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In the last few years intermodal competition in the information and communication technologies industry has been driven by a technological phenomenon known as convergence: the provision of an increasing number of services through an increasing number of transmission/distribution platforms. Convergence is a complex phenomenon and its economic implications are vast. Nevertheless, the number of analytical studies discussing convergence has been alarmingly scarce. This thesis intends to fill this gap by providing a first step towards a more analytical treatment of this phenomenon. Regarding the dynamics of market dominance that emerges from the competition between converging technologies the analysis shows that processes of self-preserving dominance and dominance switching can be identified depending on the relative structure of efficiencies that prevail across platforms; It is also shown that convergence might not imply cross-industry entry and, more interestingly, that an underdog technology might have incentives to deliberately preserve its technological gap with respect to a dominant technology. In the area. of the regulatory challenges posed by the process of convergence, the analysis unravels the existence of a set of cross-industry effects that cause the implementation of welfareenhancing regulation in one industry to have a negative impact on a neighbouring industry, an instance of a cross-industry transmission mechanism. In turn, this transmission mechanism creates incentives for cross-industry regulatory replication in asymmetrically regulated industries, an action that is not always optimal from a welfare point of view. The thesis concludes with a welfare analysis of implementing 'network neutrality' policies. The analysis suggests that the welfare consequences of noneutrality provisions depend critically on the nature of the regulatory regime prevailing in the industry before no-neutrality provisions are implemented.