International law today is a discipline rife with dissensions. This is largely because international law has meant different things to different generations of scholars and nation-states. In 1996 a United States circuit court in Atlanta affirmed a civil judgment against an Ethiopian defendant in an action initiated by Ethiopian citizens for violations of that country’s law and international law. But about a decade earlier in 1984 another appeal court denied to enforce claims against Libyan and Palestinian defendants under international law because according to the court, international law is dedicated exclusively to the relationship between independent states and not their citizens. Although such different interpretations may appear startling, over the previous centuries, courts have eschewed one view while embracing the other. It is thus imperative to examine what constitutes international law or under what authority a U.S. court could challenge another state’s treatment of its own citizens, in its own land, under its own laws. The Judiciary Act of 1789 which created the Alien Tort Statute, a relatively obscure piece of legislation is at the center of these actions. But what was the original intent of the Alien Tort Statute? Is it possible to reconstruct the meaning of that statute? To answer these questions, this dissertation critically interrogated the meaning of international law and the law of nations as it existed at the time of the founding of the United States. What was called the law of nations and subsequently international law revealed multiple meanings. In unpacking the history of the Alien Tort Statute, this dissonance was reflected in the conflicts which assailed the discipline. This dissertation therefore reproduces the dissensions as it analyzes and reconstructs a hitherto unexplored front in this debacle: lawsuits filed by some Africans in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute against their leaders and corporations for egregious human rights violations in Africa. In the end therefore, the issue becomes, can justice and reparations be achieved in United States courts for human rights violations committed in Africa?

Les mécanismes de soft law ont joué un rôle central dans le développement de la notion actuelle de la responsabilité des entreprises transnationales en droits de l’homme telle qu’elle est définie dans les Principes directeurs relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l’homme, une initiative approuvé par le Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations unies en juin 2011. La responsabilité des entreprises de respecter les droits de l’homme, telle qu’elle a été conçue par le Représentant spécial, repose sur les attentes de la société plutôt que sur une obligation juridique. Cela signifie que les entreprises « devraient éviter de porter atteinte aux droits de l’homme d’autrui et remédier aux incidences négatives sur les droits de l’homme dans lesquelles elles ont une part ». Les limites de cette approche sont importantes à moyen et à long terme. Même si l’approche pragmatique adopté par le Représentant spécial a permis de surmonter le débat au sein de la communauté internationale autour du Projet de normes sur la responsabilité en matière de droits de l’homme des sociétés transnationales et autres entreprises, elle a aussi éloigné la possibilité d’élaborer un instrument international imposant aux entreprises transnationales des obligations contraignantes en droits de l’homme. Construire la notion de la responsabilité des entreprises transnationales en matière de droits de l’homme uniquement sur les attentes de la société semble insuffisant et dangereux face aux victimes des abus de ces acteurs économiques. La responsabilité de respecter les droits de l’homme, telle que définie aujourd’hui, renforce l’acceptation d’un système international où les entreprises transnationales sont encouragées mais pas obligées à respecter les droits de l’homme, une solution qui laisse les victimes des abus dépourvues de toute action en justice et de réparation. L’objet de cette thèse est de présenter de manière succincte l’évolution de la problématique complexe de la responsabilité des entreprises transnationales du secteur énergétique en matière de droit international des droits de l’homme et de droit international humanitaire depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours, ainsi que de comprendre les principales limites de l’approche actuelle à la question, afin d’envisager des potentielles solutions. / Soft law mechanisms have played a central role in developing the current notion of the responsibility of transnational corporations in human rights as defined in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, an initiative approved by the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2011. Corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as defined by the Special Representative, is based on social expectations rather than on legal obligations. It means that companies should “avoid prejudice to the rights of others and to address adverse impacts on human rights in which they are involved”. The limitations of this approach are important in medium and long term. Although the pragmatic approach adopted by the Special Representative has closed the international community debate on the Draft Norms on the responsibility for human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, it also ends the chances of developing an international instrument requiring binding obligations in human rights for transnational corporations. Setting the notion of the responsibility of transnational corporations in human rights exclusively on social expectations seems unsatisfactory and dangerous towards victims of violations committed by these economic actors. Responsibility to respect human rights as defined today reinforces the acceptance of a system where transnational corporations are encouraged but are not compelled to respect human rights, a solution that leaves victims of abuse devoid of any legal action and redress. The purpose of this PhD thesis is to present briefly the evolution of the responsibility of transnational corporations in the energy sector in human rights and international humanitarian law from its origins to our days, as well as to understand the main limitations of the current concept in order to explore potential solutions.