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Agency and Autonomy: A New Direction for Animal EthicsEvans, Natalie 14 November 2013 (has links)
The main problem addressed in animal ethics is on what grounds and to what extent we owe animals moral consideration. I argue that many animals deserve direct moral consideration in virtue of their agency, selfhood and autonomy.
I start by providing an account of agency and selfhood that admits of degrees, from minimal to complex, among animal species that is supported by current research on consciousness and the mental capacities of animals. I posit that agency and selfhood are morally valuable as they allow for subjective mental experiences that matter to conscious individuals.
I then develop a view of autonomy that corresponds to my view of agency and selfhood, whereby the degree to which an individual is self-aware indicates the degree to which that being is autonomous. I argue that autonomy not only consists in the rational and reflective capacities of humans, but also at a more minimal level where autonomy is simply the ability to make choices. I support this view of autonomy as choice with an account of ???naturalized autonomy??? and explain some of the implications of this view for animals.
After considering the views of Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Bernard Rollin on animal ethics, I analyze the flaws in their reasoning and argue that my own view provides a stronger account for the direct moral consideration of animals. This is due to my inclusion of agency, selfhood and autonomy, which these philosophers mainly neglect.
I review some current reinterpretations of Kant???s moral arguments that claim animals ought to be considered ends-in-themselves. I present reasons why the inclusion of selfhood would strengthen this claim and further develop my argument for respecting the autonomy of animals.
I conclude that a theory of animal ethics based on agency, selfhood and autonomy provides the strongest account for the direct moral consideration of animals, as it is empirically informed and provides a moral middle path between animal welfare and animal rights.
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Atribuciones intencionales a animales sin lenguaje: aspectualidad y opacidad referencial / Atribuciones intencionales a animales sin lenguaje: aspectualidad y opacidad referencialDanón, Laura 09 April 2018 (has links)
Intentional Attributions to Animals without Language: Aspectuality and Referential Opacity”. It is generally accepted that intentional attributions are referentially opaque. But, as it is also stressed in the literature, referential opacity introduces difficulties to those who defend the attribution of intentionalmental states to non-human animals. In this paper: i) I identify one of these difficulties –which I call the problem of nonsense–; ii) I offer an answer to that problem. In order to accomplish ii), I begin by examining which are the behavioral and representational requisites that a creature has to satisfy so that our mental states attributions to it are referentially opaque but, at the same time, avoid the problem of nonsense. Secondly, I offer some empirical examples of non-human animals which seem to follow such requirements. / Usualmente se acepta que las atribuciones intencionales son referencialmente opacas. Pero, según se suele señalar, dicho rasgo comporta dificultades para quienes defienden la legitimidad de atribuir estados mentales intencionales a los animales no humanos. En este trabajo: i) identifico uno de tales inconvenientes–al cual denomino el problema del sinsentido–; y ii) ofrezco una respuesta al mismo. Para llevar a cabo ii) examino, en primer lugar, cuáles son los requisitos conductuales y representacionales que debe satisfacer una criatura para que nuestras atribuciones intencionales a ella resulten referencialmente opacas sin caer en el sinsentido. En segundo lugar, ofrezco algunos ejemplos empíricos de animales no humanos que parecen satisfacer tales requerimientos.
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