三國之世戰事連年，社會從相對穩定的東漢時期走進亂世，地區軍事活動頻仍，為適應時代變遷，地方行政制度自然是三國政制改革中的重要一環。就此，孫吳的地方行政制度為州郡縣三級制，名稱依循東漠，但當中的細節實有不少調整，本文即選定了州郡縣行政系統、地方兵制、軍鎮督及州郡縣更為研究對象。礙於史料所限，現階段還不可能將整套孫吳地方行政制度復原，因此本文在分析孫吳制度時，乃以孫吳中央對地方(包括地方官及大族)的監控為重心。質言之，了解制度內容是研究方法，得知孫吳中央如何監控地方及其成效則為研究目的，兩者相輔相成。 / Regional military activities happened frequently during the Three Kingdoms Period. In order to adapt to the new age, all three regimes had carried out reforms on their municipal systems. Although Sun Wu had adopted the provinces(zhou)-commanderies(jun)-counties(xian) three-tier municipal system from Eastern Han Dynasty, its specifics had been adjusted. In this regard, this eassy is going to look into Sun Wu's municipal administration and military system, governors(dudu) and the low-ranking bureaucrats(li). Since the limited historical sources, the municipal system of Sun Wu cannot be restored completely at this stage. Therefore, this essay would focus on the scrutiny of municipal authorities and large families from the central government. In other words, analyzing the content of the system is the research method, while comprehending how the central government oversaw the municipal authorities and large families is the ultimate objective. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 余津銘. / "2013年7月". / "2013 nian 7 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-141). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Yu Jinming. / Chapter 第壹章 --- 緒論 --- p.1 / Chapter 一、 --- 研究動機 --- p.2 / Chapter 二、 --- 章節結構 --- p.3 / Chapter 三、 --- 名詞定義 --- p.4 / Chapter 第貳章 --- 文獻回顧 文獻回顧 --- p.7 / Chapter 一、 --- 「綜合式研究」回顧 一、「綜合式研究」回顧 --- p.7 / Chapter 二、 --- 「專題式研究」回顧 二、「專題式研究」回顧 --- p.8 / Chapter 1. --- 州郡縣行政系統研究 --- p.9 / Chapter 2. --- 地方軍事制度研究 --- p.12 / Chapter 3. --- 軍鎮督研究 --- p.13 / Chapter 4. --- 州郡縣吏研究 --- p.15 / Chapter 三、 --- 現存研究 之限制 --- p.17 / Chapter 第參章 --- 州郡縣行政系統 州郡縣行政系統 --- p.20 / Chapter 一、 --- 州郡制度的 特徵 --- p.20 / Chapter 1. --- 州：牧、刺史並置 --- p.20 / Chapter 2. --- 郡：尉部之置 --- p.25 / Chapter 二、 --- 中央對地方 行政系統 的監察 --- p.27 / Chapter 三、 --- 避籍制度 地方 監官長吏 的任用原則 --- p.36 / Chapter 四、 --- 下放地方長吏任用權 --- p.51 / Chapter 五、 --- 小結 --- p.55 / Chapter 第肆章 --- 州郡縣 兵制 --- p.57 / Chapter 一、 --- 聚兵制度 --- p.57 / Chapter 二、 --- 領兵制度下的 軍隊 性質私人抑或國家 --- p.71 / Chapter 三、 --- 地方 長官的 軍事權限 --- p.80 / Chapter 四、 --- 小結 --- p.87 / Chapter 第伍章 --- 軍鎮督 --- p.89 / Chapter 一、 --- 督區規劃與編制 --- p.89 / Chapter 二、 --- 軍鎮督與行政系統的關係 --- p.95 / Chapter 三、 --- 中央對軍鎮督的監控 --- p.99 / Chapter 四、 --- 小結 --- p.101 / Chapter 第陸章 --- 州郡縣吏 州郡縣吏 --- p.103 / Chapter 一、 --- 來源地位與工作 --- p.103 / Chapter 二、 --- 論「吏戶」 --- p.118 / Chapter 三、 --- 小結 --- p.123 / Chapter 第柒章 --- 結論 --- p.125 / Chapter 一、 --- 研究發現 --- p.125 / Chapter 二、 --- 研究貢獻及限制 --- p.127 / 參考書目 --- p.129

Inaug. diss. - Berlin. / Lebenslauf. Incomplete remainder of work appeared in Quellen und forschungen zur alten geschichte und geographic.

Inaug. diss. - Berlin. / Lebenslauf. Incomplete remainder of work appeared in Quellen und forschungen zur alten geschichte und geographic.

No description available.

No description available.

This dissertation presents work on gerrymandering in American legislative districts and on school competition and school choice. The work on gerrymandering analyzes how to measure gerrymandering and investigates some of its causal effects. The analysis of how to measure gerrymandering is presented in Chapter 1 and in the first half of Chapter 2. The context is the following. Legislative maps are often evaluated along dimensions of proportionality (the alignment between parties' seat shares and their state- or nation-wide vote shares) and competitiveness (the fraction of contests with uncertain winners). Since a map is intended to be used for multiple elections, policy-makers want to accurately predict how it will perform on these dimensions in the future. Doing this is difficult because future elections will differ from past ones due to changes in the demographic composition of the electorate and as a result of electoral shocks to preferences and turnout costs. Citing this uncertainty, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the judicial system is incapable of adjudicating claims of partisan gerrymandering. The first contribution of the dissertation is to develop a method for predicting the uncertainty in a map's performance due to electoral shocks and changes in demographics. The method relies on a structural voting model, which describes the preference and turnout decisions of a potential voter. The model decomposes an election into (i) a set of candidate qualities and (ii) individual-level utility parameters. I assess map performance in two steps. First, I examine the effect of electoral shocks by simulating alternative values of the candidate qualities and utility parameters. Second, I investigate the influence of demographic changes by re-running the simulations using different electorates. I apply the method to rich data from the 2008 to 2018 general elections in North Carolina and show that it allows credible and precise evaluations of maps. I also show that the method is better than existing approaches at predicting gerrymandering outcomes in excluded elections. The remainder of Chapter 2 concerns the causal effects of gerrymandering. Specifically, I examine whether the probability that someone turns out to vote is influenced by the competitiveness of his or her legislative districts. I do this by comparing outcomes over time for individuals in North Carolina who were placed into more or less competitive districts in 2011 as part of the decadal ``redistricting" process. I compare individuals who shared the same districts in each legislative chamber (U.S. House, NC Senate, NC House) before redistricting and who differed in districts for only one chamber after redistricting. Within these comparison groups, I match individuals on demographics and history of turnout and party registration. I find that being placed into a less competitive district reduces turnout. Effects grow over time and exist in both midterm and presidential elections. By 2018, having been placed in a district in which one party is always predicted to win versus one in which the parties have an even chance of winning reduces turnout by 1.9 percentage points for U.S. House districts and 1.4 percentage points for NC House and NC Senate districts. These results highlight the importance of considering district competitiveness when drawing legislative maps. Chapter 3 is work that is joint with Rajeev Dehejia, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Miguel Urquiola. It examines how schools' incentives are influenced by the way in which households make school choice decisions. A summary is as follows. Recent work examines whether households choose schools based on school value added (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2020; Beuermann et al. 2019). Given that value added is difficult to observe, households' choices are likely to depend on both (i) how much they care about value added and (ii) how well informed they are about which schools have high or low value added. We examine this concern using administrative data, a survey, and an experiment in Romanian high school markets. Using the survey, we can explain households' preferences based on their beliefs about school traits, rather than on the values of these traits that are measured by researchers. In the administrative data, we find that households' choices are better explained by measured values of peer quality than by measured values of value added. By contrast, in the survey data, we find that households' beliefs about value added and peer quality have equal explanatory power for their choices. This motivates an experiment in which we provide households with information on school value added. We find that the information has a positive but heterogenous effect on the extent to which households prioritize value added in their school choices. Effects are largest for households who were initially less certain of their choices and for households with low-scoring students.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1984 A85 / Master of Regional and Community Planning

Li, Xiaojia. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-170). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

This dissertation contributes to the definition of an analytical framework for the study of optimal jurisdictional size for local service delivery. We argue that the standard economics framework for the analysis of optimal jurisdictional size importantly neglects individual preferences for political accountability. Our theoretical model shows that once we take into account such preferences, the optimal jurisdictional size for the provision of local public goods is smaller than in the standard model. We obtain empirical evidence to support our hypothesis from a sample of 197 countries. Our results show that, in fact, demand for political accountability leads to higher jurisdictional fragmentation both in terms of greater number of jurisdictions and smaller average population per jurisdiction. In addition, a meta-analysis of the empirical contributions to the study of economies of scale in the provision of local services shows that the economies of scale expected from service provision to larger jurisdictional sizes may not be present except for a handful of local services, and limited to relatively small population sizes. The results of the meta-analysis signal moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of traditional local services. In light of these results, we argue that forced jurisdictional consolidation programs across the world justified by perceptions of excessive jurisdictional fragmentation, or by the expectation of large expenditure savings due to economies of scale may have been, thus, erroneously designed. From a policy perspective, multi-layered institutional frameworks for service delivery (including cooperation and privatization among other options) may allow targeting available efficiency gains more efficiently than consolidation.