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This thesis examines the period in command of British land forces during the American War of Independence of Sir William Howe. The previously untapped resource of a draft of Howe’s famous narrative to the House of Commons underpins the original contribution made by this thesis, which also draws original conclusions from more familiar documents. Howe’s command is considered in the light of four major factors: his relationship with subordinate officers; the composition and quality of his army; his relationship with the American Secretary, Lord George Germain; and his personal qualities and experience. These four factors are then combined to consider key tactical and strategic decisions made by Howe while in command of the British army in North America. No attempt has been made to examine every decision or event during Howe’s period in command. Rather, those most contentious and controversial events, and those that can be reconsidered using new evidence and new interpretations of existing evidence, have been focussed on. This thesis does not (nor was it intended to) systematically counter the prevailing opinions of Howe set down over more than two centuries of historical works. However, it can be seen that Howe had more reasonable grounds for some of his most contentious decisions than has previously been argued and his overall strategy for 1776 was more coherent than he is generally given credit for.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the nature of Russian foreign policy towards Iraq in the post-Soviet era. This thesis argues that the Russian foreign policy towards Iraq in the post-Soviet era has been primarily determined by Russia&rsquo / s self-interests which are mainly defined in economic terms. The thesis follows the realist approach to international relations. It also emphasizes the importane of economic factors in foreign policy making process. The thesis consists of five chapters: In Chapter 1, the thesis is introduced. Chapter 2 explains the Soviet-Iraqi relations from a historical perspective. This is followed by Chapter 3 where Russian foreign policy towards Iraq under Boris Yeltsin is examined. Next, Chapter 4 discusses the Russian foreign policy towards Iraq under Vladimir Putin. Then, Chapter 5 assesses the economic factors, socio-political factors and international factors affecting Russian foreign policy makers in the post-Soviet era. The last chapter concludes the thesis.

This diploma thesis focuses on the legitimization methods in case of George W. Bush's war on terror and Osama bin Laden's terrorist attacks. It takes into consideration the time period from the 9th of September 2001 (the date of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C.) until the 20th of March 2003 (the beginning of the USA's invasion in Iraq). Using the discourse analysis methodology, the thesis presents the different legitimization approaches, which were used frequently, or not at all. The analysis itself is based on a database of the official statements of the two leaders or their close fellows. The interpretation of these approaches and the analysis of the societal, political, cultural or religious context, highlight the common and different features of these two cases. The aim of this thesis is to argue that despite very different political roles George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden played, their legitimization approaches were, in fact, very similar.