent countless military coups which profoundly destabilized the country and had a marked effect on the SAF. In tandem with the internal upheavals, the ascent of the Pan-Arab Baath party brought about a gradual severance of political and military relations with the west, particularly Britain, and a shift to the Soviet sphere of influence, something that not only ensured a massive flow of modern arms but also brought about close cooperation and coordination with the Egyptian military establishment, particularly the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), culminating in the establishment of the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR). With the entrenchment of the Baath’s pan-Arab ideology in Syrian political and military life, anti-Israel rhetoric and activities increased to the extent that by the early 1960s the Jewish state had become Damascus’s major security concern and bitter foe. Border skirmishes gradually reached a climax that saw Syria and Israel locked in the second full-scale war in two decades. Despite better equipment and training, the SAF failed to achieve any success, however minor. Drawing on a wealth of hitherto untapped archival sources, this dissertation is the first academic attempt to offer an in-depth review of the history and development of the SAF from its inception to the aftermath of the 1967 war. The work’s main insight is that the SAF’s professional decline was a direct outcome of the pervasive political intervention in military affairs, something a modern air arm, as a highly professional and technologically advanced body of people and material, cannot tolerate. As a result, it found itself in the impossible position of being expected to act as the defender of the nation while being deprived of the necessary means to confront Syria’s most formidable military foe.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

It is often asserted that British army casualties in the Great War were carelessly incurred and that this influenced the way Britain fought in the Second World War. Manpower was a prime resource in the mobilisation for total war but its scarcity only fully realised by end of 1917 when the army was cautioned about casualties. The government, however, had feared an early popular reaction against mounting casualties. It did not materialise: the incidence of casualties was diffused over time, and households had no mass media spreading intimate awareness of battlefield conditions. The army itself never mutinied over casualties or refused to fight. The country considered the casualties grievous but not inordinate or unnecessary. Between the wars unemployment and 'consumerism' mattered more to people than memories of the Great War., kept ritually alive by annual Armistice Day services. Welfare benefits increased, more children went to secondary school but social and political change was tardy. Many intellectuals turned pacifist but Nazi Germany made an anti-war-stance difficult. Air raids rather than memories of Great War casualties preoccupied the nation as it armed for war. In the Second World War army casualty lists were not regularly lengthy until the beginning of 1944 and did not have an adverse impact on civilian morale. The manpower shortage became acute earlier, in 1942, and army commanders were alerted to replacement problems. Politically, Churchill desired a strong, victorious British army but lack of men induced caution about casualties, particularly in relation to the invasion of Normandy, involving frontal amphibious attack on the German army. This caution communicated itself to the citizen armies in the field, which showed little natural bent for soldiering. These circumstances governed the way the army fought in the Second World War, not memories of Great War casualties - which were more numerous because of the extent over time and scale of the fighting.