How do we recognize that someone is thinking that the train is running late, desiring another cookie, or intending to make coffee? What is the cognitive process by which we come to attribute to another individual the belief, for instance, that Barack Obama is President? For the past few decades, philosophers working on Folk Psychology--i.e., those involved in the study of how people typically form judgments about others’ mental states--have focused largely on questions involving everyday attributions of mentality in terms of intentional states, like beliefs and desires. What I dub ‘the New Folk Psychology’ expands on this tradition to include everyday attributions of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., feelings and experiences). How, that is, do we come to recognize something as being capable of and having phenomenal states, like feeling happy or experience pleasure? The project is organized around three core topics. The first component attempts to identify the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness. This task is carried out with an eye towards addressing issues in the current folk psychology of consciousness debate, such as whether ordinary psychology incorporates something like the philosopher’s distinction between intentionality and phenomenology. My work (Arico 2010, Arico, et al. 2011) advocates a model of mind-attribution called the Agency Model. According to this model, whenever we represent an entity as having certain properties (for example, facial features), we automatically categorize that thing as an AGENT. This AGENT-categorization then activates a cascade of behavioral dispositions, including the disposition to attribute both intentionality and phenomenology. The second component concerns ways that the process underlying everyday attributions of consciousness might be related to psychological process involved in moral perception. My work to date has focused largely on the question of how it is that we come to see an entity as a moral being, as something that deserves moral consideration and/or is subject to moral evaluation. I argue that existing accounts of such moral perception are based on problematic experimental data (Arico, forthcoming). I then propose an amended Agency Model (Arico, under review), according to which seeing an entity as a moral being--like attributing it consciousness--is a consequence of categorizing that thing as an AGENT. I then utilize this cognitive picture in an attempt to explain the enduring normative ethical debate over which kind of mental capacity most fundamentally grounds moral standing.

Il primo capitolo offre un sommario della letteratura teorica ed empirica relative ai cicli di bilancio a livello nazionale e locale, iniziando dai primi cicli politici di bilancio detti “tradizionali” fino ad arrivare ai modelli detti di “political agency”. Viene discusso il filone di letteratura che scaturisce da quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica, cominciando dai primi modelli di segnalazione fino ai più recenti modelli teorici sull’effetto di selezione e di disciplina svolto dalle elezioni politiche. Un’enfasi particolare viene data alla rassegna dei test empirici basati su quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica e, in particolare, sul nesso tra decentralizzazione e trasparenza a livello locale. Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulle tematiche del ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassazione e alla spese in un campione di comuni italiani. Le stime econometriche indicano un forte ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassa comunale sugli immobili (ICI) e, utilizzando le predizioni teoriche dei modelli a informazione incompleta sul differente comportamento dei sindaci che possono correre per un secondo turno e di quelli che sono invece impossibilitati a ricandidarsi, viene mostrato come i sindaci al primo turno che possono ricandidarsi manipolano in maniera più intensa l’imposta comunale sugli immobili applicata alla prima casa. Le stime effettuate sul comportamento differente dei sindaci con limite di mandato e senza limite di mandato, relative alle scelte di tassazione applicate alla base imponibile ICI ordinaria, indicano pure la presenza di un effetto di disciplina di partito. Questo capitolo, inoltre, compie un passo avanti rispetto a precedenti stime sui cicli elettorali fondati solo sulla dinamica delle spese correnti e in conto capitale senza tenere in considerazione la natura di competenza o cassa delle poste di bilancio corrispondenti. Sono presentate alcune evidenze in merito all’esistenza di un ciclo elettorale nella spesa in conto capitale registrata in contabilità come di cassa. Viene fornito anche un test econometrico sull’effetto dei vincoli del patto di stabilità interno sui comportamenti di spesa dei comuni. Nell’ultimo capitolo, sono ulteriormente approfonditi i risultati presentati nel secondo capitolo relativi alle scelte differenti dei comuni sulle aliquote ICI ordinaria e prima casa, esplorando il nesso tra cicli opportunistici razionali e trasparenza degli strumenti fiscali. Viene presentato un modello formale a informazione incompleta che predice come gli incentivi politici per usare due diversi strumenti fiscali possono essere diversi, a seconda delle caratteristiche di trasparenza annesse ai medesimi strumenti. Le predizioni teoriche sottoposte a stima empirica sono le seguenti: 1) i sindaci al primo mandato utilizzano maggiormente l’addizionale IRPEF introdotta per i comuni nel 1999 rispetto ai sindaci che non possono più correre; 2) il turnover politico dovrebbe diminuire dopo la riforma che ha introdotto l’addizionale IRPEF e, in particolare, per i sindaci che usano maggiormente tale strumento; 3) la riforma dovrebbe agevolare la decisione dei sindaci di correre per un secondo mandato, essendo agevolata la probabilità di rielezione. I test empirici presentati utilizzando un campione di comuni italiani confermano le predizioni teoriche contenute nel modello. / The first chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature about political budget cycles at national and local level, starting from earlier traditional political business cycles models to political agency models. This last strand of literature is discussed, starting from earlier signalling models to the more recent advancements in theoretical predictions about the selection and disciplining effect of elections on politicians. A particular emphasis is given to the full review of empirical tests based on political agency models predictions about the links between accountability and decentralization, especially at the local level. The second chapter focuses on the issues of electoral cycles in taxes and expenditures for a sample of Italian municipalities. Econometric estimates show a strong electoral cycle on municipal property tax, and extending political agency models' implications about the differences in tax-setting behavior between first- and second-term mayors, evidence is shown of a stronger electoral manipulation of property rates applied to main residence tax base when mayors run for re-election. Estimation of property tax rates' sensitivity to term-limited mayors' fiscal behaviors also uncovers a party discipline effect on tax rates applied to business and non homeowner property tax base. Furthermore, this chapter goes beyond previous econometric estimates of expenditure cycles focusing solely on the dynamics of current and capital expenditures without taking into account the basis on which outlays are recorded in local budgets. Some preliminary evidence points to the existence of an electoral cycle in cash-recorded budgetary investment outlays. An econometric test on the effect of formal expenditures restraints on municipal spending behaviors concludes the chapter. In the last chapter, results from the second chapter relative to business and main residence property tax rates’ choices are further investigated, exploring the link between opportunistic rational cycles and accountability of tax instruments. A formal political agency model predicts that the political incentives for using the two different property taxes may be different, according to their level of transparency. Three empirically testable implications derives from theoretical predictions: 1) first-term mayors should use a local income tax surcharge, introduced in 1999 in Italy, more than second-term mayors; 2) political turnover should be lower following the reform, and in particular for mayors using more the local income tax surcharge and 3) the reform might also affect the decision to run again by mayors, as it should be easier to get re-elected after the reform. Empirical estimates using a sample of Italian municipalities are presented, confirming theoretical predictions of the model.