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Abstract Every new scientific or technological development is often met with reactions, some positive and some negative .Same is true for the advent of any new technological innovations that could be a replacement or new applications of an older one. The advent of DNA Database and the move for its continuous expansion attracts not only Champions but Critics as well .Although the Forensic application of the currently developing DNA profiling for criminals’ identification (DNA Data base), has been accepted as a worthy technological advancement in crime detection, there has not been a unanimous acceptance on its possible expansion to include the entire population (National DNA Database) .The controversy is partly because of the social values which the NDNAD seems to undermine and partly because the NDNAD ,is never a ‘child of legislation’ , in that there is no specific ‘National DNA database Act’ which established the database, and defined what details may be stored in it or how it may be used. Instead, the database was created as a result of The Criminal Justice and Police Order Act 1994, which, though amendment of the Police and Criminal evidence Act 1984 established the condition would allow the database to be created . It is a debate basically on public utility vs private goods. Though the controversy rages, the insistence on NDNAD establishment is solidly backed up by the expectation that the endeavour will give a wealth of information that will be very vital to the society for criminals’ detections and social control. This work based on the communitarian usefulness of the programme, demonstrates that the wealth of social benefits accompanying the NDNAD programme, outweighs the hypothetical fears of having the programme initiated. I argued for the priority of the common well being over the individual good.

The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted several times to reform the way it approaches the issue of curial deference in judicial review. Each attempt however, has been in vain. This paper argues that the cause of this failure of each reform of the deference test proposed by the Supreme Court is not necessarily one of content, but instead one of structure. Each of the reforms retained a ‘multifactorial approach’ to the deference test, involving the weighing of several factors leading to a prescribed level of deference. Through critical analysis of the approach, and the postulation of an alternative, this paper argues that the multifactorial approach is what thwarts the Court’s intentions, and that it needs to abandon it should it wish to achieve clarity and coherence within judicial review.

No description available.

Inaug., dies, --Heidelberg. / Lebenslauf. "Schrifttum": p. 77-80.

Thèse--Université de Paris. / Appendices: I. Documents d'ordre générale (catalogue) II. Cas de juridiction contentieuse. III. Notices biographiques. IV. Pièces justificatives. "Sources": p. [5]-46.

This thesis surveys the last three decades of Canadian jurisprudence on the standards of review applicable to judicial review of substantive administrative decisions, with a focus on the guidance that is or is not forthcoming on the significance and practical application of reasonableness (deferential) review. My argument is that the doctrinal developments I survey trace out a burgeoning understanding of the purposes of substantive review which is at the same time a particular understanding of administrative state legitimacy. I refer to an account of legitimacy, or the legitimacy proper to law, that conceives of law as an aspirational project aimed at fostering relationships of reciprocity as between legal subjects and legal authorities. On this account (advanced in the work of David Dyzenhaus, and others), common law administrative law principles of procedural fairness and substantive reasonableness function as co-ordinate mechanisms for grounding administrative decision-making in a “culture of justification”.

The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted several times to reform the way it approaches the issue of curial deference in judicial review. Each attempt however, has been in vain. This paper argues that the cause of this failure of each reform of the deference test proposed by the Supreme Court is not necessarily one of content, but instead one of structure. Each of the reforms retained a ‘multifactorial approach’ to the deference test, involving the weighing of several factors leading to a prescribed level of deference. Through critical analysis of the approach, and the postulation of an alternative, this paper argues that the multifactorial approach is what thwarts the Court’s intentions, and that it needs to abandon it should it wish to achieve clarity and coherence within judicial review.

This thesis surveys the last three decades of Canadian jurisprudence on the standards of review applicable to judicial review of substantive administrative decisions, with a focus on the guidance that is or is not forthcoming on the significance and practical application of reasonableness (deferential) review. My argument is that the doctrinal developments I survey trace out a burgeoning understanding of the purposes of substantive review which is at the same time a particular understanding of administrative state legitimacy. I refer to an account of legitimacy, or the legitimacy proper to law, that conceives of law as an aspirational project aimed at fostering relationships of reciprocity as between legal subjects and legal authorities. On this account (advanced in the work of David Dyzenhaus, and others), common law administrative law principles of procedural fairness and substantive reasonableness function as co-ordinate mechanisms for grounding administrative decision-making in a “culture of justification”.

The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted several times to reform the way it approaches the issue of curial deference in judicial review. Each attempt however, has been in vain. This paper argues that the cause of this failure of each reform of the deference test proposed by the Supreme Court is not necessarily one of content, but instead one of structure. Each of the reforms retained a ‘multifactorial approach’ to the deference test, involving the weighing of several factors leading to a prescribed level of deference. Through critical analysis of the approach, and the postulation of an alternative, this paper argues that the multifactorial approach is what thwarts the Court’s intentions, and that it needs to abandon it should it wish to achieve clarity and coherence within judicial review.