During the years preceding the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 Britain's Ambassador to Japan was Sir Robert Craigie. His period in Tokyo has since been the object of a good deal of controversy, with some observers criticising him for being an abject appeaser while others have praised him for his skilful diplomacy and for his realism. Similarly his counterpart, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Shigemitsu Mamoru, has had his career much scrutinised, and has been variously labelled as an Anglophile liberal and as a puppet of the Japanese military. Apart from the dispute over their reputations, an analysis of the diplomacy of these two Ambassadors during the years 1937-1941 is important because both men were deeply disturbed by the steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, and sought to alleviate the growing tensions by espousing alternatives, designed to establish the grounds for a new understanding, to the policies pursued by their respective governments. This study analyses both the practicality and the practicability of the policies put forward by Craigie and Shigemitsu, and also shows the influence they exerted on the course of Anglo-Japanese relations. This is done by investigating not only their roles in the major crises that shook relations during this period, such as the Tientsin crisis of 1939, the Burma Road crisis of 1940 and the events immediately prior to the outbreak of war, but also the whole range of issues that led to increased tensions. In particular, emphasis is put on the effect that economic forces had on the relations between the two countries, and how the rivalry arising first from the Depression and second from the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 drove London and Tokyo apart; a process which the two Ambassadors were powerless to stop. It is hoped that this will prove to be a useful contribution to the study of the origins of the Pacific War.

Comprised of three regular battalions of infantry, 2nd Battalion The South Wales Borderers, 2nd Battalion The Essex Regiment, 2nd Battalion The Gloucester Regiment and Brigade HQ, 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade was only formed in early March 1944. Its specific task was to land 'under command' of 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division on D-Day. This Division itself was made up of three brigades of very experienced infantry. What is remarkable is that 56th Infantry Brigade's infantry battalions had all been on Home Service since June 1940 and were not experienced in battle. Despite this, within only thirteen weeks of formation, 56th Infantry Brigade task was to land on Gold Beach on D-Day as follow up troops and fight inland taking the town of Bayeux by nightfall. After this the Brigade was expected to provide infantry for 7th Armoured Division in a quick push south to take Villers-Bocage. This study traces the journey made by the three battalions of 56th Brigade from 1940 through to a very concentrated forming up and training period specific to the Normandy landings in 1944. It follows their actions from the landings through to the taking of Le Havre in September 1944, by which time the Brigade had served in four different divisions and lost its 'Independent' title to become a permanent member of 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division for the remainder of the war in North West Europe. No study has previously been made of 56th Infantry Brigade and extensive use has been made of primary evidence from The National Archives and other sources in this investigation. A considerable amount of new evidence has been gathered by interviews with surviving veterans of 56th Infantry Brigade. The evidence is used to explore issues that shed new light on life in the Army at home during the war, training for war and the Normandy Campaign.

No description available.

No description available.

In this thesis I set out the rarely-documented life history of the Sumatra Railway, which was constructed by prisoners of war (POWs) of the Japanese during the Second World War. I bring to light the personal narratives of former POWs, based on diaries, memoirs and sound recordings held predominantly within Imperial War Museum (IWM) archives. By doing so, I use some of the most powerful and comprehensive narratives from the men who survived the experience to address the gaps in current historical literature about the Sumatra Railway. Following this, and most substantially, I read these archival materials for what they tell us about the ways in which the captive experience has been represented by former POWs (and how their audiences have responded to their stories). Informed by interviews that I have carried out with the relatives of former Far Eastern POWs, I examine POW life-writing in the context of current cultural debates about forgotten histories and familial remembrance. By focusing on the different genres of POW life-writing, I explore how specific narrative components shape the representation of captivity. Further, I establish that literature, and literacy, were key to maintaining a POW’s imaginative freedom even when he was physically confined. My examination of the linguistic choices made by former POWs finds that the world of the camp was embedded into their words, and that a camp discourse developed as a means of forging bonds between men, and resisting oppression. This leads me to consider the physicality of incarceration – what I term the 'body biography' of the POW – and its impact on post-war responses to Far Eastern captivity. I conclude by reflecting on the transgenerational transmission of POW history (its postmemory), and question whether a new role is emerging for the third generation in exploring the affective impact of postmemory itself.

This thesis investigates the mental health of civilians through an exploration of medical discourse, government policy and psychiatric practice in Britain during the Second World War. The first section of the thesis analyses how the diagnosis of ‘war neurosis’ was constructed and theorised in psychiatric thought. It explores the relationship between psychiatric theories and the government’s health and pension policies, and argues that psychiatric understandings of what constituted ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ psychological responses to the war involved a political as well a medical judgement. These official discourses and policy helped to create and sustain the dominant narrative of the war as one that had created few psychological disorders among civilians. The second section of this study explores wartime mental health as it was practised in the political and social context of the war. It investigates psychiatric interventions at four sites of wartime practice: public mental hospitals, psychiatric outpatient clinics, ‘front-line’ areas hit by bombing-raids, and industrial factories. Its findings indicate that there was no agreement amongst medical practitioners about the extent and nature of civilian neurosis, and suggest that civilians’ psychological reactions to the war were far more diverse than has been portrayed in many histories of the home front. The thesis contends that the notion of a collective psychological response to the war masks the complexity of diagnostic debates and the multiplicity of emotions that were experienced during the war.

This thesis considers armour and infantry unit organization and structure in the British Army during the Second World War, specifically in Montgomery's 21st Army Group in North-West Europe. The strengths and weaknesses of how corps and divisions responded to Montgomery's command system - and in particular the commonality of doctrinal practice - has become an issue of debate among historians. This thesis examines and analyses the factors that produced both an effective weapon and a functional doctrine for combining armour and infantry. It does this by tracking how 21st Army Group moved from 'anarchy' to 'problem solving' under Montgomery's direction. It shows that far from being either authoritarian or anarchic, Montgomery's ultimate command system actually encouraged commanders to use their initiative within the goals set out by Montgomery in late 1944 in a series of pamphlets. He believed in the imposition of doctrine, but this overlooks mid-July to end-of-September 1944 when he was open to the "bubble-up" of new ideas: albeit post-pamphlets the subsequent price of uniformity of doctrine was a certain apparent inflexibility. By late 1944 when Montgomery's 21st Army Group "stood at the door of Germany", armour-infantry co-operation practice is shown to have involved the coordination of armour originally intended to play different roles; infantry, and artillery on the basis of commonly agreed upon understandings which had been reached by an essentially collaborative process. Once set out in Montgomery's pamphlets, however, no deviation from this framework was subsequently permitted. Simultaneously, success in action depended on commanders exercising their initiative to be proactive to a greater extent than has hitherto been suggested: Montgomery wanted to constrain choices yet he allowed armoured commanders enough freedom of action to respond to challenges within the "master plan". This thesis thus makes an original contribution to the debate on Montgomery's command style, and its consequences, and more widely on the role of a great commander.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.