The New Zealand Labour Party's election victory on 14 July 1984 resulted in an official rejection of the global strategy of nuclear deterrence. This action was the most fundamental challenge to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September 1951. This thesis is concerned with the effect of Prime Minister David Lange's personality on the resulting dispute between the two nations. This qualitative study utilises a theoretical framework articulated by Margaret G. Hermann which seeks to demonstrate the relationship between the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of their respective nations. In order to effectively conduct this study, a number of key individuals involved in various aspects of the ANZUS dispute were interviewed by this author. It should be noted that David Lange was seriously ill throughout the course of this study and was unable to be interviewed by the author. Sir Geoffrey Palmer declined to be interviewed for this study. Following the introductory chapter of this study, a review of the literature concerned with the analysis of leadership and personality is undertaken. The powers of the Prime Minister in the New Zealand political system are examined as are the events surrounding the execution of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS dispute. This thesis then assesses the effect of Lange's personality on the dispute through an examination of situational factors, and a variety of aspects of his personality. This thesis finds that Lange's personality was instrumental in determining the course of events in the ANZUS crisis. Furthermore, this study concludes that Hermann's theoretical framework is a useful tool in determining the effect of a leader's personality on a particular foreign policy outcome.

In 1942 Curtin officially turned Australia to the United States for support and regarded the United States as Australia’s ally in World War II. Curtin’s call to the US set a precedent for Australia’s foreign and defence policy to rely on American support. This thesis analyses the Australian effort to become an ally to the Americans in the early 1950s and to increase American interest in the defence of Southeast Asia. ANZUS and SEATO culminated the Australian effort in bringing the Americans to the defence of Southeast Asia and Australia. Australia believed that it had ‘a special relationship’ with the United States through the formation of these treaties and regarded these treaties, especially ANZUS, as the cornerstone of Australia’s defence. The United States, however, did not give any special significance to these treaties and continued to treat Australia as it treated other friendly countries. The main focus of this thesis is on how the American-Australian alliance forged through ANZUS and SEATO influenced Australian foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia, especially in relation to issues such as the West New Guinea sovereignty problem, the defence of Malaya, Konfrontasi and Vietnam. The central argument is to examine how the American connection affected Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia. As both countries saw the importance of this area to their strategic and defence interest and were heavily involved in the defence of Southeast Asia after World War II, this thesis will analyse on how the Australians reacted to and interacted with the Americans. This thesis reveals that Australia’s suggestions, plans, views and opinions regarding events in Southeast Asia were constantly rejected by the Americans. This rejection however, did not deter the Australian government from continuously pursuing a policy that would impress the United States. Australia tried hard to be a ‘good buddy’ to the Americans and became ever more subservient and submissive to American wishes. Although there were cases where Australia tried to pursue a policy that differed from the Americans, as in West New Guinea prior to 1959 and in the defence of Malaya, these Australian efforts could not sustain pressure from other actors and were doomed to failure without the support of the Americans. The failure to pursue independent policies was influenced by the increasingly dependent attitude of the Australian government towards the Americans and the fear that Australia would be left alone to defend itself. As Britain, Australia’s traditional ally’s influence in Southeast Asia was in decline,Australia perceived that it did not have other choices but to cling ever more tightly and submissively to the Americans for its own survival.

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