This research is an anti-racist, feminist challenge to the representation of terrorism and counter-terrorism which aims to disrupt the creation of insecurity stories that have led to an increase in anti-Muslim racisms, reified traditional gender roles and enabled particular ‘counter-terrorist’ violences. This thesis builds on the growing work that takes the role of popular culture seriously in Security Studies. It draws on a new set of data that includes a systematic analysis of the television show Homeland and focus groups with Homeland viewers in Britain. It shows how gendered and racialised terrorism stories in Homeland shape our understanding of what terrorism is. This thesis traces the connections between identities and texts, representation and understanding, politics and culture. This thesis explores how this terrorism story rearticulates gendered and racialised logics of counter-terrorism, but it also pays critical attention to where these discourses are exceeded or resisted to draw out the deconstructive potential within these new characterisations and stories. This thesis is concerned with how audiences make meaning for security as they consume popular culture. It brings in approaches from Television Studies to Security Studies in order to theorise the process of meaning creation for audiences of television. This synthesis enables an original contribution to the way terrorism on television is studied and understood.

This thesis explores the strategies of detention, control and removal that are pursued by the state when the prosecution, surveillance or release of a terrorist suspect are not viable options. The inquiry examines executive practices that have emerged in the legal system of England and Wales, and draws on the experiences of the United States of America in order to identify issues of relevance and concern. Analysis is conducted of the interwoven nexus of constitutional mechanisms that supervise and limit executive action. In accordance with principles of constitutionalism, four constitutional benchmarks are examined. It is suggested that counter-terrorism laws must be sufficiently certain in their scope and application; there should be the provision of both effective legislative and judicial oversight mechanisms; and the human rights doctrine of proportionality is required in order to ensure that the appropriate balance is struck in the dynamic between personal liberty and national security. These benchmarks are applied across the strategies of terrorist detention, control and removal. The investigation makes three overarching and original recommendations. Legislative codification is suggested across a number of areas. It is argued that enhanced legislative oversight mechanisms, in both emergency and non-emergency contexts, should be sought. In addition, ways to enhance the utility of the judicial oversight mechanism should be contemplated. A confluence of these mechanisms is required in order to achieve 'constitutional optimization'. Adherence to these principles will ensure that a terrorism emergency is subject to strict temporal limits and that exceptional terrorism-related powers do not perpetuate.

This study is concerned with how ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is countered within liberal democracies and what impact government responses have on how a conflict involving the use of terrorism is transformed from one of violence to constitutional political activity. Specifically, we are concerned with the balance between coercive and conciliatory responses. A moderate terrorism studies approach is used, which focuses on root causes of terrorism and places them in a historical context ranging from the historical precedents of a terrorist campaign to when a group reaches a permanent and verifiable ceasefire. The study combines theories from within terrorism studies and conflict studies to develop a theoretical framework, in which the relational conflict triangle model of situation-attitudes-behaviour is informed by academic knowledge on terrorism. In order to put the study into context preliminary matters are addressed as to what ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is and the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy. The following chapters introduce conflict studies, terrorism studies, and develop the theoretical framework, noting the convergence of interests between the two disciplines. The framework is then tested by comparing three protracted cases of ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism in the Basque Country, Corsica and Northern Ireland. The analysis centres on the terrorist groups involved and how they come to emerge and, in many cases, reach the decision to abandon violence. The analysis is historical and takes into account the situation, attitudes and behaviour of the protagonists involved, noting the proneness of terrorist organisations towards volatile division. The conclusion drawn is that a combination of coercion, conciliation and reform led to the eventual ending of terrorist campaigns in the three cases but conciliation and reform were dependent on the use of coercive measures targeted directly at the groups involved. The reasons for splinter groups continuing violence are also discussed.

The Intelligence process has increasingly found itself in the public eye in modern times. The Al Qa’eda attacks against the USA in September 2001 led to a rapid spread of other international terrorist attacks. The invasion of Afghanistan occurred soon afterwards, followed by the invasion of Iraq in 2003. All of this resulted in the Intelligence community and their processes being pushed into the spotlight of the global media. Central to all Intelligence work is the Intelligence cycle, in whatever form it might take. This thesis investigates the effectiveness of the UK’s 6-stage Intelligence cycle in counter-terrorism work. Definitions of two key terms, Intelligence and terrorism are dissected at length, and the merits and shortcomings are outlined. Accusations of Intelligence failure have been levelled at both the UK government and at the country’s law enforcement, Intelligence and security agencies. Intelligence gaps and Intelligence failures will be described, and the differences between these key terms highlighted. All counter-terrorism work in the UK takes place within the environment of the government’s counter-terror strategy called CONTEST. The six pillars of the strategy are explained, and examples are used to show where Intelligence fits into it. Two UK-based case studies (Operation CREVICE and Operation RHYME) are used to highlight how Intelligence is used to protect the public from terrorist attacks. A thorough examination of the Intelligence cycle is conducted and some of the common difficulties and challenges encountered in the cycle are presented. It shows what can, and sometimes does, go wrong in the Intelligence cycle, and why this happens. Various models of the Intelligence cycle are compared and their intrinsic components discussed. The thesis benefits from a unique collection of personal insights from a number of serving and retired Intelligence specialist, all with personal experience of working in counter-terrorism. This adds valuable material to the considerations of the strengths and weaknesses of the model. The conclusion provides some recommendations for the enhancement and strengthening of the Intelligence cycle, resulting in a more robust and applicable model for the UK’s counter-terrorism work.

This thesis focuses on the main factors leading to terrorism, the connections between terrorism and civil wars and how terrorism and civil war can affect each other. For the theoretical clarity, I decided to deal only with ethnically motivated domestic terrorism since I argue that ethnic component as well as domestic focus significantly affect mobilization and targeting strategy. For the purpose of the PhD research, the Database Ethnically Motivated Terrorist Attacks (DEMTA) is built using the Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), information from the Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPs) and other sources. The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnically motivated terrorism and a newly built database providing information on terrorist attacks committed on behalf of ethnic groups. The chapter connects theories on causes of terrorism and ethnic violence to build a complex theory on causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism which is empirically tested. The second chapter explores the relationship between terrorism and civil war. Studies on terrorism show that intensity of terrorist incidents varies over time. A closer look on data on ethnically motivated terrorism shows that frequency of terrorist incidents is higher in post-war period than in pre-war periods. I explain the increase in the number of terrorist attacks by radicalization of the ordinary people which is caused by exposure to a systematic violence. The third chapter adds the concept of the lethality of terrorism to the classic explanation of motivation and capabilities as the main factors affecting the likelihood of of civil war. Motivation and capability are not enough to explain the occurrence of civil war as while they might address the potential for action they do not address the resolve to use this potential. The main findings of this thesis show that political exclusion leads to mobilization often resulting to civil war which radicalizes people. Subsequently, radicalized people are more prone to the use of violence, including terrorism. Lethal terrorism further mobilizes people and increases likelihood of civil war.

This thesis is a study of radicalisation within the context of the UK. The research focuses on how people become radicalised, why some are rendered susceptible to radicalisation, and why some go on to commit acts of violence and terrorism. This thesis also critically assesses how radicalisation affects relevant counter-terrorism policy and how this policy affects radicalisation. The research has been informed through the analysis of empirical data in the form of 61 qualitative semi-structured interviews. A number of these interviews were completed with respondents across government and academia. However, there was a specific focus on conducting interviews with the data set termed as the ‘informed informants’. This group consisted of grassroots workers conducting organic de-radicalisation strategies, religious leaders and imams, and former non-violent and violent extremists. The interviews were supported by fieldwork based observations.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States widely known as 9/11 undeniably produced a profound impact on a multitude sectors across the globe. The events became a turning point in the treatment of maritime security establishing a “before” and after” dividing line. One element that emerged in response to that attack was the change of attitude to security. This change, led to changes in behaviour and practices since it prompted a raft of measures, rules, and regulations to prevent such occurrences in the future. This thesis examines how security in the maritime sphere in respect of ports was given a new impetus by virtue of their inherent weaknesses as a potential target. In the past, port security was primarily focused on cargo theft and pilferage as well as denying access to those seeking to enter the country to improve their political or economic condition or to engage in smuggling activities. While the international regulation of shipping had increased substantially through the efforts of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the second half of the 20th century, ports had remained largely unaffected by this regulation. However, the 9/11 changed this situation. As the main focus turned towards dual objectives: to secure ports from any kinds of unlawful acts and concurrently fulfil the international security requirements, implementing and complying with a host of security regimes imposed by a range of parties was seen by some commentators as a particular challenge for the developing nations, due to higher costs and the implications for port policy and administration. This study examines this generalisation using the Port Klang and Malaysian port system as a case study. It analyses security measures and management before and after 9/11, considering the impact not only of international regulations, especially the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, but also of bi-lateral security measures required by the United States as a trading partner and regional organisations. Its findings are based on in-depth interviews conducted with the key Malaysian governmental and private stakeholders, supplemented by other primary and secondary sources. The study concludes that, partly as a result of previous colonial and post-colonial anti-terrorist measures, Malaysia generally had a well managed port security system prior to 9/11. This meant that though some minor internal and external problems were identified, Malaysia managed to handle effectively the post 9/11 port security regimes with minimal cost implications. Any presumption that, as a developing country, it would have problems with implementation proved to be unfounded.

The subject of this study is that of bomb threat risk communication; a ‘sensitive’ topic because of its association with counter-terrorism policy. It is also a subject that has not generated extensive empirical research but is, nevertheless, affected by strongly-held and competing worldviews. The majority of bomb threats are identified, ultimately, as the work of ‘cranks’, ‘pranksters’ or ‘jokers’ (FBI, 2012; CPNI, 2010) but a smaller number have resulted in the adverse event that was threatened - although not always within the temporal or spatial parameters specified by the threat actor (MI5, 2005: 30). Risk management advice intended to inform a decision-making process is located in the collective views of subject matter experts and within this ‘orthodoxy’ the dominant view is that, under conditions of uncertainty, when “vital binary decisions need to be made” (Blackett Review, 2011), the ‘safest’ option is to assume the validity of the terrorist threat. Available evidence suggests that this position is disproportionate and risk averse; specifically, that the assessment of risk fails to take sufficient account of deliberate deception on the part of the threat actor or potential misinterpretation of the message communicated. Research presented here considers the extent to which the literature on the subject supports the orthodoxy. It identifies the risk management response as one founded on a principle of precaution and which has become symptomatic of a “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) - where some elements are addressed in great detail whilst others, integral to risk management decision-making, are circumvented or excluded. This research addresses the absence of published data concerning bomb threats as a tactic of terrorists and expands upon the findings of the very small number of studies concerned exclusively with ‘hoaxing’. It analyses a unique dataset collected by the author comprising of a total sample of 7595 threat events directed at Britain’s railway network and spanning almost a quarter of a century; and uses qualitative data from secondary sources to contextualise the incidents (hoax and real) located. The study also analyses a second sample drawn from 328 ‘newsworthy’ incidents: all of which were hoaxes. By considering hoax and valid threat events within the same study, the findings raise a substantial challenge to the tenets of the bomb threat orthodoxy; particularly the worldview within which to “brave the bomb threat” (HSE, 1992: 27) is characterised as a risk ‘not worth taking’.

This thesis presents an empirical analysis of a unique data set of 427 men and women who have been charged with criminal offences as a result of suspected involvement in dissident republican activity in Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2014. The charges result from involvement in the four main dissident groups currently active in armed struggle in Ireland namely Continuity IRA (CIRA), Real IRA (RIRA), Oglaigh Na h’Eireann (ONH) and most recently the New IRA (NIRA). Both official Government publications and open source dissident news material was used to create a violent dissident republican personnel database. This database was then used to compare the dissidents with the Old IRA of the Irish Revolution between the years 1916-1923. This study is primarily comparing and contrasting the IRA and how it has changed in 100 years. Conclusions are made on gender and religion, age and marriage and status and class. It contains policy implications for both practitioners and academics on how to counter the contemporary violence of dissidents in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

In 2013, Lee Rigby was murdered in Woolwich. In retaliation, there were several attacks on the Muslim community. Both series of events fall under the Terrorism Act 2000 legal definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, only Rigby's murder was treated as an act of terror by the government. This begs the question, as terrorism is defined in a broad and neutral way legally, what explains the selective use of the label of terrorism by the UK government? Answering this question begins by looking at terrorism from the perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies, approaching the label of terrorism as an act of securitization. As such, the thesis goes beyond the legal definition of terrorism, seeking to unearth the official policy narrative of terrorism on the UK. In order to do this, it analyses the three versions of Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, the government’s official terrorism policy papers. The analysis reveals an official policy narrative of terrorism which securitizes Islam, Muslims and Muslim identity, by constructing a causal story that places ideology and identity at the heart of the explanation for terrorism. Moreover, the concern with identity gives the narrative a strong nationalist characteristic. This is further deconstructed using the boundary-security nexus. The boundarysecurity nexus incorporates boundary and nationalism theory into securitization, which better helps to understand and explain how discursive constructions of security and identity work in a dialectic relationship. Once the nexus is introduced, it becomes clear how the selective use of the terrorism label by the government may not just further securitize Islam and the Muslim Community, but also act as a way of protecting and reinforcing the bounded community of the nation state.