This thesis focuses on the extent to which the physical terrain features across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia affected British operations throughout the campaign in North Africa during the Second World War. The study analyses the terrain from the operational and tactical perspectives and argues that the landscape features heavily influenced British planning and operations. These should now be considered alongside other standard military factors when studying military operations. This thesis differs from previous studies as it considers these additional factors from June 1940 until the Axis surrender in May 1943. Until now it has been widely assumed that much of the North African coastal sector was a broadly flat, open region in which mobile armoured operations were paramount. However this work concentrates on the British operations to show they were driven by the need to capture and hold key features across each battlefield. At the operational level planning was led by the need to hold key ground in Libya and across the province of Cyrenaica during the crucial middle period of the campaign. A secondary theme of the thesis argues that British forces began to improvise some tactical doctrines, with the initial practice of combined arms altering into Infantry and armour fighting separated battles. Other new developments included the practice of unit dispersal to hold key ground and to engage the enemy using temporary units known as Jock columns. The two themes are inter-linked and contribute fresh insights to the debate on British methods of warfare. The methodology has been to consult key primary documents, reports, war diaries and published memoirs, from major archives across the UK and compare these with the campaign historiography to develop the main arguments. These include the National Archives, the Churchill Archives Centre, the Liddell-Hart Centre for Military History, the National Army Museum, John Rylands Centre, Imperial War Museum at London and Duxford and London and the Tank Museum Archives at Bovington. The sources include unit war diaries, after action reports, along with many of the key 3 published and some unpublished memoirs. The analysis of these two themes will show that key terrain features were a significant influence upon all levels of military planning and operations throughout the campaign.

No description available.

This thesis is concerned with British policy in relation to General Edmund Allenby's command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (E.E.F.) from June 1917 to November 1919. This thesis divides into two parts: until October 1918 the Palestine campaign of the E.E.F. is evaluated in terms of its position within wider British war strategy, and in particular it is shown how the campaign did very little to help Britain's efforts to defeat the Central powers during the First World War; with the armistice in October 1918 the focus is on the politfcal and imperial aspects of the battlefield victories by Allenby which resulted in the occupation by the E.E.F. of Palestine and Syria. These non-military concerns come to the fore in the post-war peace settlements, and it is shown how the usefulness of the Palestine campaign extended beyond the war's end to November 1919 when the E.E.F. withdrew from Syria. This thesis reveals that the Palestine campaign needs to be analysed not just for its contribution to the defeat of the Central powers, but that it had a non-military dimension which centred round the need to provide Britain with negotiating strength at the Paris Peace Conference so as to provide for long-term British imperial security. Allenby's operations to October 1918 are, therefore, examined for more than just their military significance, and in this work a complete analysis of the Palestine campaign is undertaken. This thesis shows how too often the existing literature on the Palestine campaign concentrates either on the purely military aspect, or focuses on the formation of the modern Middle East. What is typically left out is the connection between the two. It is shown that the Palestine campaign was Clausewitzian in that operations were used as a means to further political ends, and that these political concerns influenced the conduct of the campaign. Allenby's central role in these matters means that this thesis comments on his role and position, not just as a militaiy commander, but also in relation to the political and imperial aspects outlined above.

No description available.

From 1994, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) undertook a number of cooperative regional military projects with the support of numerous Western countries. In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was an example of efficient Western defence cooperation to generate outcomes in order to achieve military and political goals. BALTBAT became the template for other Baltic programmes: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). This thesis analysed the Baltic programmes, particularly BALTBAT, as a case study for identifying the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. The focus was on the broad political decisions agreed upon by the donor and recipient states, such as the selection of development of peacekeeping capabilities, as the basis for military assistance, which provided the foundation for these initiatives. The value of the Baltic programmes as a case study and basis for identifying the elements of a model was enhanced by the fact that they succeeded at a delicate time in a sensitive region. The Baltic states had virtually no military forces upon regaining independence. Russia objected to Baltic state membership in NATO and was sensitive about a build-up of military capabilities close to Russian borders. In spite of these obstacles, the Baltic projects achieved outcomes which supported the military and political goals of the donor and recipient states. Analysis of the Baltic projects highlighted the importance of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives. It also indicated the major factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) resulting from those decisions which were important to the outcomes from these programmes. These Mechanisms comprise the elements of a model which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.