Coercive diplomacy attempts to use military force in a limited fashion as a diplomatic and political tool in order to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping. The use of limited military force in coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy, but rather a refined political and psychological instrument used for resolving a crisis. One relatively new instrument in the toolbox of limited force when engaging in coercive diplomacy, fashioned to deter adversaries, is the use of no-fly zones. The term no-fly zone describes the physical area of a nation that is patrolled using the airpower of another sovereign state or coalition. However, despite its relatively frequent use in its short history, it has largely been ignored in theoretical studies of coercive diplomacy. As scholars, such as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, have presented a critical view on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, this paper grounds the argument that there is still value in this approach. Given that the conditions of coercive diplomacy mainly focus on an array of coercive instruments at a political level, are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of the military instrument of no-fly zones? Hence, this paper illustrates the theoretical reach of the theories of coercive diplomacy by highlighting the fungibility of the coercive diplomacy’s theoretical ‘success conditions’ when assessing a single military instrument. By studying the political success and failure in four separate cases, this paper proposes an analytical framework, which is by and large, derived from Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Alexander George’s theoretical basis. However, as the theoretical basis does not fully cover all of the political dimensions of no-fly zones, an additional variable is proposed. The resulting analytical framework suggests that this is a viable approach, but only by combining Jakobsen’s revised conditions with the original work of Alexander George, in addition to the proposed variable. Thus, this result contributes to the large body of scholarly work on coercive diplomacy theory and the debate whether one can assess a specific coercive instrument with the political ‘success conditions’ of coercive diplomacy, or not. / Master Thesis

Ernst Alexander hat sich sowohl als experimentell als auch theoretisch äußerst fähiger Assistent von Georg von Hevesy im Institut für Physikalische Chemie der Universität Freiburg um die Entwicklung der Röntgenfluoreszenzanalyse verdient gemacht, habilitiert und wurde 1933 kurz nach seiner Ernennung zum Privatdozenten entlassen. Er ging an die Hebräische Universität Jerusalem, wo er das Arbeitsgebiet Experimentalphysik mit einer Institutswerkstatt aufgebaut, wesentliche Beiträge zur Röntgenstrukturanalyse geleistet und als Hochschullehrer fähige Wissenschaftler hervorgebracht hat. Während der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen stellte er Ersatzteile erst für die britische und dann für die israelitische Armee her. Ungeachtet seiner In Freiburg und in Jerusalem erbrachten Leistungen waren 1956 Institutsdirektor R. Mecke und der Dekan bei der Beurteilung seines Wiedergutmachungsantrages nicht bereit, ihm einen positiven Verlauf seiner akademischen Laufbahn zu bescheinigen, wenn er in Deutschland seine Arbeit hätte fortsetzen können. / Ernst Alexander was an assistant of George de Hevesy in the institute of physical chemistry of the university in Freiburg. He was a skillful experimenter with broad knowledge. He has done important contributions in the development of x-ray fluorescence analysis and has been qualified to give lectures at the university. In 1933 shortly after his appointment as lecturer he was dismissed. He went to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he founded the laboratory of experimental physics with a workshop, where he dealt with x-ray structural analysis. During the war he produced spare parts for the British and later for the Israeli army. In 1956 he applied for reparation, but the head of the institute, R.Mecke and the dean did not accept that he would obtain a professorship if he must not leave Germany.