The modernisation of the Republic of Korea Navy from the election of Kim, Young-sam in 1993 to the sinking of the Cheonan has been remarkable in that it is a microcosm of the security dilemma that the ROK faces; how to deal with the threat from the DPRK while developing a defence capability that is commensurate with a middle power with global interests. This thesis examines said modernisation both through an analysis of the force development program and its driving factors. Its original contribution is in its use of previously unavailable sources and author conducted interviews to demonstrate for the first time that ROKN modernisation in its nature, drivers and hindrances is a synthesis of a multitude of factors both internal and external. While much focus has been on the developing regional capability that the ROKN has pursued, this thesis demonstrates that regional capability is part of a wider force improvement program which encompasses C4ISR, strike and power projection capabilities aimed at meeting all of the threats both current and future that the ROK perceives. What has driven such modernisation is a focal point of the thesis, demonstrating that while the East Asian maritime security environment and the development of the Korean People’s Navy has played an important role, the decision to construct a more powerful navy is ultimately an expression of the ROK’s political and economic development. This thesis concludes however with the caveat that force modernisation is ultimately dependent on political support and incidents such as the sinking of the Cheonan have a large bearing on the nature and extent of naval modernisation.

In the contemporary, globalised world the maritime domain is more important than it has ever been throughout history. As such, maritime strategy - the direction of elements of national power (including naval power, in particular) to secure national interests at sea - remains a vital subject. Just as there are principles of military strategy, so too are there principles of maritime strategy. However, these principles have their roots in the thinking of scholars from as far back as the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Yet the political, strategic and technological environments have changed a lot since those periods, with the current context marked by advancements in information and communications technologies and their associated political and strategic ramifications. This thesis asks how the principles of maritime strategy have evolved as times have changed. In particular, it focuses upon how they deal with 'visibility' - a triad consisting of knowledge, perception and interpretation. These have always been important to navies, yet the principles arguably say little about them. This thesis then ultimately aims to assess whether a new principle, control and/or denial of visibility, can be useful as a means of filling this gap. This thesis therefore contributes to the literature and discussion of maritime strategy not only by assessing traditional concepts, but also by assessing the extent of this gap in their definitions. Furthermore, it will assess whether a new principle is useful in filling this gap. The main finding is that, despite some evolutions in how they are conceived, the traditional principles only account for visibility to a limited extent, making a new principle of control and/or denial of visibility useful.

This study investigates the emergence of Malaysia-India Maritime Security Cooperation (MIMSC) in response to traditional threats and non-traditional security threats at the Eastern Indian Ocean Region (EIOR). This thesis argues that although both Malaysia and India have identified the maritime significance of the EIOR to them, the common threat faced by them in that region, and have recognised the need for cooperation in maritime security, it appears at present that MIMSC in EIOR projects a lack of robustness in its engagement. This is despite both an appreciation of the relations between the two countries, and a substantial ability to address the challenges of the EIOR. The positive relations that are challenged by these maritime threats show that there is a pressing need for both countries to draw up effective maritime policies. But it is as yet unclear why these countries have failed to do so. The paucity of scientific investigation into the question of why the two states have failed to draw up an effective maritime policy cooperation despite their potential to do so, and the lack of availability of substantive arguments, turn this question into a significant field of academic inquiry. In order to address this issue, this thesis will ask three sub-questions, relating to: a) the drivers of MIMSC in EIOR, b) the emerging areas of maritime cooperation in mitigating traditional and non-traditional threats in EIOR, and c) the critical factors that would contribute towards a successful MIMSC in EIOR. It will cover the dynamics of MIMSC from the post-Cold War era in EIOR, and draw more substantial answers to how MIMSC in post-Cold War period is a ‘missed opportunity’ but projects a ‘promising opportunity’ to address issues of maritime security threats in the EIOR. Qualitative research design is employed in this research inquiry. This research has used two primary data collection method: a) in-depth personal interviews and b) focus group interviews. Informants were selected through purposeful sampling, focusing on high-ranked retired and serving officials from the Navy, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maritime security agencies, and think tanks. This research used the NVIVO 10 software program to conduct a Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) to analyse data obtained through interviews. Several emerging areas of maritime collaboration are shaping MIMSC in the EIOR such as: a) partnership in search and rescue operation, b) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, b) increasing interoperability of constabulary role, c) partnership in defence industry, and d) partnership in maritime resources and competence. These areas of maritime collaboration are highly dependent on major critical success factors such as: a) shaping both formal and informal bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation, b) overcoming bureaucracy and statutory bottlenecks, c) shared cost-benefit and d) change in maritime strategic thinking.

Dès 1880, le projecteur photo-électrique contribue à la protection des cuirassés contre les torpilleurs, ouvrant la voie à de multiples applications embarquées. Alors qu’à terre l’électricité se répand sous la forme de réseaux socio-techniques, le processus de l’électrification des navires militaires interfère fortement avec les innovations des armes navales. Après la diffusion de l’éclairage intérieur, nombre de servitudes quittent la motorisation à vapeur pour des dispositifs électromécaniques. Au service de la mission militaire, ces usages sont énergivores et la maîtrise du système technique devient impérative, sa fiabilité étant un enjeu au combat. Vers 1910, la complexité de l’outil fait apparaître un professionnalisme spécifique, indispensable pour que chacun dispose d’une énergie devenue essentielle. Le savoir-faire du marin électricien s’appuie sur des écoles de formation et sur la l’expérience acquise, l’équipage et sa hiérarchie adaptant en autonomie les pratiques à leur environnement. Durant cette période, seule l’US Navy expérimente la propulsion électrique sur un bâtiment de surface et elle n’en généralise pas l’usage. Par ailleurs, les cultures maritimes différentes des flottes facilitent ou entravent la motorisation électrique des tourelles blindées. L’artillerie navale est l’ultime conquête de cette jeune énergie, mais deux freins brident ce système technique électrique: le courant continu limite les performances des génératrices et les asservissements de puissance manquent de modèles conceptuels face aux boucles de rétroaction. En 1930, devenue incontournable à bord, l’énergie électrique y apporte une contribution essentielle aux armes navales. / From 1880, the photoelectric projector contributed to the protection of battleships against torpedo boats, paving the way for multiple on-board applications. As electricity spreads ashore in the form of socio-technical networks, the electrification process of military ships interacts strongly with naval weapon innovations. After the diffusion of interior lighting, many servitudes leave the steam engine for electromechanical devices. In the service of the military mission, these uses are energy consuming and the control of the technical system becomes imperative, its reliability being an issue in combat. Around 1910, the complexity of the tool revealed a specific professionalism, essential for everyone to have access to an energy that had become essential. The electrician's know-how is based on training schools and experience gained, with the crew and their hierarchy independently adapting skills to their environment. During this period, the different maritime cultures of the fleets facilitate or hinder the electric motorization of the armoured turrets. Thus, only the US Navy experiments with electric propulsion and does not generalize its use. Naval artillery is the ultimate conquest of this young energy, but two difficulties hinder this electrical technical system: direct current limits the performance of generators and power servoing lacks conceptual models to deal with feedback loops. In 1930, electrical energy, which had become a must on board, made an essential contribution to naval weapons.

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This thesis explores the connection between seapower, maritime strategy and national policy, and assesses the utility of a potential Maritime Strategy for Britain. Underpinning the analysis, and providing the skein of connecting thought throughout the thesis, is the question: what is the strategic utility of maritime forces? Specifically, the thesis first examines the development of maritime theory and its translation into practice within the context of contemporary British maritime thinking and doctrine. In order to do this, the thesis examines the development of the British maritime school of thought, focusing on its leading figures and core tenets and the extent to which such thinking is reflected in contemporary doctrine. The thesis proceeds to examine, as a case study, the debate on the rationale for, and design, development and procurement of, Britain’s future aircraft carrier capability in order to shed light on British thinking on the role and utility of maritime strategy. The analysis especially considers the debate on the configuration of aircraft carrier to be developed and the commensurate variant of aircraft to be acquired (that is, principally short take-off and vertical landing or catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery). This debate extends beyond a consideration of naval factors and considers wider military and national policy (notably military-industrial) factors. Proceeding from this, the thesis examines potential alternatives to a traditionally conceived aircraft carrier, including missile-armed surface and sub-surface naval forces and land-based aviation. The purpose of this is to shed further light on the utility of aircraft carriers relative to other options and assess their value to British maritime strategy and national policy. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the implications of the aircraft carrier debate for British defence and national policy and examines the rationale for, and implications of a Maritime Strategy for Britain.

Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of the threat or use of force in the pursuit of policy since the dawn of strategic thought, the utility of seapower beyond warfighting is poorly understood and articulated. The classical theorists who have investigated seapower in peacetime have invariably done so through the lens of hard power effects such as coercion and deterrence; commentaries on engagement, interoperability and the use of maritime forces to forge friendships are largely conspicuous by their absence. The central question of this research is how naval diplomacy, a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime actors in pursuit of their national interest, can be better understood for use in the 21st century. This thesis defines diplomacy from the sea and investigates its use before, during and after the Cold War. Existing theoretical frameworks are deduced from the works of leading naval theorists, critically analysed and found wanting. The most widely known model, described in Sir James Cable’s seminal book Gunboat Diplomacy, provides a good benchmark, but even the most recent edition ends its period of analysis in 1991; huge geopolitical changes have since taken place. A qualitative and quantitative review of over 500 incidents from 1991 to 2010 is undertaken and the thesis draws on this empirical evidence to determine that the common understanding of naval diplomacy does not fit with contemporary reality. An alternative foundational model, drawing on basic communication and stakeholder theories, is offered and subsequently tested. The implications of the research can be addressed in three broad and overlapping categories: its contribution to theoretical debate, including its potential to ‘update’ Cable; its meaning for policy makers in their consideration of national and international security; and, finally, its utility for practitioners, including state, semi-state and non-state actors.

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No description available.

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