Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2003. / Thesis directed by Teresa Ghilarducci for the Department of Economics. "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-139).

Thesis advisor: Jonathan Reuter / This dissertation is comprised of three essays that focus on the role of overseeing entities in retirement plans. In the first essay, I study the role of trustee and non-trustee service providers as well as the composition of a firm's board of directors in overseeing 401(k) plans. I ask whether differences in the number and type of these 401(k) plan overseeing entities can explain differences in 401(k) plan performance and structural characteristics. Using a proprietary dataset of 401(k) plans, I find that having more trustee and non-trustee service providers results in better menu performance. However, these findings are not robust when benchmark adjusting performance. Second, I find that having more non-trustee service providers leads to less menu diversification and higher fund level expenses, but lower total plan expense. Last, having more trustee service providers and a greater percentage of insiders on a firm's board of directors results in a more generous company match. My results suggest that 401(k) plans are significantly impacted by oversight decisions, and that improving oversight quality may be a more effective way to mitigate 401(k) plan losses than focusing on increasing financial literacy of plan participants. In the second essay, I examine the nature of compensation for 401(k) plan consultants and ask whether variations in the form of compensation explain variations in 401(k) plan costs and menu performance. Using a proprietary dataset of 401(k) plans, I find that 401(k) plans which hire a consultant experience lower fund level fees and higher after-fee returns if the consultant does not participate in revenue sharing arrangements. In exchange for their services to improve plans, consultants without revenue sharing arrangements charge higher fees to offset their revenue losses from not having opaque arrangements. This results in higher administrative expenses for plans. The net effect is a 9.6 basis point annual gain for the average plan participant or a 24.7 basis point annual gain for a plan participant invested in the default menu choice, assuming that employees pay the higher administrative expense. My findings are robust to a narrower definition of a consultant, additional controls for investment expertise, retirement expertise and bargaining power, falsification tests, and propensity score matching. Overall, my findings suggest that 401(k) plan menu design may be improved through the use of a consultant if the consultant does not suffer from conflicts of interest. In the third essay, I empirically test whether governance mitigates underfunding in US public pension plans. Traditional governance proxies in public sector defined benefit plans focus on plan board of directors. However, plan responsibilities extend beyond the board and are addressed by state or plan policies and by other entities involved in pension oversight. Using unique governance survey data for US public pension plans, I measure governance in an agency theory framework and in a theoretical best practices framework. In the first framework, governance proxies include state and plan policies while in the second, governance proxies include the distribution of oversight responsibilities. I find that the most important governance policies are those that encourage sponsor commitment to paying required annual contributions. I also find that theoretical best practices do not mitigate plan underfunding. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

The nature of employee retirement plans has changed dramatically over the past fifteen years as employers have been replacing traditional defined benefit retirement plans with defined contribution plans like the 401(k) plan. This dissertation is focused on the impact that 401(k) plan have on household asset accumulation. The first essay looks at how much asset accumulation can be attributed to 401(k) plans as opposed to other factors such as demographics and saver type characteristics. Overall, the conclusions are consistent with recent research that says these plans induce a reshuffling of assets rather than being funded through a reduction in consumption. Controlling for cohort effects reduces the amount of wealth attributable to 401(k) eligibility to a negligible (and statistically insignificant) amount. The second essay considers the impact that borrowing against the assets in 401(k) plan might have on household asset accumulation. Most personal finance advice warns against borrowing against a retirement plan because of the potential negative impact on retirement wealth. This is especially true for borrowers who are also undisciplined savers and do not or cannot maintain their retirement plan contributions during loan period or who separate from their employers before the loan is repaid. For good savers a retirement plan loan only has a modest impact on retirement wealth. Only modest make-up contributions would need to be made to mitigate the impact of a retirement plan loan. It seems that many borrowers may be using retirement loans because they are in financial difficulty. It also appears that borrowers are trying to maintain their retirement savings, but their asset accumulation within broader measures of wealth is below that of households that do not have outstanding 401(k) loans.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Target-Date Funds (TDFs) facilitate retirement planning by varying asset allocation over time with the goal of reducing portfolio risk. We explore potential agency problems in TDFs by examining their return performance and flow-performance relation. We find that TDFs under-perform balanced funds (BFs) which are also approved as a default option along with TDFs in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment. We show that the under-performance is driven by TDFs that have a fund-of-fund structure and constituent funds with high expense ratios or poor performance within the fund family. Additionally, we discover an absence of flow-performance relation in TDFs while BFs exhibit the convex flow-performance relation shown for mutual funds. Our evidence suggests the presence of agency problems in TDFs arising from investor inertia, weak incentives for fund managers to outperform peers, and opportunities for fund families to gain private benefits.