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This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

An account of the nature of courage and how it figures in management decisions is developed on the basis of classical and contemporary literature in philosophy and management. The account contains seven elements, including obstacles and tools and a requirement for acting for good. The account is subject to a reality check using content analysis of articles in the business press in Australia, United Kingdom, United States and Hong Kong.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.