My purpose in the researching and the writing of this thesis has been to investigate, and to try to explain, Frank Ankersmit's curious shift from his well expressed and firmly held narrativist position of "Narrative Logic", to an arguably contradictory, yet passionately held counter belief in the plausibility of a form of direct (sublime) historical experience - an authentic unmediated relationship with the past. I am, accordingly, presenting here what I believe to be the most adequate explanatory account of/for Ankersmit's intellectual journey. A journey which, in essence, constituted a substitution of his earlier representational, language centred philosophy of history for what might be taken as a new and mystical non-representational theory. This alternative theory of Ankersmit' s (let it be called this for now), lacking cognitive foundations, works on the basis of sensations, moods, feelings and therefore a consciousness deemed to be received directly from the past itself, and therein - for this thesis - lies its fatal weakness as a historical theory. Belief in the mystical may be all right at some level, if this is what is wanted, but a mystical experience itself cannot produce a historical re-presentation which (tautologically) is the only way that the past can be presented historically. Thus, I argue that Ankersmit's journey from language to (historical) experience - the latter phenomenon being more appropriately situated within the field of sociology/social theory and memory studies - is, in the end, a lost historical cause.

This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions. Questions will be asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to person, it is also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the development of the term, Atman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions been undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Atmanhypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to overcome the barriers that separate and divide.

The question of dwelling, how, where, in what way and in what manner describes a crisis in many professional women's lives especially when living in pursuit of equality becomes dissatisfying and the demands of traditional stereotypes unappealing. Books such as Desiring Practices (1995) demonstrate the need for some sort of shared expression and community to resolve the career frustrations of working academics in traditionally male dominated environments. Documents such as Why Women Leave Practice? (2003) record what is seen as a very real difficulty for the Institution. The important aspect of Irigaray's work for these debates, however, is how she has already begun to unravel the problems women face in contemporary societies. For architects concerned with diversity, her work is an incitement to reformulate this question by thinking how we can positively approach sexual difference as the basis for approaching all other differences. For feminists, Irigaray's philosophy also presents the possibility of a practice (albeit a practice profoundly reconsidered) beyond a simple desire for equality with men but nevertheless, without denying the problem of a culture of discrimination within the profession. Furthermore, for theorists concerned with how we approach the other, the hidden, or the devalued within our discourses her work is motive to take further these theories towards a more radical poetic or artistic practice. The question of dwelling as a reconsideration of coexistence, co-habitation and co-belonging, as relation rethought, extends the problem of the intimate to address issues of the architectural.

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Master of Science / Department of Grain Science and Industry / Greg Aldrich / Since 2010, there have been seven recalls related to thiamine deficiency in cat food products (FDA, 2017; FSA, 2017). Cats have a high requirement of thiamine (5.6 mg/kg), and deficiencies can lead to death within a month if not treated (AAFCO, 2017). A few studies have been published regarding the impact of retort processing on thiamine loss in canned pet food but no work has been reported on heat penetration in other containers (pouches and trays). Therefore, our objectives were to determine the effect of container size and type on thiamine retention during processing of cat food. Our hypothesis was that thiamine retention would be impacted by container size and type. To address this, a 2x3 factorial arrangement of treatments in which two container sizes (small: 89-104 mL vs medium: 163-207 mL) and three container types (can, pouch, and tray) were evaluated for B-vitamin losses and thermal process lethality of a wet pet food. A model wet cat loaf type formula was produced for all six experimental treatments and each was processed in duplicate over six-days. All ingredients including the vitamin premix (10x level) were thoroughly mixed, heated to 43ºC, and containers were manually filled. The filled and sealed containers were cooked in a retort (cans: SJ Reid Retort, Bellingham, WA; trays and pouches: FMC retort, Madera, CA) with thermocouples attached to the center of representative containers (n=14) in each batch. Software (Calsoft Systems, v. 5.0.5) was used to record the internal temperatures. The retort time was targeted to meet an F₀=8 at 121ºC and 21 PSI. Treatment sample were analyzed for included pH, moisture, crude protein, crude fat, ash, and B-vitamins. Results were analyzed using the GLM procedure in SAS (v. 9.4; Cary, NC) with means and interactions separated using Fisher LSD method by significant F and an α of 5%. The proximate composition and pH were similar (P > 0.10) among treatments. There was an interaction (P < 0.05) between container size and type for time to reach the F₀=8; wherein, the medium can and tray had the longest time (45.5 and 46.3 min, respectively); the small can and tray, and medium pouch were intermediate (35.4, 36.0, and 32.0 min, respectively); and the small pouch had the shortest time (36.0 min). There was no difference for either main effect of container type or size on heating lethality values (each main effect average F₀=10.3) and total lethality ranged from 12.7-16.7 min. Thiamine retention was lowest (70%) among the B-vitamins, and there was minimal loss throughout the process. The excess heating beyond F₀=8 may account for the dramatic impact on the retention of heat labile nutrients like thiamine. This may be more difficult to control in the newer packaging systems like pouches and trays.

This account of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy takes the form of a critique. It attempts to show the ways in which she falls foul of what she criticises. Murdoch is concerned about the influence of the romantic tradition upon our contemporary (post-war) accounts of morality. She charges contemporaries, such as Sartre and R. M. Hare with having mistakenly extended freedom in ways that make morality seem like a matter of free choice. Against this, her own most rigorous work (The Sovereignty of Good) advances three central claims: (1) an idea of moral perfection (an ideal Good) is built into our ways of thinking and speaking; (2) this idea of Good/perfection is not an unavoidable fiction but a reality principle, it helps to undermine the egocentricity that prevents us from doing justice to the reality of others; (3) this idea of a single, unitary Good pulls us towards Platonic metaphors. (We are like pilgrims, trying to move out of dark egocentricity and into the light of attention to others). My response to this is advanced in the following three parts: Part one sets out Murdoch’s position, complete with an account of the stylistic peculiarities of its exposition. (She believes that value-laden metaphors are unavoidable, and in some cases irreducible). Part Two flags up her similarity to what she attacks. Far from being a moral quietist, Murdoch is deeply critical of our everyday lack of moral ambition. (It is as if we are content to lurk about in the dark). She rejects everyday (‘bourgeois’) contentment in favour of the command ‘be ye therefore perfect’. Having flagged up this shared rejection of everyday contentment, I explore the way that Murdoch’s apparently diffuse charge of ‘romanticism’ is held together by the idea of erotic striving. Such romanticism is the general theoretical correlate of the wrong model of love, romantic love rather than the slow patient love that she wants us to emulate. On this account, avoiding romanticism requires us to meet the following conditions. Firstly, we must direct loving attention towards the contingent reality of persons without puritanically avoiding attention to messy detail. (We should not just ‘tag’ people symbolically, as one of these or one of those.) Secondly, our attention to the other should really be about them, it should not covertly redirect attention to the self. Thirdly, we should not allow our fascinating suffering to obscure the reality of death. (The realisation of our finitude is a crucial aspect of undermining egocentricity). Part Three consists of chapter-pairs which examine the central Murdochian metaphors of fallenness, eros, and the death of the self in an attempt to show that Murdoch falls foul of what she attacks.

My aim in this thesis is to examine Louis Zukofsky's poetry in relation to his stated objectivist principles using those principles and Zukofsky's unpublished statements as a test for his theory and practice. The first chapter introduces Zukofsky's poetic principles and examines the relationship between his work and Ezra Pound's Imagism. My aim here is to put the origins of Zukofsky's principles into an appropriate context, disputing the idea of the `objectivist' as a temporarily revivified Imagist. Chapter II examines Zukofsky's earliest verse, both umpublished juvenilia and the few early poems retained for publication. These poems all predate the `objectivist' statements and a comparison is made between these poems which anticipate the poet's later technique and those which do not. The chapter culminates in a study of `Poem beginning `The'' as the first identifiably objectivist work. Chapter III is concerned with Zukofsky as editor and critic since it was in this dual role that he first expressed his poetic theory. The principles of this theory are examined in detail here and the relationship between Zukofsky's poetry and criticism closely defined. The fourth chapter examines Zukofsky's shorter poems in the light of the critical framework provided by the `objectivist principles'. Individual poems are closely examined to reveal the `mechanism' of `objectivist' poetry and to facilitate a reading of Zukofsky's long poem `A'. Chapters V and VI are concerned with the two halves of `A'. Attention is given to the poem's detailed composition and to its overall structure and movement. This analysis is guided by the overriding question of the application of `objectivist princples' to a long rather than a short poem. The final chapter reviews Zukofsky's sustained critical idiom in both poetry and prose criticism and concludes that this idiom provides a flexible but principled and consistent framework for his life's work.

This thesis undertakes the Deleuzian experiment of a conceptual site development of contemporary choreography through analysis of the works of Antonia Baehr, Juan Dominguez, Xavier Le Roy and Eszter Salamon. It examines the way these works transform choreography qualitatively by elaborating singular methods which couple the issue of movement with the creation of aesthetic regimes. As opposed to a representational outline of choreography’s ontology, my thesis investigates the participatory potential of choreography by focussing on the singular relational assemblages that each choreography creates with the audience. These singular relational assemblages defy practical philosophy insofar as they require a methodology which can account for their dynamic complexity without reducing them either to pre-established categories or to a static analysis. On the basis of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s transcendental empiricism, my thesis responds to this challenge by establishing contamination and articulation as methodological concepts for an open ended inventory of what choreography can do. Contamination, on the other hand, accounts for the qualitative transformations that concern bodies in their power to assemble and to be assembled. Articulation, on the other hand, names the qualitative transformations of sense that a choreography conveys through its differential composition. Both concepts are inseparably interwoven and specified in the aesthetic regimes of the Retenu and the Dé-lire. While the Retenu scrutinizes the way movements generate a continuous transformation of body images (cinematic retenu) and sensations (cine-emotional retenu), the Dé-lire explores the choreography of temporal relations. Showing how these singular assemblages and their implicit methods critically redistribute the sensible of choreography at the turn of the twenty-first century, the four concepts of my thesis form the argument in itself. This argument highlights the ethical impact of qualitative experimental research, specifies the prolific capacities of choreography and forces practical philosophy to rethink their relation.

The LHCb experiment is a single-arm forward spectrometer situated at the Large Hadron Collider, CERN. LHCb is optimised for the precision study of beauty and charm flavoured hadrons and in 2011 collected 1 fb-1 of proton- proton collision data at a centre-of-mass energy of 7TeV. The aim of LHCb is to search for rare decays and make precise measurements of Charge-Parity (CP) violation in the beauty and charm sectors. In the Standard Model the decay B°→ ΦK*(892)° is described by a loop mediated process, providing a sensitive test for new physics. In this decay, signs of CP violation could indicate the presence of physics beyond the Standard Model. This thesis presents a study of the flavour eigenstate B° → Φ(→ K+K-)K*(892)°(→ K+π-) and its charge conjugate -B°-decay. The decay products form an admixture of CP-even and CP-odd eigenstates, which can have longitudinal or transverse polarisation. An angular analysis is performed to disentangle these different contributions and the polarisation amplitudes and strong phases are measured. No difference is observed between B0 and -B0 amplitudes, supporting the hypothesis that CP is conserved in this decay. In addition, the Triple Product Asymmetries (TPAs) are determined from the products of the polarisation amplitudes and strong phases. True TPAs are zero in the event that CP symmetry is conserved, while fake TPAs can arise due to final-state interactions. Although the measured true TPAs are consistent with zero, several significant fake TPAs are observed.

This thesis will address two questions: Does philosophy contribute to the ‘public understanding of science’ (PUoS), and if so, how? The popular public image of science is one of methodology. Science is a means for making true statements about the world, where we compare hypothesis with observation against the evidence. This then allows for a body of knowledge that guides further advancements and progress. Philosophy, however, seems to be antithetical to this. A popular notion is that philosophy is either what science was, or it deals with objects and ideas so intangible, that they have no real effect in the world. Either it is an outmoded way of doing science, or it is the preserve of armchair academics. In both cases the average person would be forgiven for thinking it had no relevance to them, and especially their ability to understand science. This thesis will look to challenge this relationship. Using hermeneutics, discourse-textual analysis and deconstruction, I present two interpretations of science and philosophy. These two interpretations I will call the ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ approach. The ‘methodological’ approach is to understand science as a collection of principles or rules that, if followed, will produce true statements about the world. An example of such a principle that intersected both philosophy and science is ‘falsification’ as understood through the ‘problem of demarcation’ (PoD). The irrelevance of philosophy to science is fortified by the constant failure to produce fixed rules for what makes one thing scientific and another not. The ‘historical’ approach is to understand the actions of scientists as historical events. So rather than ask ‘what is science?’ we might ask, ‘what does it mean to act scientifically?’ I will argue philosophy can be of use in overcoming the antagonism between understanding a methodological question historically and a historical question methodologically. Firstly, I give an uncontroversial reading of the PoD, as argued by Karl Popper, who represents the ‘methodological’ view and oppose this to the ‘historical’ approach of Paul Feyerabend. Due to the dominance of the interpretation of science as a methodology, I argue that historical critiques, like Feyerabend’s, become nonsensical when understood as methodological substitutes. This is what I call the ‘received view’of what both Popper and Feyerabend had to say on science. Here, Popper fails to solve the PoD and Feyerabend appears to deny the method, objectivity or rationality of science. Next, using ideas inspired by Heidegger, I reverse those roles by presenting a ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ reading of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. I develop two types of language, which I call ‘about’ and ‘of’ language that map on to the methodological and historical distinctions. Using this method I construct two contradictory readings of the text, but unlike the Popper-Feyerabend antagonism, we see how the historical approach is the more fertile interpretation. One version, which I call the ‘strong’ reading, has Kuhn as a relativist, irrationalist or anti-science, which is important if this is the ‘received view’ of Kuhn. This reading carries political weight with ‘interest groups’ who may wish to undermine the epistemic authority of science. That same reading can be used to discredit Kuhn/ philosophy of science, and by extension philosophy as a worthwhile instrument for understanding science. The other version, which I call the ‘weak’ reading, has Kuhn as a supporter and defender of science, but it also resolves old philosophical disputes by framing the problem in a different way. This will not only problematize any notion of a dominant interpretation, but it gives good grounds why one cannot be relativist or irrationalist about ‘truth’. Thus it defends the epistemic authority of science, and also gives philosophy a valuable role in public thinking about science.