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The thesis attempts to trace the role of the state prevalent in American political discourse in shaping politics and legislation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This has involved linking developments in American foreign policy with changes in political views of the state at home. The aim of my research has been to set political developments at the centre of American studies in this period by arguing that they had a profound effect upon broader American society and its views of the wider world. This helps to explain why the political ideology of social democracy, or the involvement of government as a provider of economic and social justice, declined in America after World War II in contrast in most other industrialised nations. I argue that while traditional American hostility to government generally weakened during the depression and war, the Cold War encouraged Americans generally to associate the state with totalitarianism. Politically-promoted conceptions of life in the USSR and Great Britain in particular were used both to reorient American political priorities away from social reform and to marginalise those who attempted to take further the more progressive aspects of the New Deal. The association of the state with inimical ideologies abroad, and the notion that America was a socially cohesive nation, in which all citizens were 'free' and 'equal', formed a political orthodoxy strengthened by developments in foreign affairs. The dissertation analyses key figures in both political parties, as well as key pressure groups, in the period 1946-1952. It also traces the development of public opinion over the same period, and attempts to show how the images of others nations at the heart of the Cold War lessened the prospects for European-style social democracy in the United States in the later twentieth century.

Populist conservatism brought new constituencies, issues and campaigning techniques to the American right, which helped it to become a dominant political force. However, the very nature of populist conservatism meant that it was less effective as a force for governing in the 1980s. Populist conservatives capitalised on the unease felt by certain groups, such as evangelical Christians, about ‘social issues’ such as abortion, but also foreign and economic policy. The populist conservative movement, including the ‘New Right’ political activists and the ‘religious right,’ tapped the discontent of working and lower middle class whites in particular in an attempt to build a new conservative majority. However, these constituencies sat uneasily with libertarian and ‘big business’ elements within the Republican Party. Interviews with populist conservative leaders and officials in the Carter and Reagan administrations have illuminated the often rather dry official records. That said, new collections in the Carter Library reveal the extent to which his administration ignored social conservatives and pushed a bold agenda in areas such as women’s and gay rights. Recently opened documents in the Reagan Library demonstrate that populist conservative leaders often worked with the administration whilst publicly urging it to take a more conservative stance. I was also fortunate to be granted access to some closed collections, such as those of Reagan’s pre-presidential office, which catalogue his strained relations with his erstwhile populist conservative allies. Finally, I have made use of the huge amount of political literature produced by populist conservatives. Of course, it has not been possible to conduct an exhaustive survey of populist conservative activity, due to both space constraints and the availability of evidence. A future study would cover issues such as busing, the campaign for a balanced budget amendment and the ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’.