This investigation is concerned with determining the role played in the development of a body of economic thought by the philosophic, political, and economic forces prevailing in the eighteenth century.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T11:34:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-alexandra-paulina-de-aguiar.pdf: 1083603 bytes, checksum: 3b4ed811817044fa4f1a0e560de1202e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T11:35:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-alexandra-paulina-de-aguiar.pdf: 1083603 bytes, checksum: 3b4ed811817044fa4f1a0e560de1202e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-28T11:35:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-alexandra-paulina-de-aguiar.pdf: 1083603 bytes, checksum: 3b4ed811817044fa4f1a0e560de1202e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O presente trabalho tem como proposta explicitar a concepção da natureza humana no pensamento de Adam Smith, isto é, buscar um entendimento da antropologia filosófica no pensamento do filósofo e economista moderno. Desse modo, será incorporado à discussão as principais obras do autor: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Lectures on Jurisprudence e Lectures on Rethoric and Belles Lettres, para aprofundar a tentativa de resposta do sistema moral de Smith. Entretanto, destacamos a primeira obra, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, por entendermos que esta obra estabelece os principais pressupostos da Filosofia Moderna que se aproximam do entendimento da antropologia filosófica, e também, por situar a discussão no cenário da "crise moral" dos séculos XVI e XVII. Outra ressalva a fazer sobre a discussão compreende a leitura que entendemos do método adotado por Smith, que se vale pela visão de sistema filosófico do homem e sociedade de mercado. Por isso, momentaneamente será abordado o tema com elementos que dialogam com outras obras do pensador. Em outras palavras, entendemos que as relações que imantam a escola filosófica escocesa do "senso moral", isto é, as condições que são sinalizadas para a natureza humana sobre os sentimentos morais, são proposições de um sistema filosófico moderno que se apresentam, mais adiante, como ciência social e econômica. Para tanto, o alcance que se busca neste trabalho compreende responder a seguinte questão: qual é o lugar no pensamento de Smith para a Antropologia Filosófica? Neste sentido, o método a ser adotado no estudo compreende analisar os pressupostos do sistema moral do pensador, à luz do tempo lógico e temporal do que pode-se nomear de "crise moderna moral". O estudo ainda sinaliza que a relação de intersubjetividade existente na ordem social e econômica estão expressos pelos sentimentos simpáticos - sentir com - que são sugeridos como resposta pelo autor para a nova ordem social e econômica moderna, e, ao meu entender, está situada no solo das regras gerais da moral. Diante deste contexto, nos faz considerar que a simpatia é explicitada como causa (conveniência social e econômica) e como efeito (aprovação e desaprovação moral). / The present work has the proposal of explaining the conception of the human nature according to the thought of Adam Smith, that is, to seek an understanding of the philosophical anthropology in the thinking of a modern philosopher and economist. In this way, the discussion will be incorporated with the main works of the author: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Lectures on Jurisprudence and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters, to deepen the answering attempts of the moral system of Smith. However, we emphasize the first work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, for we understand that this work establishes the major assumptions of the Modern Philosophy that approach the understanding of the philosophical anthropology, and also, by situating the discussion into the scenario of the “moral crisis” that took place during the centuries of XVII and XVIII. Another observation to make on the discussion comprises the interpretation that we understand from the method adopted by Smith, who goes by the vision of man’s philosophical system and market society. So, for a moment, the theme will be addressed with elements that dialogue with other works of the thinker. In other words, we understand that the relations that magnetize the Scottish philosophical school of the “moral sense”, i.e., the conditions that are signaled to the human nature about the moral sentiments, are all propositions of a modern philosophical system that are presented, later, as social and economic science. For such, the reach searched in this work intends to answer the following question: what is the place in the thinking of Smith for the Philosophical Anthropology? In this sense, the method to be adopted in the study intends to examine the assumptions of the moral system of the thinker, in the light of the logical and temporal time of what can be called as “modern moral crisis”. The study still signs that the existing inter-subjectivity relation in the social and economic order is expressed by the sympathetic feelings – to feel with – that are suggested as an answer by the author to the new modern social and economic order and, to my understanding, is situated on the ground of the general rules of moral. With this said, we consider that sympathy is explicated as cause (social and economic convenience) and as effect (moral approval and disapproval).

In this paper I am going to look at Adam Smith’s and Rousseau’s conceptions of conscience and the latter’s development of the third party spectator in the society of three in La Nouvelle Héloïse. The Smithian notion of the impartial spectator is supposed to make one behave better than we are capable of on our own, acting like a conscience which we consult when making choices, tempering our emotions and actions. In Rousseau, with a third party watching our response is indeed affected, but the external eyes of society and the awareness of the regard cause all kinds of problems because society is corrupt and we are corrupted in turn by our amour-propre. Rousseau develops the friendship of three as an alternative to society, which then involves a vested party who takes interest in the individuals. While he may not have been reading Smith, Rousseau develops a similar concept to the imagined impartial spectator, with one twist: his spectator is interested and is real. The third party spectator is interested in our virtue and he has both a say and a stake in the relationship. He is an actual third person looking in on the relationship as an invested spectator and participant but in order to successfully guide the other individuals, they must have the right interests and capabilities. The third party spectator must be invested in cultivating their virtue rather than suppressing nature or abandoning duty. In this paper, specifically, I will look at the failures of Claire and Eduard in La Nouvelle Héloïse to effectively guide the relationship between Saint-Preux and Julie. Then I will examine why Wolmar’s interests in Julie and Saint-Preux are ultimately the right reasons, making him the most able, if not completely successful, third party spectator. / text

No description available.

In this thesis I argue that Adam Smith is committed to moral egalitarianism, which extends to his theory of political economy. While Smith’s work is often used to justify economic inequality in society, I show that his political theory is best understood as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Using Elizabeth Anderson’s Democratic Equality as a model, I examine Smith’s commitment to equality in the space of social relationships. In particular, I argue that Smith’s focus on eliminating inequalities that cause oppression in society in conjunction with his efforts to design a political and economic system that will yield social conditions of freedom for individuals make him a relational egalitarian.

This thesis explores relationships between economics and theology through the concept of salvation. Self-interested behaviour is often equated with sin in religious circles including Christian theology, while it is the foundation of modern economic theory. Must there be a deep gulf between theology and economics in this and other areas? This is the question of the thesis. The aim of this thesis is to show that economics and theology are mutually intertwined, and that understanding these links contributes to a better understanding of salvation. By showing that self-interest is not only the main motive of economic behaviour but also the basis of theological faith, the thesis will investigate their mutual interrelationship. It argues that economics has a theological dimension as theology is embedded in economic thought, and that theology has an economic aspect as faith is dependent on the self-interested consciousness similar to economics. Different theology leads to different economics. Theological investigation of human behaviour cannot avoid economic account of human self-conscious desire as a way of salvation. The argument about salvation is developed in relation to the two major philosophers Adam Smith and G.W.F. Hegel. Smith???s self-interest is a natural instinct embedded in human nature, while Hegel???s self-consciousness is a rational ability to be realized. It will be argued that this bifurcation comes from the differences in their theological foundations regarding grace, original sin, eternality, transcendence, immanence, etc. The illumination of the theological foundations of the economic ideas of two main thinkers helps to enrich our understanding of the issues related to salvation such as: sympathy and recognition, poverty and the state, invisible hand and cunning of reason, evil and scarcity, and eschatology. This thesis concludes that human self-conscious desire is a way of salvation both in economics and theology as they are mutually interrelated in theologies of economics in Adam Smith and Hegel. This interdisciplinary thesis contributes to better understanding of human behaviour not only in the world of economics but also in the ethical and religious world.

In this paper I offer an analysis of the Adam Smith Problem. This Problem arises from perceived inconsistencies between Smith's economic work, The Wealth of Nations, and his moral theory, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that far from being inconsistent with Smith's economic theory, his moral theory serves as a necessary foundation. I suggest that, because he takes humans to be moral by nature, Smith defends social capitalism which requires moral economic agents rather than homo economicus. I then sketch some specific implications for the moral limits of Smithian social systems. / Master of Arts

The norms that mediate our responses to accidents play a critical role in facilitating social cooperation. My dissertation explores these norms with an eye towards what they can tell us about the nature of moral responsibility. Drawing on Adam Smith's brief, but important discussion of moral luck, I argue that our responses to accidents reveal the extent to which the obligations we incur and the moral appraisals we make of one another are often appropriately influenced by fortune. In particular, I show how making sense of these responses requires us to embrace the idea that we can sometimes be morally responsible for things without being culpable, and I argue that doing so need not do violence to our moral intuitions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, The Committee on Social Thought, Dec. 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-196). Also available on the Internet.

Adam Smith is often thought to be an unequivocal advocate of capitalism based on unfettered self-interest. Against this caricature, I argue that his attitudes towards commercial society are, in fact, more ambivalent. To ground this claim, I outline Smith’s account of ambition, a passion responsible for the dynamism of commercial economies but deleterious to individual happiness, and focus on the rhetoric Smith deploys in his portraits of three ambitious characters: the poor man’s son, the ambitious man, and the prudent man. Next, I challenge alternative interpretations. In particular, I contest Samuel Fleischacker’s view that Smith no longer sees ambition, motivated by vanity, as the driving force behind economic growth in commercial society by the time he writes the Wealth of Nations and, thus, is not meaningfully ambivalent. In the last section, I draw on recent work by Amelie Rorty to argue that Smith’s ambivalence towards commercial society is both appropriate and constructive.