This thesis deals with the knowledge testing of the natural history at pupils in 9th classes of primary and lower secondary schools by means of the didactic test which was created by students of Masaryk´s University in Brno (Kokošínská, Slavíčková) in 2009. Output knowledge of natural history was tested with 302 students (156 boys and 146 girls) in South Bohemia region (České Budějovice, Tábor, Soběslav). The comparison of the knowledge of the natural history was carried out at primary school leavers a graduates of lower secondary school cycle. The respondents from secondary school showed better knowledge than pupils of the natural history of the 9th classes of the primary school. The pupils achieve the highest knowledge in the field of human biology, the lowest one in the field of inanimate nature. The results of the thesis were compared with the results of the survey in primary and lower secondary schools in Brno (2009) and Central Bohemia Region (2009, 2011). The results were in all tested regions comparable and a statistically significant difference was not proved.

Thesis advisor: Richard J. Clifford / The translation of הֶבֶל (hebel) with vanitas has had a profound influence in the history of exegesis of the book of Qoheleth often characterized as the most pessimistic, skeptical, and nihilistic book in the Hebrew Bible, having as author a despondent man. This dissertation provides a corrective to the “vanity”, “meaningless”, “absurd” or negative reading of הֶבֶל in Qoheleth, by arguing that הֶבֶל has a positive value, as it expresses not the absurdity or the meaningless of life, but its fleetingness/transitoriness/brevity, whose meaning is disclosed in the opening and closing poems (1:2-11 and 12:1-8). This dissertation thus argues that the הֲבֵל הֲבָלִים הַכֹּל הָבֶל which introduces and concludes the book of Qoheleth (1:2; 12:8) is an appeal to contemplate the order, the beauty of the cosmos, through the regularity, recurrence, and cyclicality of natural phenomena. It also calls attention to the fleetingness of human experience in the world, which Qoheleth highlights in the opening and closing poems but also by the use of transient markers: יְמֵי־חַיֵּי הֶבְלוֹ ,(7:15) בִּימֵי הֶבְלִי ,(9:9), כָּל־יְמֵי חַיֵּי הֶבְלֶךָ ,(11:8) יְמֵי הַחֹשֶׁךְ (11:8) יְמֵי בְּחוּרוֹת (11:10) הַיַּלְדוּת וְהַשַּׁחֲרוּת הָבֶל (6:12), as well as אַחֲרָיו ,צֵּל and מִסְפַּר. The shortness of life and the limited duration of human achievements do not empty human life of its true meaning and value. Rather, they tell of the very nature of humans and their actions. The hebelness is from God who made things as fleeting, temporary, transient compared to his own eternity. By using the term הֶבֶל, and by introducing and concluding his book with “nature” poems, Qoheleth reminds the readers of their transience in this world with its pressing and tragic problems, as well as comforting them with the fact that evil itself is temporary in its impacts on life. They will pass away. Hence, Qoheleth’s opening and closing statement: הֲבֵל הֲבָלִים הַכֹּל הָבֶל (1:2; 12:8). / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

This thesis deals with teaching about inanimate nature of the local region. The main theme of the thesis is to create own suggestions for project teaching on the 2nd grade of elementary school using the example of inanimate nature of Novohradské mountains. The project includes various activities focused on teaching about inanimate nature. The theoretical part deals with basic principles of interdisciplinary relations, project-based teaching and field exercise. It also includes an assessment of the significance of the interdisciplinary relitonships of the topic inanimate nature within the FEP. One of these chapters is devoted to the physical-geographic characteristics of the Novohradské mountains. The practical part is the final suggestion of the project.

This thesis comprehensively analyse the issue of legal protection of inanimate nature. The thesis analyses the legal protection of inanimate nature only by Czech law and the primary source of this thesis is the Act No 114/1992 Coll., on the Protection of Nature and Landscape. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of thesis focuses on the specific legal protection of particular elements of inanimate nature in the Czech Republic, such as caves, paleontological resources and mineral resources. In this part, thesis analysis how these elements are protected by the law and how effective this protection is in practice. The second part of thesis focuses on territorial protection legal tools in the context of inanimate nature protection in terms of both general and special legal tools. It analysis legal protection of significant landscape elements and landscape character as well as inanimate nature protection through regulation of specially protected areas including Natura 2000 European protected areas. In this context the attention is also paid to protection of inanimate nature elements as protected habitats of animals and plants and their importance for the conservation of biodiversity. In addition to the comprehensive analysis of legal protection of inanimate nature in the Czech Republic...

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.