Since the early 1990s British Islamists have been fighting, killing and dying in a succession of conflicts across the world, beginning with the Bosnian civil war of 1992-95. A decade later this violence reached the United Kingdom, with a series of deadly attacks on the London transport system in July 2005, the first suicide bombings in Western Europe. This thesis provides a historiography of the involvement of Britons in global and domestic jihadist struggles at home and abroad across three decades. It catalogues and records their actions, and bring into a central document the names and affiliations of both British Islamist combatants, and those from jihadist organisations who have settled in this country. The ever increasing number of Britons travelling to the Islamic State does not come as a surprise when the scale of past involvement in such causes is considered. This thesis deconstructs the religious objectives is intrinsic to these trends, and emphasises that in British Jihadism it is the goal, as much as the message, which is religious. The reluctance of British Muslim representative organisations to address early examples of these developments, the ‘denial’ – is analysed herein. The development of a religious terrorism which often targets women and minority groups may have been expected to face critical examination from academics, in particular from within the critical terrorism studies school. Regrettably such rigour is found to be lacking. Indeed it is within the academy that some the most sustained attempts to deny any religious influences behind contemporary terrorism have been found. Detailed feminist critiques of Islamist practice are deployed to advocate a new approach – one that leads to a critical terrorist studies which critiques not just government responses to terrorism, but terrorist actors also.

This research explores the factors, dynamics and circumstances that explain how and why terrorist organisations decide to integrate into political systems. The research proposes that such integration is a result of decisions and actions taken by a terrorist organisation, the state that deals with it and the surrounding international system. The research propositions are tested against three cases of terrorist organisations that successfully integrated into political systems: the Irgun, the Ulster Volunteer Force and Hizballah. The findings determine that the presence of certain factors, whether on the organisational, domestic or international levels – and preferably all at the same time – provide the necessary conditions for a successful integration to occur. The research concludes that the most dominant parameters that create the necessary conditions for terrorists' political integration are: (a) fluctuation in the level of public support for the terrorist organisation's strategy and tactics, (b) internal split in the ranks of a terrorist organisation if one faction becomes more moderate than the other, (c) the mix of aggressive and accommodating counter-terrorism policies employed by the state, and (d) the level and impact of international involvement in the conflict. In situations where these parameters are present and have a tangible influence on a terrorist organisation's decisions, behaviour and actions, the process of integration into a political system by the terrorist organisation is not only more likely, but also faster and more efficient. Ultimately, the research offers a theoretical model that could potentially provide a set of guidelines for decision-makers on how to instigate, encourage or enhance a transformation process within terrorist organisations, from militant strategy and extremist doctrine toward acceptance of political strategy and democratic principle-based ideology as the sole means to achieve their objectives.

High-impact, low-probability events such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attacks have the potential to cause serious disruption to national infrastructure organisations in the UK. Although research examining the willingness and ability of healthcare workers to report to work during an extreme event has been conducted, little is known about levels of willingness and ability for employees of other sectors of national infrastructure. This thesis presents much needed evidence regarding the likely concerns, behavioural responses and information needs of employees of national infrastructure organisations in the UK during extreme events, with a focus on CBRN terrorist attacks. An interview study revealed that many resilience professionals assumed their staff would be willing to report to work during extreme events and had not placed sufficient emphasis on facilitating staff willingness to return to work during a crisis. An employee web survey revealed that in the case of some CBRN scenarios, less than a quarter of staff reported they would be willing to go to work. A series of employee focus groups revealed that staff will face a variety of barriers during a CBRN incident and will expect a great deal from their employer, including medical interventions and accurate, scientific information. At present, it appears likely that national infrastructure organisations’ plans will not meet the expectations of their staff and will fail to address their numerous practical, psychological and communication needs in the event of a CBRN terrorist attack. This research has drawn on theories of risk perception and risk communication, alongside theoretical frameworks from health psychology and social psychology, to understand likely employee responses to extreme events. A series of recommendations are suggested for UK national infrastructure organisations’ business continuity plans and activities, including strategies that could be used to motivate and support staff in their return to work during an extreme event.

Since the U.K. Government reviewed its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011 to include "all forms of extremism" with an emphasis on right wing extremism, there has been no empirical research undertaken to explore the impact of this decision on local responses to the phenomenon. Furthermore, the international literature on responses to right wing extremism has thus far focussed on its various political manifestations, particularly in relation to both right wing extremist and populist political parties and the ideology that underpins them. From a U.K. perspective, the emphasis over the last thirty years has been very much on attempting to understand the causal factors underpinning the extreme right wing, the composition of these groups and how they compare with similar groups throughout Europe. It is striking that there is very little material available which provides a platform for debate as to how the state should actually respond to movements such as the English Defence League who do not seek legitimacy through the ballot box. As a movement at the zenith of its power and influence in 2011 the English Defence League mobilised thousands of people through its street protests, and although its ability to galvanise large numbers of people to turn out to protest has waned, the sentiment from which it gained its legitimacy has not. As the first study of this subject matter, through data yielded from 80 qualitative interviews based on unique access to frontline practitioners in the three case study areas of Luton, Newcastle and Waltham Forest boroughs, conducted by a serving counter terrorism police officer specialising in the Prevent Strategy, it will explore the ways in which this shift in the strategy played out at a local level among statutory actors interpreting and implementing it against the backdrop of central government imposed austerity measures. The major conclusions of this research are that; (1) the impact of the decision to explicitly include right wing extremism within the Prevent Strategy has been minimal. With the exception of the Channel intervention programme, there are for instance no specific counter narratives that have been created as a response to the expansion of the policy to include "all forms of extremism". Instead, this has led to a generalised approach to countering extremism without a clear understanding of right wing extremism as a distinct phenomenon, (2). The EDL is understood by local actors as a threat to the public order and community cohesion, but not as a terrorism threat. Notwithstanding this position, the case studies highlight the continued role of counter terrorism Prevent Officers in the pre, during and post phases of EDL attendance in maintaining community cohesion and providing reassurance with reference in particular to Muslim communities, and (3). Right wing extremism is poorly understood and articulated at a national policy level. There is a lack of synergy on this issue between the integration, cohesion, hate crime, Prevent and extremism policy areas, the interpretation of which at a local level has led to inter-agency tensions that have been further negatively impacted by Government imposed austerity measures on public sector resourcing since 2010.

This PhD thesis develops a complex, multi-layered conceptual framework and analytical strategy for approaching ‘clandestine political violence’ (della Porta 2013) from a thoroughly communicative perspective. More precisely, the thesis sets out to conceptualise how revolutionary identities are (re)produced in radical ‘discourse communities’ (Apter 1997b) by interpreting socio-political realities, constructing counter-memories, and establishing a semantics of ‘armed struggle’ to legitimise the use of violent means in nonrevolutionary situations and pacified, democratic societies. Its theoretical framework builds on Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory (Luhmann 1995a, 1998, 2002a; Luhmann and Hellmann 1996) as well as on seminal work in social movement studies (Bosi and della Porta 2012; Caiani et al. 2012; della Porta 1995; Zwerman et al. 2000), social semiotics and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995c; Fairclough et al. 2011; Halliday 1978b, 1985; Wodak 1989, 1996; Wodak and Meyer 2009). The project’s empirical chapters comparatively analyse the writings of two left-wing armed formations in late 20th century Germany and the ways in which these were perceived in the contemporary radical counter-public. Case studies are the ‘2nd of June Movement’ and the ‘Revolutionary Cells’, two German groups ‘in the shadow of the RAF’ (Kraushaar 2006b). A range of leaflets, brochures and selfidentified radical periodicals provide the source material for mapping out the counter-public. Common sense in terrorism studies literature often has it that texts produced by terrorist groups are jargon-ridden, semantically one-dimensional, and purely rhetorical pieces of inwards-directed ideological justification, more auto-propaganda than actual political communication (Cordes 1987a; della Porta 1995; Rapoport 1988). In contrast, the conceptual framework of this thesis argues that meanings, identities, and interpretations of socio-political realities are negotiated in more complex ways within the writings of armed formations. In different ways and to different degrees, even the closed, small-scale social systems of clandestine groups enter into (indirect) conversations with their wider social environment.

This research is intended to critically analyse the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) strategic role as a regional institution in addressing the transnational threat of terrorism. By examining ASEAN's history, development and security initiatives, this thesis argues that ASEAN, as it aspires to be a security community, has the necessary experience and potential in managing regional security challenges, particularly in combating terrorism. In considering ASEAN's role and potential as an emerging security community, it is predicted that ASEAN's future security challenges, especially the ongoing threat of terrorism, are to have serious implications on humans as well as States. Thus, the adoption of an ASEAN Counter Terrorism Convention 2007, although a move in the right direction, is far from sufficient. ASEAN requires multifaceted approaches that could complement its current and future multilateral initiatives. An ASEAN counter terrorism strategy should then be founded on a more holistic, security conscious approach based on the concepts of human security, enhanced multilateral cooperation and the rule of law. The realisation of such a strategy ho~ever, requires effective counter terrorism' cooperation, greater institutionalisation of ASEAN and its security initiatives, and the rethinking of its strong adherence to its established norms and the ASEAN 'Way'. Only a developed and sophisticated ASEAN could deliver a more secure Southeast Asia.

The prospect of nuclear terrorism, terrorist acts with nuclear fission explosives, is analysed by means of rational choice theory, a methodology borrowed from economics which has hitherto not been systematically applied to nuclear terrorism. The methodology allows the formalisation and modelling of key choices faced by both the aspiring nuclear terrorist and a potential target government in order to work out best strategies under the assumptions that the players are rational and intelligent. Four relevant decision situations are studied: The terrorist's choice of whether to embark on an ambitious and expensive nuclear project or to stay with tried and trusted conventional methods; The choice of fissile material for a terrorist bent on building a nuclear weapon: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium as fissile material; The government's choice of prioritising between branches of fissile materials safeguards (HEU versus plutonium); and the strategic interplay between terrorist and government in the case where the terrorist has acquired a nuclear weapon and must decide whether to use it to attack, for extortion (blackmail) or to deter an attack upon his own interests. Several key conclusions reached are of direct policy applicability. A simple decision theoretical analysis shows that heavy emphasis on HEU over plutonium in safeguards measures is justified. It is demonstrated that relative deterrence (by denial) of nuclear terrorism in favour of conventional means is possible, and the conditions for which are found. It is found, moreover, that to use an acquired nuclear weapon for blackmail or deterrence purposes is almost never preferable for a terrorist, and the best response of a government to an explicit nuclear terrorist threat is almost always forceful response.

The study examines the reasons which prevent agreement being reached on a definition of acts of international terrorism. The conundrum of the terrorist phenomenon raises a series of questions, not least the perceived need to define the crime comprehensively, rather than in a piecemeal, reactive fashion. The research focuses fust on the origins and growth of international terrorism, with the aim of locating the present impasse within its historical context and identifying the roots from which it developed. A study of the changing crime patterns follows, examining firstly, changes in the criminal intent over time as revealed by specific attacks and secondly, the adaptability and versatility of terrorists in altering their modus operandi to circumvent measures aimed at suppressing their activities. The profiles of some terrorist leaders past and present are then scrutinised, with the aim of identifying any significant changes in their abilities and backgrounds. Unique features of the newly established International Criminal Court are studied, absent its jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism. The viability of mounting prosecutions for acts of terrorism under the auspices of any of the crimes over which the new Court does have jurisdiction are also explored. An analysis of possible options for making progress in the light of the results of the research work follows, with the incomplete draft comprehensive convention on terrorism being the subject of a detailed examination in this context. The study concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of current and potential legislative initiatives aimed at addressing the increasing threat to world peace posed by terrorism.

US President Barack Obama promised to undo the Global War on Terror (GWOT). To do this, he used a series of discursive manoeuvres that positioned him as the marker of 'change' in opposition to the 'Bush era' politics of exceptionalism, fear and unilateralism. How then does the Obama administration disarticulate the discourse of the GWOT? This thesis provides a comprehensive appraisal of the structuring conditions and constraints of the GWOT and then explores Obama's de-militarising, re-legalising and hubris-deconstructing discourse of 'change'. I use discourse theory and feminist International Relations to assess continuity and change in the international politics of US national security. My assessment is based on close analysis of texts and images used by a variety of actors within the Obama administration who communicated a 'changed' US counterterrorism project. This 'change' was articulated through: the invocation of a 'return to the rule of law' after the Bush-era legal excesses'; the 'culture of preparedness' against the previous 'politics of fear'; and the new era of engagement' against the old administration's explicit rejection of international law and politics. This analysis reveals that Obama's discourse of , change' did not constitute a counter-hegemonic project counterposed to the 'Bush era' GWOT. Instead, Obama reproduced militarising tropes for ensuring 'security' that reaffirm the heteromasculine, racialised and exceptionalist workings of the US nation-state as. militarised protector and hegemon. The Obama administration's discursive manoeuvres show how the figurative properties of discourse, as specified in this thesis, perform a hegemonic US national 'security'.

For two decades, there has been a high-profile debate on the issue of cyberterrorism. Politicians, law enforcement agents, the information security industry, other experts and the press have all made claims about the threats to and vulnerabilities in our society, who is responsible and what should be done. This is a UK study in the field of Information Systems based on interpretative philosophical assumptions. The framework for the study is provided by the concept of moral panic, propounded by Cohen (2002) and elaborated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) and Critcher (2003). Moral panic is used widely in the reference discipline of Sociology as a tool for investigating the social construction of social problems in cases where there is heightened public concern and intense media interest, closely followed by changes in legislation and social control mechanisms. This study employs moral panic as an heuristic device to assist in the investigation of the social mechanisms at work in the social construction of cyberterrorism. The corpus of data for analysis comprised articles from the UK national press relevant to cyberterrorism. A grounded theory approach was used to analyse these articles in order to identify images, orientations, stereotypes and symbolisation and to examine representational trends over time. Reflexivity in such a task is of the utmost importance, and the analytic process leading to an explanation of the social processes at work was deliberately divorced from the moral panic framework in order to guarantee rigour in the findings. The findings set out an explanation of how the concept of cyberterrorism has been constructed over two decades and compares this explanation with a framework provided by a model of moral panic. These findings are then linked to wider issues about national security, civil liberties and state control of information and communication technologies.