This thesis is a study of interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, the cross-border zone between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, from independence to 2005. It argues that strong ethnic tension between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz was present during 'the Yellow Revolution' and the Andijan massacre in that year. The economically dominant ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan played a role in initiating the opposition due to ongoing political marginalization by the government, while the opposition appealed to Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism and failed to draw wider political support from the Uzbeks or other minorities. As a result, there the ethnic minorities' lines were divided into pro-Akaev and pro-Revolution group. In the case of the Andijan massacre, the Uzbek government, after the arrival of the Uzbek asylum seekers into Kyrgyzstan territory on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, had stirred latent fears amongst local Kyrgyz through their propaganda broadcasting. The economically marginalized ethnic Kyrgyz on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley had subsequently turned against the refugees and the tension was not alleviated until the refugees were moved to Romania by UNHCR. Both cases exhibit that the ethnic tension between these titular ethnic groups has deeper roots, which could be taken back to the pre-1991 Soviet era. A range of dynamics affect interethnic relations: (1) the potential for harmonious relations between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has been reduced by the rise of 'pure Uzbek' and 'pure Kyrgyz' ethnic-nationalism among these two ethnic communities in their newly created states; (2) a new economic aspect of the ethnic tension has arisen since 1991 in both eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan as a result of the ethnic Uzbeks dominating the local economy in southern Kyrgyzstan; and (3) clan networks have strongly influenced the flow of post-independence politics. The revival of Islam and fundamentalist and radical ideologies, before and after independence had added complexity to the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz relationships in the Ferghana Valley. Initially democratic nationalists and Islamic nationalists shared some goals, but this commonality faded as Islamic groups became to be seen as a critic and a threat to the Uzbek government and were subsequently banned. The ethnic Uzbeks express more religiosity than the ethnic Kyrgyz, while the majority of the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism are the Uzbeks and a smaller number of ethnic Kyrgyz supporters. The failure of post-independence economic transitions of both countries have deepened rural poverty in eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, and gradually created collective poverty on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The ethnic Kyrgyz have been victimized by the deepening rural poverty on both sides of the border. As a result, creation of 'poorer Kyrgyz' vs. 'richer Uzbeks' dynamic has sharpened the conflict between these two ethnicities.