This thesis asks who is able to answer the call to action that the problems of global injustice pose. It focuses on the concept of institutions such as states, intergovernmental organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations as moral agents and whether such institutions can be said to be morally responsible for creating or responding to global injustice. It examines three theories of institutional moral agency as presented by Peter French, Toni Erskine and Onora O’Neill and the way in which their conceptions of moral agency are based on the idea of attributing moral responsibility. It argues that the nature of organisational decision-making structures provides an unstable basis on which to establish the moral responsibility of institutions. It presents an alternative account of moral agency that includes institutions but separates the concept of moral responsibility from that of moral agency. The thesis contends that it is only individual agents who are able to bear moral responsibility, in the sense of blame or duty, for moral problems but that a coherent account of institutional moral agency is important for understanding the moral responsibilities of individuals in terms of the power of their collective actions. It argues that while institutions are capable of responding to the call to action that global injustice poses,  it is individuals who bear a moral responsibility to do so.

This dissertation is about biological sex and how we ought to make sense of it. By biological sex I mean those elements of an individual’s body that are involved in reproduction of the individual’s species; by make sense of it I mean the way in which the occurrence of these elements and their interactions are conceptualized in our minds. Given certain things that are known about sex and reproduction, I argue in this dissertation that sex, maleness, and femaleness ought to be conceptualized in a specific way: this specific way is what I call the multidimensional model of sex. My argument challenges what I call the folk understanding of biological sex, which is (generally speaking) the understanding that most people in most places have about what makes a person male or female. This understanding, I argue, takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to be logically opposed and atomistic, and constitutive of categories with homogeneous members. I explore three important facts that challenge this understanding: 1) the emphasis on continuity within biological thought, 2) the understanding of sex differences within biology, and 3) the occurrence of intersexuality in human beings. Some authors have already proposed continuum-based understandings of SEX as a replacement for the folk understanding. I identify and discuss three of these: 1) the basic continuum model (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 2000; Blackless, et al. 2000; Kessler 1998; Preves 2003; Intersex Society of North America 2011a; Organisation International des Intersexués 2011a), 2) the multiple continua model (Stoltenberg 1989), and 3) the hybrid model (Stein 2001; Dreger 1998). Inherent to different degrees within each of these models is the belief that maleness and femaleness are somehow conceptually opposite (which is a belief also shared by the folk understanding). This belief, I argue, is not borne out in nature, as demonstrated in part by the occurrence of intersexuality in the species Homo sapiens, and the occurrence of hermaphroditism in other species. These occurrences, I argue, suggest another way to make sense of sex. The model of sex that I present is inspired by the occurrence of intersexuality and hermaphroditism, and also by Sandra Bem’s (1974) work on the concept ANDROGYNY. Bem reconceptualized masculinity and femininity as dimensions of psychological androgyny. I argue that the concepts MALE and FEMALE, and thus BIOLOGICAL SEX, can be understood in a similar way. I propose a multidimensional model of SEX that includes the concepts MALE and FEMALE as intersecting continua that create a space in which the separate features of an individual’s sex are each individually located. The dissertation concludes by discussing the moral implications of the multidimensional model, as some of our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of a person’s actions are related to our understanding of that person’s sex. But if the words male and female come to refer to individual parts of the body and not whole people (as I argue they would, if the multidimensional model were adopted), how would our ideas about the moral acceptability of certain actions and practices change? By examining this general question, I show that adoption of the multidimensional model of sex is important not just because it offers a more biologically accurate representation of sex: it is also important, I conclude, because there is good reason to think that adopting it could improve the quality of life for many.

Modern warfare in general, and targeted killing (TK) in particular, challenge conventional legal paradigms. While some contend that targeted killing is a clear violation of law, others argue that it is the law that should adapt to its modern context. In this thesis, I argue in favor of the latter. I will first explain the two dominant paradigms through which one can interpret TK: law enforcement versus armed conflict, going on to argue that an armed conflict paradigm can be legitimately invoked. In sections IV and V, I examine the rights and status of targeted individuals in modern conflict. I will then explore Jeremy Waldron’s objection to TK—that its potential for abuse outweighs its utility. I conclude by arguing that TK, like all warfare, is justified only by the unacceptability of its alternative, and that the justification of all warfare abides under the same pragmatic presumption.

This dissertation is about biological sex and how we ought to make sense of it. By biological sex I mean those elements of an individual’s body that are involved in reproduction of the individual’s species; by make sense of it I mean the way in which the occurrence of these elements and their interactions are conceptualized in our minds. Given certain things that are known about sex and reproduction, I argue in this dissertation that sex, maleness, and femaleness ought to be conceptualized in a specific way: this specific way is what I call the multidimensional model of sex. My argument challenges what I call the folk understanding of biological sex, which is (generally speaking) the understanding that most people in most places have about what makes a person male or female. This understanding, I argue, takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to be logically opposed and atomistic, and constitutive of categories with homogeneous members. I explore three important facts that challenge this understanding: 1) the emphasis on continuity within biological thought, 2) the understanding of sex differences within biology, and 3) the occurrence of intersexuality in human beings. Some authors have already proposed continuum-based understandings of SEX as a replacement for the folk understanding. I identify and discuss three of these: 1) the basic continuum model (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 2000; Blackless, et al. 2000; Kessler 1998; Preves 2003; Intersex Society of North America 2011a; Organisation International des Intersexués 2011a), 2) the multiple continua model (Stoltenberg 1989), and 3) the hybrid model (Stein 2001; Dreger 1998). Inherent to different degrees within each of these models is the belief that maleness and femaleness are somehow conceptually opposite (which is a belief also shared by the folk understanding). This belief, I argue, is not borne out in nature, as demonstrated in part by the occurrence of intersexuality in the species Homo sapiens, and the occurrence of hermaphroditism in other species. These occurrences, I argue, suggest another way to make sense of sex. The model of sex that I present is inspired by the occurrence of intersexuality and hermaphroditism, and also by Sandra Bem’s (1974) work on the concept ANDROGYNY. Bem reconceptualized masculinity and femininity as dimensions of psychological androgyny. I argue that the concepts MALE and FEMALE, and thus BIOLOGICAL SEX, can be understood in a similar way. I propose a multidimensional model of SEX that includes the concepts MALE and FEMALE as intersecting continua that create a space in which the separate features of an individual’s sex are each individually located. The dissertation concludes by discussing the moral implications of the multidimensional model, as some of our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of a person’s actions are related to our understanding of that person’s sex. But if the words male and female come to refer to individual parts of the body and not whole people (as I argue they would, if the multidimensional model were adopted), how would our ideas about the moral acceptability of certain actions and practices change? By examining this general question, I show that adoption of the multidimensional model of sex is important not just because it offers a more biologically accurate representation of sex: it is also important, I conclude, because there is good reason to think that adopting it could improve the quality of life for many.

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No description available.

The dissertation takes as its central problem the priority and value of nonviolent and pragmatic social epistemology. Many concede the desirability of nonviolent problem solving, but quickly and unreflectively assent to violence when the imagination fails to procure viable alternatives. Moreover, the kind and quality of knowledge gained through the use of nonviolence, it is argued, is far superior to the kind and quality of knowledge gained through the use of violence. This dissertation attempts to settle the discussion of the priority and value of nonviolence as a social epistemology by arguing for, and ultimately proving with the use of rationale and empirical evidence, that pragmatic nonviolence has more social-epistemological and/or value as knowledge than the available violent alternatives. Neither modern nor post-modern violence are able to produce knowledge with quite the same staying power, lasting effects, and high quality than that which is generated through what I call "pragmatic nonviolence." Traditionally, for a variety of biased reasons, classical American pragmatism has not taken a stand for either philosophical or methodological nonviolence. This unfortunate situation will, I hope, change with the argument in this dissertation. The issue of whether or not the social-epistemological value of pragmatic nonviolence, as a philosophical movement, has the potential to steer the course of contemporary social, political, and moral pragmatism into the 21st century, has largely been settled. The discussion and analysis offered in chapter one focuses primarily on the logic of domination, violent knowing, and violent realism. Historical context is provided to situate the central problems, compare sources of knowledge, and explore the relationship between violence and knowledge. The views of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, The United States Military Academy, Wendy Hamblet, Crispin Sartwell, Judith Bradford, and Aaron Fortune receive primary attention in chapter one. Chapter two focuses primarily on the development of a radically empirical social epistemology and theory of concept formation. I examine the roots of social epistemology and describe the problem of learning theory and concept formation through notions of habit, conduct, and struggle. The views of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Leonard Harris receive attention in this section of chapter two. I conclude this chapter by outlining concepts of peace and social justice as they demonstrate how social knowledge is created pragmatically. The views of Martin Luther King, Jr., Duane Cady, and Steven Lee receive attention in the latter section of chapter two. The analysis offered in chapter three centers on what I claim generates better knowledge: pragmatic nonviolence. The first section of chapter three describes the kind of normative epistemology I advocate and how pragmatic nonviolence offers qualitatively better knowledge than the alternatives. The views of C.S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Edgar Sheffield Brightman are considered in this section. The second section details the extent and value of uniting pragmatism and nonviolence, the need for a distinctly pragmatic conception of nonviolence, prophetic pragmatism, and American personalism. The views of Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Cornel West, and Randall Auxier are treated in this part. The third and fourth sections of chapter three applies the theories advanced in previous sections and chapters to demonstrate how pragmatic nonviolence generates better knowledge. The views of Myles Horton and Bob Moses are considered at length.

It is eminently logical that the bare first word of this essay should be as to the philosophical motive that makes it appear interesting and fruitful. If we let two circles represent, respectively, the fields of ethics and economics, it seems probable that they will somehow intersect, providing an area common to both. It is this presumptive borderland of ethics and economics that we intend to study under conditions of restricted method and scope. It should be confessed at once that our efforts will be necessarily and rigorously theoretical, our essay is one of partial clarification of the ethical character of certain economic theories of wages.

This thesis shows how the metaphysical features of the Jungian collective unconscious can be demystified by viewing the collective unconscious through the lens of functionalism. The features of the collective unconscious that will be investigated in this thesis are the possibility of the collective unconscious being present in every person, the archetypes as being the formal feature of some of our modes of perception, psychic energy, and synchronicity. By admitting functionalism, Jung doesn't need to posit synchronicity to explain how it is possible for the archetypes to interact with the body. This is because functionalism can view mental states as being material without needing another connecting principle, i.e., synchronicity, which goes beyond scientific explanation. If mental states are material and the body is a material thing, there is no need for Jung to explain how the archetypes interact with the body through synchronicity. In viewing the collective unconscious as a functional system, synchronicity can be dismissed while still leaving the rest of Jung's psychological theory of the mind in place.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: On entry to medical school, students are confronted with a worldview that can be typified as materialistic monism. The student progressively becomes a materialistic monist, not only because of the teaching, but also because medical schools fail to address the question of suffering. One would expect the biopsychosocial model to surmount the limitations of the biomedical model, but it in itself has to deal with both suffering and materialistic monism. Suffering cements the collapse into materialistic monism in the way the student practises medicine. What life strategies would transcend this materialistic monism? This thesis examines potential educational interventions that might help the student to analyse the philosophy of medical school and find ways of dealing with the question of suffering. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Met toelating tot mediese skool word studente gekonfronteer met ’n wêreldsiening wat as materialistiese monisme beskryf kan word. Die student verander progressief in ’n materialistiese monis, nie slegs as gevolg van die onderrig nie, maar ook omdat mediese skole nie daarin slaag om die kwessie van lyding aan te spreek nie. ’n Mens sou verwag dat die biopsigies-sosiale model die beperkinge van die biomediese model sou oorkom, maar instede moet dit self beide lyding en materialistiese monisme aanspreek. Lyding moedig die verval in materialistiese monisme in die wyse waarop die student geneeskunde beoefen aan. Watter soort lewensstrategieë is nodig om hierdie materialistiese monisme te transendeer? Hierdie tesis ondersoek die opvoedkundige intervensies wat die student kan help om die mediese skool se filosofie te analiseer en wyses te vind om die kwessie van lyding te hanteer.