This thesis examines the use of prisoners of war (POWs), agents and other groups of persons as source of information in the British conduct of war against Germany during the Second World War and demonstrates its significance. While the successes of Bletchley Park in decrypting German wireless traffic are well-known, human intelligence (HUMINT) has received considerably less scholarly attention. During the years 1939 to 1945, the British used an extensive espionage network, maintained informal contacts in neutral cities, and questioned refugees, convicted enemy spies and soldiers who had escaped from German captivity. Most notably, the military services established a far-reaching system of interrogation facilities to obtain intelligence from German prisoners of war in all theatres of war. These activities provided a valuable amount of intelligence on German weaponry, tactics, plans and mentality, which not only constituted useful background information in rapidly changing war conditions but also improved decision-making processes and resulting actions. During the past decades, the main focus of academic research lay on signals intelligence and its influence on British strategy and operations which resulted in a neglect of other forms of intelligence. Recent academic research has not only emphasised a more holistic view of intelligence and its impact on warfare but also points to several successful HUMINT operations such as the international cooperation in espionage and the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC(UK)). At the same time, studies in intelligence provide an extensive framework dealing with various theoretical, practical and ethical aspects which facilitates the analysis of intelligence in historical context. In light of these developments and the unprecedented access to archival material, a re-evaluation of the role of human intelligence in Great Britain during the Second World War is necessary. This thesis combines the theoretical approaches of intelligence with an examination of the organisation of human intelligence during wartime. It utilises three case studies covering the tactical, operational and strategic level of war. First, it offers a model of “main areas”, collection, analysis, dissemination and use, to examine the intelligence process in historical context. These elements constitute a set of interacting steps which describe the way from a specific piece of raw material to its use as human intelligence in decision-making. The human origin influences the characteristics of the intelligence process such as the interaction of individuals during collection, the inherent problem of reliability and accuracy, and the question of acceptance by potential users. The model also serves as a basis for an evaluation scheme: the internal value addresses the intelligence process itself, whereas the external value measures the effect within decision-making and its impact on resulting actions. Regarding the organisational aspect, the intelligence agencies responsible for human intelligence used their previous experience from the last war and grew significantly in size during the Second World War. The interrogation of prisoners of war consisted of a multi-step process with the CSDIC(UK) at the top, which over 10 000 POWs passed through. The combination of interrogation techniques – such as the omniscient trick and friendly approach, concealed microphones, and former refugees or prisoners acting as stool pigeons – resulted in a high output of accurate and appreciated HUMINT. The Secret Service (SIS) recovered after some setbacks at the beginning of the war and – supported by contacts in occupied territory – it was able to deliver reports covering a wide range of topics. In addition, the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) supplemented the work of the SIS – besides their primary objectives. In addition to the use of enemy prisoners and agents in the field, there were three other sources for HUMINT: the questioning of refugees in the specifically designed London Reception Centre, regular contacts with interned British soldiers and individual arrangements in neutral countries, most notably in Sweden and Switzerland, which provided the Foreign Office with news of varying quality. The outcome of these extensive efforts is discussed in the three case studies. The tactical example deals with the defence against German attacks during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz in 1940/1941. POW Intelligence supplemented the other sources of intelligence with the perspective of the enemy: it provided actual data on armament, armour and equipment of German bomber and fighter aircraft; it added details on the order of battle and combat readiness of the German Luftwaffe; and it gave insight into enemy tactics, targeting and the effectiveness of British countermeasures. Therefore, HUMINT made a valuable contribution to the overall intelligence picture which supported and optimised the efforts of Fighter Command. It helped to prepare fighter pilots for their engagements with the enemy and to counter new tactics and technologies such as navigational aids for night bombing. The operational case study covers the detection of the German plans to use a liquid rocket and cruise missile (the so called V-weapons V1 and V2) against British cities, where human intelligence played a key role. In early 1943, SIS reports and secret records of conversations between German POWs convinced the authorities in London of the danger of a long range weapon of a new type. HUMINT later gave indications of the existence of two distinct weapons and the V1 firing system in Northern France. In 1944, it provided details on the characteristics and launching procedures of the V2. These contributions enabled the British not only to direct other intelligence resources such as aerial reconnaissance towards the new threat but also to develop effective offensive and defensive countermeasures. These delayed the deployment of the two weapons and significantly reduced the inflicted damage. The strategic example deals with the British efforts to assess the state of morale of the German military and civilian population. This aspect was primarily covered by human intelligence. Although the amount of raw material gradually expanded and the analytical methods became more sophisticated – especially after the drastic increase of prisoner of war interrogations after D-Day –, the impact of HUMINT remained ambivalent. Until 1943, preconceived opinions about an inferior German morale and an especially vulnerable civilian population were not altered by intelligence products provided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and a separate “morale committee”. The conviction in the second half of 1943 that Germany would collapse from within as it had happened in 1918 was the most visible result. In the following months, intelligence analysis improved considerably and finally falsified previous hopes; however, that development did not restrain British authorities from over-enthusiastic expectations of a rapid end of war in the summer of 1944. Ultimately, human intelligence provided a considerable insight into the inner state of the enemy, but the intelligence task to detect a predefined collapse and the attempt to conceive an elaborated concept of morale overburdened the intelligence services. This thesis combines theoretical approaches with a historical analysis and shows that human intelligence was a powerful force multiplier which the British early recognized and successfully utilized. Therefore, this thesis offers a new perspective on British intelligence and military history during the Second World War. Furthermore, it seeks to contribute to general discussions about the relevance of intelligence in decision-making up to the present day.

This dissertation studies Second World War ‘sites of memory’ in the islands of Jersey, Orkney and the Isle of Man, to determine if each island celebrates the war’s events as Britain does, or if they have charted their own mnemonic course. It builds on the work of Angus Calder, Malcolm Smith, and Mark Connelly, who have explored how popular conception of the Second World War in Britain has been structured around a certain set of commemorative motifs, most of which centre on Winston Churchill and the events of 1940. The British war narrative is now commonly referred to as the ‘Churchillian paradigm’ or ‘finest-hour myth’, and continues to be the driving force in commemoration and memorialization on the British mainland. The three islands in this study are culturally and historically distinct from Britain, and each has strong notions of its own ‘island identity’. Each also possesses a tangential and divisive domestic experience of war, one which is often minimized in the iconography of the Churchillian paradigm. Jersey was occupied by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945, Orkney was home to several thousand Italian POWs who built important infrastructure in the island, and the Isle of Man was home to 14,000 German, Finnish, Japanese, and Italian internees in what one critic has called ‘a bespattered page’ in the nation’s history. By examining ‘sites of memory’— museums, heritage sites, commemorations, celebrations, philately, and use of public space—this dissertation shows that each island simultaneously accepts and rejects elements of the finest-hour myth in their collective memory. Each island displays its unique (though often quite negative) heritage in order to differentiate itself from Britain, while at the same time allowing them, at certain events, to participate in celebration of Britain’s ‘greatest victory’. In this way, islands’ use ‘Britishness’ pragmatically, by basking in traditionally ‘British’ commemorative tropes, while at the same time deepening their own cultural and historical sovereignty.

From a broader perspective this cross-disciplinary and cross cultural thesis examines the relationships between identity, ideology and propaganda and their influence over the production of private and public memories. This examination is carried out through a case study investigating various representations of the Czech RAF airmen from selected British and Czech WW2 newspapers approached as an archive of memory, and from individual recollections of the Czech veterans – the living archive of memory. These representations in the context of this research become interacting versions of public and private memory which in a unique way and yet equally contribute towards the historical construction of the Second World War. This thesis proposes that the various versions of memory, in Rothberg’s (2009) words ‘multidirectional memory’, are a consequence of versioning, a constant creation and re-creation of different versions of memory due to numerous influences on the producers of such memory. However, this research also considers a presence of Second World War discourse, which underpinned public and private memory and transcended collective memories of the Britishness and Czechness forming a transnational or cross cultural (Radstone, 2010) WW2 memory. In other words, this project draws upon current theories about non competitive multiple, transnational and mediated memory (Dijck, 2007) and extends upon these by considering their existence within a potentially unifying WW2 discourse within which they connect and disconnect. By doing so, this thesis challenges master narratives of history. These memories are also seen as a base for multi-layered identity of the ones who remembered and had the right to remember. Furthermore this study explores the potential reasons behind the creation of the discovered qualitative treasure of this project The Czechoslovak, a small community newspaper produced by the Czech minority living in Britain during the WW2. The theoretical underpinning as well as the methodology of the project attempt to interrogate media studies, oral history and memory studies in order to create a most pertinent space in which the written and oral memory is explored effectively. This merger of theories and methodologies allowed me to investigate the various memories within the context of the WW2 and thus construct them from the past perspective when they were being created. A discourse analysis of selected British and Czech WW2 newspapers (The Times, Daily Mirror, News of the World and The Czechoslovak) has been employed distinguishing between traditional and tabloidised newspaper representations and investigating to what extend the Czechs were portrayed as the ‘other’ or the heroes in the British society. The outcome of this analysis was a discovery that the Czech RAF airmen had not been given much prominence in the British newspapers and that their representations varied according to the different type of newspaper and the different period of the war in which they were produced. Moreover, ideology, propaganda and the notion of Czech and British identity present in the newspapers played an important role in the creation of public memory versions of the Czech RAF airmen’s images. Besides newspapers, this study took the opportunity to reveal very fragile and valuable private recollections of the Czech WW2 RAF veterans (six former members of the Czech RAF settled in Britain after the WW2 and 1 widow were interviewed in the summer 2008); the men who played an important role in the success of the Allies in WW2. By doing this, the former Czech airmen were given a voice and the chance to contribute towards existing knowledge about the Czechs in the RAF and the Second World War. The various versions of the past produced by their private memory have been investigated in the view of various factors influencing these versions: notably their identity, war ideology, propaganda, and forgetting and in relation to WW2 media. Considering the occurrence of versioning, when critically reflecting upon all different memories, I position myself as a researcher into the shoes of yet another producer of another version of the past. Thus, this study creates a space where various, sometimes contrasting memories do not fight for recognition, but where official collective memory and individual memory influence each other and also enrich each other whilst they co-construct a historical representation of the past.

This thesis will examine the Electronic Warfare [EW] policies and subsequent Suppression of Enemy Air Defence [SEAD] postures of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command during the Second World War. It examines how EW was applied to the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) Integrated Air Defence System [IADS] so as to reduce Bomber Command aircraft losses, and determines whether EW policies were drafted in a proactive and/or reactive fashion vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe IADS. The thesis applies air power theory regarding the levels and methods of application by which SEAD was brought to bear against the IADS as a result of these EW policies. Ultimately, the thesis will argue that Bomber Command enacted both proactive and reactive EW policies at the Campaign and Localised SEAD levels using a combination of Manoeuvrist, Mass and Stealth/Surprise approaches.

This thesis examines the development of RAF high command of the Metropolitan Air Force (MAF) during the Second World War (SWW). It sheds new light on the re-organisations of the Air Ministry in 1934, the RAF Command structure in 1936, and the tri-service debate in 1937 concerning the RAF proposal to establish a Supreme Air Commander (SAC). It reveals that while frontline expansion created an impetus for re-organisation, it was operational readiness that was the dominant factor in the re-structuring of the RAF. It examines the transition in RAF frontline organization from the mono-functional command system of 1936 to the multi-functional organisation that emerged after 1943 by looking at command structure and practice, personalities, and operational thinking. This study builds on the established historiography but challenges the accepted explanation of RAF reforms in the 1930s. It addresses a significant gap in the literature concerning the way the frontline was directed by the War Cabinet and the Air Ministry. In doing so it seeks to establish a new starting point for the analysis of RAF high command by providing an assessment of how effective were the RAF reforms of the 1930s to the higher command of MAF operations during the SWW.

Conflict archaeology is a popular subject of academic research. Within the topic of British Second World War archaeology there are few studies examining anti-invasion defences, and none relating to the evidence or its use. This research was influenced by concepts in historical and conflict archaeology and the archaeologies of the recent and contemporary past. It was undertaken to determine the extent of survival of archaeological, documentary, aerial photographic and cartographic evidence for three cases in south and south-west Wales. Case study method was used to identify, select and analyse evidence. Grounded theory was used to induce meaning. The evidence was given equal primacy, assessed critically and analysed for its role, value and contribution. Official sources were used for their unique, informed and authoritative content. Knowledge of military organisational practices and formation/unit identities were required to use the evidence effectively. A rich but incomplete evidence base of a complex character was identified. Evidence was found to be complementary and inter-dependent, representing aspects of a common shared phenomenon. The diverse sources could be used to induce meaningful narratives. The research suggested that an archaeological approach was a valid and effective form of inquiry when applied to cross-disciplinary evidence from the recent past.

This thesis examines the construction of frames of Second World War memory in the post-occupation Channel Islands, and considers the impact of gender on both this memory-making process and the resulting popular representations of their shared past. It first explores the gendered tensions and fractures of the occupation years, and their role in the construction of this usable past. The occupation will be shown to have directly challenged the traditional gendered expectations of British wartime conduct (a key tenet of Islander identity), particularly regarding martial masculinity and feminine virtue. These tensions and fractures were particularly acute in the Channel Islands, as they were the only British territory to be occupied by German forces during the Second World War, having been demilitarised prior to the invasion of 1940. The war memories that were popularly adopted by the Islander communities after the war were, therefore, rooted in these early tensions and fractures, as they sought out retribution, closure, and unity, along with a connection to the desirable British war memory and the image of the victorious soldier hero. This thesis examines how this traumatic period has been built into a necessary and powerful founding myth in the Channel Islands, through the gendered sharing of war stories and rituals, as well as the reclaiming of contested spaces and objects to the present day. This analysis of the war memory of these small Islander communities will inform wider understanding of how gendered wartime anxieties might have similarly impacted the construction of war memory within other previously occupied nations across Europe. It also offers an important insight into the role of gender in the subsequent dissemination, disruption and stabilisation of war stories through generations, particularly within small communities recovering from the trauma of war.

India’s North-West Frontier was the one area where the British Raj could suffer a knockout blow from either external Russian invasion or internal revolt. Frontier defence was amongst the greatest burdens during India’s inter-War financial austerity. Despite the RAF’s operational and financial efficacy in 1920s Iraq, air control was never implemented on the Frontier and air power’s potential was never fully exploited. Instead, aircraft were employed to enhance the Army’s traditional battlefield capabilities, resulting in efficient tactical co-ordination during the 1930s Waziristan campaign - the RAF’s most operationally-active pre-War theatre. To address why air power was constrained on the Frontier, the Thesis examines the inter-War relationship between the Armies of India and the RAF and its impact on the development and application of RAF doctrine. It concludes that the conservatively-natured Indian Armies were slow to recognise the conceptual shift required to fully exploit air power. This entrenchment was reinforced by inter-Service rivalry and the threat of aircraft replacing land forces with a concomitant loss of political standing. The enduring high-level internecine conflict resulted in the squandering of both resources and the opportunity to test independent, ‘strategic’ air power theory prior to WWII. Its legacy impacted on Army-RAF relations into WWII.

This thesis examines the Chiefs of Staff Committee’s (COS) decision-making and policy-making influence on Britain during the September 1939 to May 1940 period of the Second World War, commonly known as the Phoney War. To date, the actions of the COS during the Phoney War have come under little scrutiny. Historians have included only passing reference to the committee’s actions during the Winter War and the Norway Campaign, and have argued that its conduct was mired in error and misjudgement. As a consequence there is both confusion and debate over the COS’s contribution to Britain’s conduct in the Phoney War. This thesis contains the first systematic analysis of the influence of the COS on Britain’s course during the Phoney War and it advances the argument that the inadequacies of the committee had a major impact on the planning and conduct of the Phoney War. This study places the COS in the context of Britain’s wider decision-making and policy-making machinery during the Phoney War, where it was answerable to the War Cabinet and responsible for Britain’s defence. It argues that the COS was inadequate as a committee and that it failed to recognise its own limitations and to acknowledge the wisdom of its advisers. While on some occasions the COS provided good advice to the War Cabinet, it failed to press its opinions with sufficient force, particularly when the War Cabinet overlooked its recommendations. Individually, the Chiefs were dominated by both Churchill and Ironside, a factor which consistently undermined the COS’s effectiveness in policy-making and decision-making; Chiefs of Staff Newall and Pound were too easily influenced by Ironside and were insufficiently forceful in exerting their positions. This thesis also proposes that Britain’s organisation for the higher management of the war was weak and that this hindered the effectiveness of the COS; the committee structure during the period September 1939 to May 1940 was overly bureaucratic and this occupied too much of the COS’s time. It concludes that the COS demonstrated inadequacies as a decision-making and policy-making committee, however, while found to be wanting, there were mitigating factors which impinged upon its ability to perform. This thesis’s examination of the COS provides a better understanding of a little documented committee, which, although often overlooked, had a profound influence on Britain’s course during the Phoney War. Through archival research of the COS and War Cabinet papers this study will appraise the COS’s contribution to the unfolding of events between September 1939 and May 1940.

This thesis examines the relationship between the private naval armaments industry, businessmen and the British Government’s supply planning framework between 1918 and 1941. More specifically, it reassesses the concept of the Military-Industrial Complex by examining the impact of disarmament upon private industry, the role of leading industrialists within supply and procurement policy, and the successes and failings of the Government’s supply organisation. This work blends together political, naval and business history in new ways, and, by situating the business activities of industrialists alongside their work as government advisors, it sheds new light on the operation of the British state. This thesis argues that there was a small coterie of influential businessmen, led by Lord Weir, who, in a time of great need for Britain, first gained access to secret information on industrial mobilisation as advisers to the Supply Board and Principal Supply Officers Committee (PSOC), and later were able to directly influence policy. This made Lord Weir and Sir James Lithgow among the most influential industrial figures in Britain. This was a relationship which cut both ways: Weir and others provided the state with honest, thoughtful advice and policies, but, as ‘insiders’ utilised their access to information to build a business empire at a fraction of the normal costs. Outsiders, by way of contrast, lacked influence and were forced together into a defensive ‘ring’ – or cartel – and effectively fixed prices for British warships in the lean 1920s. However, by the 1930s, the cartel grew into one of the most sophisticated profiteering groups of its day, before being shut down by the Admiralty in 1941. More generally, this work argues that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was a turning point for supply organisation, and that between 1931 and 1935, the PSOC and its component bodies were governed by necessity. Powerful constraints on finance and political manoeuvre explain the nature of industrial involvement. Thus, it is argued that the PSOC did a broadly effective job at organising industry with the tools it was given, and the failings were down to the top levels of policymaking – the Cabinet – not acting upon advice to ease procurement bottlenecks early enough, to the extent that British warship construction was more expensive and slower than it could have been. In sum, this group of industrialists, the Admiralty and a few key figures in the PSOC such as Sir Harold Brown, effectively saved MacDonald, Baldwin and Chamberlain’s National Government from itself.