No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-254).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Provincial electoral districts were first created in British Columbia in I869. At that time the criteria used to determine the ridings on the mainland were the existing mining division boundaries and on Vancouver Island the land district boundaries. Since 1869 many different sets of constituency boundaries have been used in the province. At all times the government has attempted to give the more settled areas the greatest number of electoral seats and yet provide each region of the province with legislative representation. Since electoral ridings were initiated, however, there has not been a stated policy by which the legislature has determined new constituency boundaries. In certain instances areal size has been the determining factor in deliniation, whereas in other cases electoral numbers were used. In 1965 the ratio of voting numbers between the largest constituency and the smallest was in excess of twenty-five votes to one. It was therefore believed that a major revision of British Columbia's electoral boundaries was due. There are three major methods by which new political boundaries may be determined; these being representation by population, by area, and by community of interest. Each method has certain qualities and liabilities. Representation by population is considered the best method of boundary delineation because the votes of all persons are then of equal weight. Since British Columbia contains such an uneven population distribution many constituencies created by employing this principle would be too large in area to be served effectively by one representative. As well, many urban constituencies would be extremely small. Therefore the thesis concluded that this method of boundary determination was not suitable for British Columbia. Representation by area was not considered to be practical for many ridings would contain only a few hundred voters while others over one hundred thousand. Therefore, representation by community of interest appeared to be the best method of determining legislative constituency boundaries. In this system the under-populated areas of the province would have few electoral representatives. Using this method of deliniation each riding would contain persons affected by similar problems and sharing common interests. Community of Interest regions were determined by isolating all territory which is primarily dependent upon a central settlement. Throughout British Columbia large settlements exist which serve the economic and social needs of the surrounding urban and rural population. The thesis recommended I that such regions would make good provincial constituencies since the rural and urban areas would have equal interest in both local affairs and development. To determine the sphere of influence surrounding each large settlement an examination of services provided by various sized communities was undertaken in order to determine which services were offered only by the larger nucleations. As this method of analysis was not applicable in the Lower Mainland area a study of shopping patterns and community activities was used as a basis for boundary determination. Each of these areas of common interest became the basis for the recommended urban constituencies. As a potential political instrument the value of a new set of electoral boundaries lies in the result which its employment would achieve. Using the 1963 provincial election statistics in the proposed constituencies, the results would have changed the political party representation in the legislature very little. Therefore more equable districts could be adopted without a shift in political party strength. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

My dissertation examines the influence of partisanship in decision making on redistricting in state commissions and judicial rulings. My central questions are twofold. First, do Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges engage in decision making that favors their respective parties? Second, what is the extent of partisan voting on bipartisan state redistricting commissions? These issues possess considerable substantive importance. Some states have considered moving redistricting responsibility out of the legislature and into state commissions, while some political scientists and legal scholars have suggested more vigorous court involvement in the regulation of redistricting. Implicit in many of these arguments is the assumption that federal courts and state commissions will act as neutral arbiters. But, very little social science research exists on the behavior of these institutions. My investigation combines quantitative and qualitative evidence, using interviews I conducted of federal judges and redistricting commissioners across the country, together with statistical analyses of court decisions and commission votes. I have 138 court cases from 1981 to 2006, totaling 414 observations or judicial votes. I argue that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor partisan maximizers. Rather, federal judges act as constrained partisans. Judges do not necessarily favor their own party's plans in court cases anymore than they do plans created by both parties under divided government. But, when a federal judge reviews a redistricting plan drawn up by a different party, and where the judge's own party is the victim of partisan line-drawing, she will be more attuned to issues of unfairness in the process. Under circumstances where Supreme Court precedent is unclear, partisan cues become more salient for the judge, increasing the probability she will rely on partisan influences to declare the plan invalid. Interestingly enough, these partisan effects in judicial voting vanish in cases where the Supreme Court delineates unambiguous rules, such as litigation concerning 1 person 1 vote equal population claims. My analysis of state redistricting commissions, based on the votes of commissioners and in-depth interviews with them, illustrates that commissions, like courts, are also not immune to partisan decision-making. Partisan factors tend to be the overriding concern of commissioners. / text