Thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität Berlin. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-188).

In this essay I defend a skeptical thesis about the meaning of life: I argue that a meaningful life is impossible. I begin by examining the attempts of several philosophers to dismiss questions of the possibility of a meaningful life as either senseless or having an affirmative answer so obvious that serious philosophical scrutiny is rendered pointless. These philosophers, I argue, offer no conclusive arguments. I proceed to consider some skeptical arguments about the meaning of life. Although these arguments are suggestive, I maintain that they are undeveloped at crucial points, and thus unconvincing. To defend my skeptical thesis, I develop an account of a necessary condition for a meaningful life. I argue that in order for a person to have a meaningful life, he must be engaged in some activity of sufficient importance so that failure in that activity would constitute a good reason for feeling a painful retrospective attitude which I call remorse. I argue that one is justified in feeling remorse, in my sense, only when one fails in the attempt to realize some desire for a categorical good, that is, a desire for something which is good independently of how one happens to feel about it. I argue that we lack good reason for thinking that such justification exists. It follows that we lack good reason for feeling what I call remorse and thus for believing we might have a meaningful life.

Thesis (Ph.D. )--Duquesne University, 2007. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 191-197).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2005. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 276-282.

Thesis--Université de Rennes II, 1975. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 379-399).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2001. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-137).

No description available.

This thesis examines the entirety of Joseph Heller's career as a novelist and explores the various existential themes uniting a seemingly diverse body of work. Considering Heller's relationship to the philosophy of Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, "Towards a Postmodern Absurd: The Fiction of Joseph Heller" suggests that the novelist promotes the same existentially authentic lifestyle of revolt originally articulated by the French existentialists. Refuting the critical assessment of Heller's fiction as formless, this thesis argues that Heller deliberately structures his fiction around the concept of dejd vu in order to buttress the author's existential concerns with the absurdity of human existence. Finally, in response to the recent debates over Joseph Heller's place in the postmodern American canon, the thesis identifies the author's use of such postmodern concepts as pastiche and paranoia as a further reinforcement of the relevance of an absurdist worldview in contemporary America.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2007. / Principal faculty advisor: Elaine B. Safer, Dept. of English. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.