Habilitation--Universität Bern, 2001.

No description available.

It is claimed that action discourse provides us with a criterion of adequacy for a theory of action; that with action discourse we have a family of concepts which a theory of action must accommodate. After an exegesis of Davidson's essay "Agency", it is argued that his semantics of action is incompatible with our concepts of motivation and responsibility for action and of attributions of action and agency, and must, therefore, be rejected. A theory of rational agency is presented within which are to be found accounts of intention, coming to intend, intentional action, and an alternative semantics of action which connects the action essentially to agency. The theory of rational agency is then used to illuminate the concepts of trying, compulsion, autonomy and involuntariness, mistake, accident, and the so-called active-passive distinction. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 1998. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [412]-429).

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2009. / Andrea Scarantino, committee chair; George Graham, Sebastian Rand, committee members. Title from title page (Digital Archive@GSU, viewed June 22, 2010) Includes bibliographical references (p. 46).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by Alvin Plantinga and Thomas Flint for the Department of Philosophy. "December 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 384-404).

The Bhagavad Gītā, a classical Sanskrit text, describes a spiritual practice called karma yoga. Central to this practice is niṣkāma karman or action without desire. A number of philosophical issues present themselves in connection with this teaching. First, while the Gītā enjoins action, action seems prima facie problematic in the Gītā in light of metaphysical claims that seem to deny human freedom. Second, Western scholars who hold that desire is necessary for action find the Gītā's desirelessness requirement problematic. Finally, while the sense of karma yoga seems clear enough, the teaching is connected with two notions that are obscure: transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrender of action to Krishna. This dissertation explores and seeks solutions to these problems. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the Gītā's philosophy and selected classical Indian commentaries. Chapter 2 tackles the assumption by some scholars that the Gītā shares tenets of the determinist metaphysics of classical Sāṃkhya. This assumption is shown false and the argument made that the Gītā, as a yogic text, implies voluntarism. Chapter 2 offers an analysis of the Gītā's concept of guṇa (literally 'strand'), and argues that the puruṣa, or self, which is called a 'consenter' exercises agency in consenting. Chapter 3 addresses the worry that niṣkāma karman, or desireless action, is a contradictory notion because desire is necessary for action. Based on examination of the Gītā's theory of action, it is shown that the Gītā does not hold desire necessary for action and that in fact the text articulates four distinct types of niṣkaāma karman. Chapter 4 explores the concepts of transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrender of action to Krishna and develops a definition of karma yoga involving these concepts. The chapter concludes with an argument that karma yoga requires creativity. The dissertation closes with the suggestion that through karma yoga a practitioner might come to enjoy an extraordinary sort of freedom that surpasses the ability to exercise will. / text