C.G. Hempel's D-N account of explanation marks a cornerstone in the history of philosophy of science. Standard interpretations construe it as a naive, if noble, attempt to characterize scientific explanations: science locates laws at work in the world and facilitates explanations by indicating that the relevant circumstances fall under the cover of those laws - an idea these days appearing credulous at best. The present examination is motivated by a curiosity about whether there might be something more interesting to be said about the point of Hempel's account. This thesis thus considers the historical roots of Hempel's thought in the Vienna Circle protocol sentence debate of the 1930s. Certain principles inherent in that debate suggest a reading of the subsequently developed D-N account not as a naive scientistic approach, but as a conventionally adopted framework with which to clarify explanatory candidates in science. It argues Hempel was not after the 'right' account of explanation, but rather one which could be assessed for its merits based on how effectively it serves to clarify explanations. This thesis first examines the point of the protocol sentence debate, which was not over justifying, via logic, grounding all scientific knowledge in sensation. Rather, as empiricists, certain members of the Vienna Circle took the language of sensation as a conventional starting point for the construction of scientific language and argued over the form and status of the basic statements comprising that language. Second, it surveys dissenting criticism within the debate and Hempel's problematic defence of the left-wing view in the Circle. Third, it locates certain principles that came out of the debate and shaped the subsequent development of Hempel's D-N account. Finally it suggests a reformulation of the D-N account as a conventionally adopted framework for the assessment of explanations and indicates how it may be understood as a candidate for philosophical methodology.

The relation between the normative and the empirical in the philosophy of science is examined by investigating apriori and aposteriori approaches to methodology. The apriori is usually equated with the prescriptive, and the aposteriori with the descriptive. It is argued that this equation is mistaken, and that neither a purely apriori nor a purely aposteriori approach to methodology can succeed. Methodologies based on probability are used as illustrations. Purely apriori and purely aposteriori approaches are examined in Parts I and II respectively. The former are investigated through the intuitionism of J.M. Keynes and the analytic method of Carnap. Dutch Book arguments are also considered as apriori arguments. I conclude that an apriori approach is irredeemably flawed, in that it can never meet the goal it sets for itself of producing a self-evidently justified set of rules for science. Purely aposteriori approaches are investigated in the second Part by focussing on R. Giere's and W.V.O. Quine's proposals for a naturalised epistemology. It is argued that a purely empirical approach is caught on the horns of a dilemma: if it is defended on aposteriori grounds then the argument is circular, and if on apriori grounds it is self-refuting. Thus it is shown that the aposteriori approach too cannot serve as the foundations for methodology. However, I shall argue that Quine's project has been misunderstood, and that in fact Quine argues for aposteriori methodology from conventionalist grounds. The possibility of a conventionalist approach to the philosophy of science which avoids the problems of the purely empirical and of the purely apriori approach is explored in the third Part of this thesis. Karl Popper's early advocacy of such a conventionalist approach is discussed. The final chapter is devoted to showing how certain flaws in Popper's and Quine's conventionalist approaches may be mended. It is concluded that the conventionalist approach to methodology provides an adequate framework for the relation between the normative and the empirical in the philosophy of science.

Two prominent debates in the philosophy of science literature - namely the scientific realism debate and the conventionalism debate - originate in the work of Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincare. This thesis explores problems in the current scientific realism and conventionalism debates and analyses Duhem's and Poincare's roles within these debates. In particulal~ it discusses the problems of underdetermination and theory choice, the problem of constitutivity, the problem of theory change and shows how Duhem and Poincare develop and address them. I present the current scientific realism debate and show Duhem's and Poincare's contribution to it. I evaluate Duhem's and Poincare's arguments against instrumentalism, explain their defence of structuralism and argue that their position is not realist, contrary to what is often assumed. I explore different solutions to the problem of underdetermination and develop objections to them. Following Duhem, I argue that the employment of theoretical virtues does not solve the problem of theory choice on the grounds that they are inconclusive and lead to a further form of underdetermination. Furthermore, I analyse Duhem's notion of 'good sense', which is an attempt at providing a normative non-rule governed account of rationality in theory choice. I address recent interpretations of this concept and develop problems for them. I develop a reading that overcomes the objections to the current readings. I present the evolution of conventionalism, from Poincare's conventions and Hans Reichenbach's constitutive a priori, to Michael Friedman's relativized a priori. I analyse Poincare's arguments for conventionalism and remove some longstanding confusions regarding his view. I discuss Friedman's defence of rationality in scientific revolutions as a solution to the Kuhnian objection of irrationality. Last, I analyse the epistemological status of the relativized a Priori and its intricate relationship with structuralism, which originates in Poincare's philosophy, and argue against current attempts that aim to connect the two theses.

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This thesis argues that the core idea of intertheoretic reduction in science is still defendable. The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part One, comprising five chapters, a positive account of reduction is discussed. In Chapter 1， Nagel's classic account of reduction is considered. There are two central themes in this survey: Nagel's account of bridge principles and his non-formal conditions. The former shows that bridge principles are not limited to identity statements, while the latter shows that almost all later philosophers (whether reductionists or anti-reductionists) have ignored these central conditions of reduction. In Chapter 2, the first wave of objections to Nagel's account, including the problems of meaning variance and inconsistency, are central issues. It will be argued that the former is not a serious objection. However, the latter leads us to Chapter 3, in which reductionists' responses to the problem of inconsistency are considered. The main tool used to remove the problem of inconsistency is the notion of approximation. I defend approximate reduction, but it needs further metaphysical clarifications to survive the second wave of objections. Before these metaphysical points are addressed, the rest of Chapter 3 is devoted to showing that identity statements between things are one kind, but not the only acceptable kind, of bridge principle, and that identity statements between properties are not required for reduction. The central notion in the second wave of objections against reduction is 'multiple realization'. In Chapter 4, I present a causal analysis of properties and realization, and show that (a) a version of the unity of science is defendable within the causal framework, and (b) arguments against the possibility of general and autonomous special sciences are not valid. In Chapter 5, an alternative flat analysis of properties and realization, based on the notion of similarity, is discussed. Firstly, I argue that this alternative can save a version of the unity of science. Secondly, I show that both of the discussed metaphysical analyses remove the second wave of objections against reduction. Part Two, comprising three chapters, concerns negative accounts of reduction. In Chapter 6, explanatory reduction is critically analyzed. I argue that the contrastive nature of explanation prevents us defining reduction in terms of explanation. In Chapter 7, those accounts of reduction which define it in terms of supervenience are discussed. I argue that supervenience is not even a necessary condition of reduction. Chapter 8 is devoted to considering functional reduction, which defines the reduction of a property to a domain of more basic properties. Based on two possible ways of functionalization, the inadequacy of functional reduction is discussed. Finally, in Chapter 9 of Part Three, I return to the version of reduction that I defend. This has two important components: approximation and non-formal conditions. First, I sketch a portrait of this account, and then I consider some of its features, such as its aim and relata, its non-formal nature and its direction.

Traditionally, scientific realism is divided into three different claims; a metaphysical claim, an epistemic claim and a semantic claim. In this thesis I argue for the importance of developing the semantic notion of reference in answering many of the challenges facing the realist position such as the Pessimistic Meta-induction and semantic incommensurability. I also think that looking more carefully at the idea of reference can prove important in making sense of how a realist can view progress within science. I discuss in detail problems that face any attempt relying heavily on the notion of reference. A prominent attack on this route has been developed by experimental philosophers who express a sceptical attitude towards the semantic theorizing that underpin notions like reference. I argue against their understanding of the issue of reference and develop a, new variation of a well-kn9wn hybrid account of reference proposed by Philip Kitcher. Even though I find that such a developed account shows great promise, I also ask whether it is possible to rely on insights from the causal theory of reference in making sense of the referential status of theoretical terms. I particularly take a closer look at Kitcher's discussion of Joseph Priestley's use of the term 'dephlogisticated air' and see if it fares better than his account. By looking in more detail at Priestley 's experimental achievements I try and make sense of how it could fit into the framework of the causal theory

Over the last decade, there has been a fundamental revolution in how science should be communicated to the public. Science communication has been built around a changing preference for “dialogue” where the public, formerly conceived as having a passive role, is now seen as an active player in the communication process. However, there are fundamental questions arising from this revolution concerning the role of the public and the science communicator, and the practice of science communication itself. I take a look at the way in which this transformation has been reflected in the communication of astronomy and space exploration to the public from the perspective of social sciences by drawing on empirical qualitative and quantitative data. I examine the characteristics of the “public for space exploration” and the views of those doing science communication on “this public” and public communication to provide as complete a picture as possible of the current meaning of science communication in the area of ‘space’ in the UK. I show that practitioners who deal with “the public for space exploration” assume a gatekeeper role as they try to control public communication rather than simply pass on information. The science communication practice in the ‘space’ scene involves both one-way and two-way communication activities that serve different aims of public communication to target different audiences. I argue that rather than competing, both models should be seen as complementing paradigms in the practice of communication of ‘space’ with the public. Consequently, outreach activities can be characterized as “preaching to the converted” – they attract the “public for space exploration” who is more likely to be part of the “attentive/interested” publics and that bring with them less attentive/interested publics, which otherwise would be very difficult to reach through other means.

This thesis investigates the changes in the spatial imaginary occasioned by the emergence of higher-dimensional thinking in the late-nineteenth century. It describes the conditions for this emergence in n-dimensional geometry, the priority of analogical explanation within scientific popularisation and the occult revival of the late-nineteenth century. It tracks the catalytic intervention of Johann Carl Friedrich Zöllner and experiments he conducted with the spirit medium Henry Slade, paying particular attention to the knot, the form through which abstract thought of higher dimensions was materially mediated. A close-reading of Edwin Abbott’s Flatland further considers the entanglements of space and matter in the context of an early literary response to the idea of the fourth dimension. The work of Charles Howard Hinton, a theorist of higher-dimensioned space, provides an exemplary materialisation of this space through its provision of a manual for using a set of coloured cubes to aid visualisation of fourth dimensional forms. The chapter on Hinton recreates these objects from textual sources before thinking through their ‘thingly’ status. The appropriation of Hinton’s ideas by participants in the occult revival is considered, with special focus on the work of members of the Theosophical Society, an important vector through which higher dimensional thought spread internationally. Readings of a broad range of literary texts describe the higher spatial imaginary of the early twentieth century in three distinct ways: the crisis of representation caused by an ‘inconceivable’ space; the resulting analogy of such a space to the space of empire, particularly in genre fiction; a productive response to the altered spatial imaginary in the theorisation and use of narrative voice or mood in Henry James.

This research project aims to put forward, through the examination of three scientific artefacts as case studies, an applied philosophy and methodology for the study of things and the thinking that they allow. Within a phenomenological/ecological framework, the project proposes that thinking of scientific instruments as playthings puts forward their instability and mobility as artefacts, and develops the notion of ‘historical affordance’ to relate the evolution and variation over time in what they offer to perception, action and understanding. An historical account is adopted to show that change is occurring in a continuous subsisting thing and to register the mobility and transformability of a thing while keeping in memory its past affordances and anticipating future ones that extend previous uses and practices. Each chapter takes a scientific artefact as a case study: the string surface model, the Crookes radiometer and the gyroscope. All date from the nineteenth century, which as a transitional period for natural philosophy and science proved ideal. Through the notion of historical affordance, each case study addresses the different materials and technologies that compose the device as histories, and looks at these constitutive parts separately and as particular arrangements and relationships within the device. The instruments are examined alongside objects that they resonate with from the fields of arts, craft and pedagogy – material ‘declinations’ in a network of objects that bring attention to particular substances and qualities of the artefacts and allow for thinking through things about the thought that dwells in things. Having fleshed out the historical affordance of the three instruments, the thesis finally proposes that each seems to suggest a particular ‘shape’ for these movements of thought: a topological one in the case of the model, an atmospheric one in the case of the radiometer and a kinetic one in the case of the gyroscope.