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No description available.

The Royal Navy's main—but not only—weapon at the beginning of the First World War was the Grand Fleet, whose pre-war title was the Home Fleet. The Home Fleet was brought into being in April 1907 after a controversial and confusing series of communications between Sir John Fisher at the Admiralty, the Cs-in-C. of the three main battle fleets, and Admiral Francis Bridgeman, who was Fisher's choice to command the new organization. The initial motive for this reorganization was a financial one: the new Liberal government demanded economies in naval expenditure on top of those introduced by Fisher for the now-ousted Conservatives. During the internal discussions on the proposed Home Fleet in the fall of 1906, three new motives were introduced: 1) A desire to improve on the existing reserve force structure. 2) Furtherance of a trend towards centralized Admiralty control of war operations replacing the previous independence of fleet and station commanders. 3) The shift from a primarily anti-Dual Alliance strategic posture to a primarily anti-German one. This combination of financial and strategic motives would set the stage for future Admiralty policy throughout the remainder of the Prewar Era. The developments related to these motives ensured the Home Fleet would not remain in its initial form for long. Attacks on the Home Fleet from within the Navy resulted in the accelerated demise of the Navy's previous first-line organization in home waters, the Channel Fleet, and shifting geostrategic paradigms reduced the importance of theatres outside the North Sea. Despite efforts by advocates of both those who wished to reduce naval expenditure and advocates of new technologies such as the submarine, the dreadnought-based Home Fleet remained the principal defence of the realm in July 1914, and was likely to remain so into the immediate future.

The work of psychiatrists affiliated with the Tavistock Clinic and Tavistock Institute has been credited with reshaping how workplaces were managed and with psychologising British society, providing British people with a new psychological language for thinking about problems. This thesis provides a history of the Second World War roots of this work. It examines two projects which emerged from a remarkable collaboration between the Tavistock group and the British Army: the War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs) and Civil Resettlement Units (CRUs). These projects, whose scale was vast and unprecedented in British human science, involved the creation and management of processes to choose leaders and to help communities disrupted by war to return to peace. As well as exploring how particular psychological programmes, theories, methods and technologies were devised, this work considers the implications of this work for those who were involved in the wartime work. It provides a history of the co-constitution of psychological expertise, military management strategies, technologies of assessment, and therapeutic intervention. This is achieved by reconstructing the complex negotiations that surrounded the WOSBs and CRUs, by tracing the macro-scale social concerns and the micro-scale personal relationships of individuals that shaped the WOSBs and the CRUs. Historiographical approaches such as actor-network theory and S.L. Star’s work on “boundary objects” are used to examine how psychological theories were balanced with military expectations and demands. The thesis highlights the importance of communication strategies, the negotiation of networks, and administrative structures in the production of science and expertise.

Past research has focused on aircraft wreck sites as historic entities with characteristics similar to any other archaeological site. The Phased Aviation Archaeology Research [PAAR] Methodology is the first study to examine historic aircraft wreck sites as unique, self-contained data sets. With a production total of nearly 500,000 units, combat aircraft represent one of the largest composite artefact classifications of the Second World War. Despite the vast production quantities, the number of archaeologically secure specimens has been drastically reduced by salvage, corrosion/decay and haphazard research. Improper research and conservation practices, usually employed by the enthusiastic but inexpert avocational aviation archaeology community, are responsible for much of the site attrition since the 1960s/1970s. Sites in close proximity to areas of human habitation have drawn thousands of hill walkers who encounter, handle and re-deposit aircraft wreck site artefacts. When combined with the media attention which often accompanies excavation of aircraft wrecks, the perceived ease of artefact identification in the internet age emboldens history enthusiasts to acquire aircraft debris without regard to the contextual integrity of air wreck sites. This dissertation addresses the lack of methodological rigour in the aviation archaeology sub-discipline through the development and application of the Phased Aviation Archaeology Research [PAAR] Methodology. Following a discussion of statutory protections for aircraft wreck sites in the United Kingdom, the practices and procedures of both avocational and professional organisations involved in aviation wreck investigations are examined. Taking into account the best practices of each of these communities, the proposed PAAR Methodology enhances standard archaeological methodology by establishing a systematic approach uniquely appropriate for the study of aircraft wrecks. By combining historical primary sources and modern archaeological and air crash investigative techniques to examine Second World War aircraft wreck sites, the PAAR Methodology both compensates for tourism induced site modification and provides a template for future resource management. Field surveys of eight Second World War wreck sites, including excavation of de Havilland Mosquito MM244 and Consolidated LB-30A AM261, assess the effectiveness of the PAAR Methodology.

This thesis examines the use of prisoners of war (POWs), agents and other groups of persons as source of information in the British conduct of war against Germany during the Second World War and demonstrates its significance. While the successes of Bletchley Park in decrypting German wireless traffic are well-known, human intelligence (HUMINT) has received considerably less scholarly attention. During the years 1939 to 1945, the British used an extensive espionage network, maintained informal contacts in neutral cities, and questioned refugees, convicted enemy spies and soldiers who had escaped from German captivity. Most notably, the military services established a far-reaching system of interrogation facilities to obtain intelligence from German prisoners of war in all theatres of war. These activities provided a valuable amount of intelligence on German weaponry, tactics, plans and mentality, which not only constituted useful background information in rapidly changing war conditions but also improved decision-making processes and resulting actions. During the past decades, the main focus of academic research lay on signals intelligence and its influence on British strategy and operations which resulted in a neglect of other forms of intelligence. Recent academic research has not only emphasised a more holistic view of intelligence and its impact on warfare but also points to several successful HUMINT operations such as the international cooperation in espionage and the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC(UK)). At the same time, studies in intelligence provide an extensive framework dealing with various theoretical, practical and ethical aspects which facilitates the analysis of intelligence in historical context. In light of these developments and the unprecedented access to archival material, a re-evaluation of the role of human intelligence in Great Britain during the Second World War is necessary. This thesis combines the theoretical approaches of intelligence with an examination of the organisation of human intelligence during wartime. It utilises three case studies covering the tactical, operational and strategic level of war. First, it offers a model of “main areas”, collection, analysis, dissemination and use, to examine the intelligence process in historical context. These elements constitute a set of interacting steps which describe the way from a specific piece of raw material to its use as human intelligence in decision-making. The human origin influences the characteristics of the intelligence process such as the interaction of individuals during collection, the inherent problem of reliability and accuracy, and the question of acceptance by potential users. The model also serves as a basis for an evaluation scheme: the internal value addresses the intelligence process itself, whereas the external value measures the effect within decision-making and its impact on resulting actions. Regarding the organisational aspect, the intelligence agencies responsible for human intelligence used their previous experience from the last war and grew significantly in size during the Second World War. The interrogation of prisoners of war consisted of a multi-step process with the CSDIC(UK) at the top, which over 10 000 POWs passed through. The combination of interrogation techniques – such as the omniscient trick and friendly approach, concealed microphones, and former refugees or prisoners acting as stool pigeons – resulted in a high output of accurate and appreciated HUMINT. The Secret Service (SIS) recovered after some setbacks at the beginning of the war and – supported by contacts in occupied territory – it was able to deliver reports covering a wide range of topics. In addition, the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) supplemented the work of the SIS – besides their primary objectives. In addition to the use of enemy prisoners and agents in the field, there were three other sources for HUMINT: the questioning of refugees in the specifically designed London Reception Centre, regular contacts with interned British soldiers and individual arrangements in neutral countries, most notably in Sweden and Switzerland, which provided the Foreign Office with news of varying quality. The outcome of these extensive efforts is discussed in the three case studies. The tactical example deals with the defence against German attacks during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz in 1940/1941. POW Intelligence supplemented the other sources of intelligence with the perspective of the enemy: it provided actual data on armament, armour and equipment of German bomber and fighter aircraft; it added details on the order of battle and combat readiness of the German Luftwaffe; and it gave insight into enemy tactics, targeting and the effectiveness of British countermeasures. Therefore, HUMINT made a valuable contribution to the overall intelligence picture which supported and optimised the efforts of Fighter Command. It helped to prepare fighter pilots for their engagements with the enemy and to counter new tactics and technologies such as navigational aids for night bombing. The operational case study covers the detection of the German plans to use a liquid rocket and cruise missile (the so called V-weapons V1 and V2) against British cities, where human intelligence played a key role. In early 1943, SIS reports and secret records of conversations between German POWs convinced the authorities in London of the danger of a long range weapon of a new type. HUMINT later gave indications of the existence of two distinct weapons and the V1 firing system in Northern France. In 1944, it provided details on the characteristics and launching procedures of the V2. These contributions enabled the British not only to direct other intelligence resources such as aerial reconnaissance towards the new threat but also to develop effective offensive and defensive countermeasures. These delayed the deployment of the two weapons and significantly reduced the inflicted damage. The strategic example deals with the British efforts to assess the state of morale of the German military and civilian population. This aspect was primarily covered by human intelligence. Although the amount of raw material gradually expanded and the analytical methods became more sophisticated – especially after the drastic increase of prisoner of war interrogations after D-Day –, the impact of HUMINT remained ambivalent. Until 1943, preconceived opinions about an inferior German morale and an especially vulnerable civilian population were not altered by intelligence products provided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and a separate “morale committee”. The conviction in the second half of 1943 that Germany would collapse from within as it had happened in 1918 was the most visible result. In the following months, intelligence analysis improved considerably and finally falsified previous hopes; however, that development did not restrain British authorities from over-enthusiastic expectations of a rapid end of war in the summer of 1944. Ultimately, human intelligence provided a considerable insight into the inner state of the enemy, but the intelligence task to detect a predefined collapse and the attempt to conceive an elaborated concept of morale overburdened the intelligence services. This thesis combines theoretical approaches with a historical analysis and shows that human intelligence was a powerful force multiplier which the British early recognized and successfully utilized. Therefore, this thesis offers a new perspective on British intelligence and military history during the Second World War. Furthermore, it seeks to contribute to general discussions about the relevance of intelligence in decision-making up to the present day.

In 2013 the candidate published Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler’s V Weapons. Through a detailed examination of the relevant primary sources – including aerial photography recently released to the National Collection of Aerial Photography in Edinburgh - this book investigates the role of British photographic interpretation in the hunt for German V-weapons during Operation Crossbow. In so doing, it provides a wealth of information on such matters as the wartime development of photographic interpretation, the techniques used by the interpreters, the personalities involved, the significance of photographic intelligence to the operation, and the wider politics of wartime intelligence. In particular, it contests some of the claims made by R. V. Jones in his memoir, Most Secret War (1978), about the role of photographic interpretation in the Crossbow investigation. It also demonstrates the wider importance of photographic intelligence in the British military history of the war and offers some explanation as to why this has become a ‘missing dimension’ of wartime intelligence studies. The critical review seeks to provide an academic superstructure for the book, which was intended for a general readership, and demonstrates that the research included therein is commensurate with that required for a PhD.

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This dissertation interrogates the relation between the French national identity, constructed around the idea of hereditary enmity with Germany, and the behaviour between French and German prisoners of war on the individual level in Normandy between 1944 and 1948. This question is important since it is widely accepted that Franco-German relations reached an all-time low during World War II, especially in areas like Normandy that had been heavily occupied between 1940 and 1944. This position is examined through an entangled analysis of low and high level records both from German and French sources, but also from American, British, and Swiss origins. It appears that individual Franco-German relations depended on the distance between the French official discourse of national recovery and the reality experienced by the civil population. During the Allied presence in Normandy, contradictions were obvious and the relations between French and German prisoners of war in Allied hands were marked with violence. When discourse and reality began to overlap, after the transfer of the prisoners to French custody, individual Franco-German relations normalised. This rapid evolution points to the symbolic character of the enmity between French and Germans, used as a tool to reinforce the national cohesion in times of threat.

This thesis examines the programme of mapping produced on silk, and other fabric, by MI9 to facilitate the escape and evasion of British military personnel during World War II. It considers the creation of MI9 in December 1939, the rationale for the new military intelligence branch and the context of the history of military mapping on silk. The map production programme is described, together with its progress and the challenges faced. The various groups of maps are identified and described, together with the source maps on which they were based. This description is developed in nine appendices produced as an integral part of the research to provide a comprehensive carto-bibliography of the 234 individual maps which have been identified. Location details of extant copies in British map collections are also provided. The ingenious methods of smuggling the maps into the camps, with other escape aids, in apparently innocuous leisure items are described. The maps were then copied and reproduced to support the escapes. Coded correspondence with the camps is discussed, and a successful deciphering of some of that correspondence is provided. The implications for the escape and evasion programme were considerable, but so too were the implications of the passage of intelligence from the camps to aid the war effort, a factor apparently largely overlooked in previous studies of the wartime role of the intelligence branches. Three case studies are provided to demonstrate the role and importance of the contribution made by the maps to the escape and evasion programme. The conclusion assesses the significance of this little known episode in British historical cartography of the twentieth century which essentially provides the latest chapter in the story of military mapping on silk, and other fabric, through the ages.