Integrated process models that combine both legal and extralegal variables provide a more accurate specification of the judicial decision making process and capture the complexity of the factors that shape judicial behavior. Judicial decision making theories borrow heavily from U.S. Supreme Court research, however, such theories may not automatically be applicable to the lower federal bench. The author uses vote dilution cases originating in the federal district courts from the years 1965 to 1993 to examine what motivates the behavior of district and circuit court judges. The author uses an integrated process model to assess what factors are important to the adjudication process and if there are significant differences between federal district and appellate court judges in decision making.

This study analyzes activist behavior of Supreme Court justices in 132 decisions which struck down congressional statutes as unconstitutional in 1789-1990. Analysis of the justices' activist rates and liberalism scores demonstrate that these votes are ideologically based. Integrated models containing personal attribute and case factor variables are constructed to explore the votes as activist behavior. The same models are also tested with a new dependent variable constructed to measure the nullification votes as liberal votes. The models which explain the votes as ideological responses better explain the votes than the models which explain the votes as activism or restraint. The attribute variables offer better explanation in the late 20th century models and the case factors offer better explanation in the early period models.

The theory proposed here is that the Supreme Court behaves in a strategic manner at the agenda-setting stage in order to vote sincerely on the merits. To test this, I measure the impact issue salience and ideological distance between Congress and the Supreme Court has on the agenda. The results indicate that whether the Supreme Court behaves either sincerely or strategically depends on the policy area. The strategic nature of the Supreme Court at the agenda-setting phase may be in large part why some research shows that the Court behaves sincerely when voting on the merits. By behaving strategically at the agenda-setting phase, the Court is free to vote sincerely in later parts of the judicial process.

Partisanship is found in voter and Congressional behavior. Members of the federal judiciary should behave similarly. I utilize cases involving the Republican and Democratic parties from 1966 to 1997 and examine the voting behavior of federal Courts of Appeal judges. I utilize both cross tabulations and a Logit regression model to determine the likelihood appellate judges will vote for their own party and against the opposition.

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Many studies have been completed on factors affecting judicial decisions. Studies have focused on civil rights cases, economic cases, criminal cases, sexual discrimination and obscenity cases, but no work has specifically looked at religious liberty cases. This work examines the factors affecting United States Courts of Appeals judges' decision-making in religious liberty cases. I hypothesize that gender, race, religious background, prior judicial experience, circuit, region and litigant status will all influence the way judges vote in religious liberty cases. The explanatory power of this study is relatively low, but the results indicate that judges follow the law when making decisions in religious liberty cases.

During the past twenty years, extensive research has been conducted concerning the judgmental processes of labor arbitrators. Previous research, sometimes referred to as policy capturing, attempted to identify the criteria or standards used by arbitrators to support their decisions. Much of the research was qualitative. Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variables, log-linear models such as logit regression have been used to examine decisional relationships in more recent studies. The decision cues used by arbitrators in 249 published alcohol- and drug-related arbitration cases were examined. The justifications for arbitrators' decisions were fitted into Carroll Daugherty's "seven tests" of just cause. The dominant cues were proof of misconduct, the appropriateness of the penalty, and the business necessity of management's action. Foreknowledge of the rule by the grievant and the consequences of a violation, equal treatment of the grievant, and an appropriate investigation by management were also important decision cues. In general, grievants in alcohol and drug arbitration cases fared as well as grievants in any other disciplinary arbitrations. However, when the cases were analyzed based on the legal status of the drug, illicit drug users were at a considerable disadvantage.

During the years following Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. district courts assumed the burden of implementing that decision across the country. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of the district court judges in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in that effort. The primary sources used are the district, appellate and Supreme Court opinions. This study concludes that many background variables used to study judicial behaviour are ineffective in this geographical area because of the homogeneity of the judges' backgrounds. But, as indicated by the Johnson appointments, a president can select judges that have a particular attitude toward an issue such as integration, if he has the desire and the political acumen to do so.

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My dissertation examines the influence of partisanship in decision making on redistricting in state commissions and judicial rulings. My central questions are twofold. First, do Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges engage in decision making that favors their respective parties? Second, what is the extent of partisan voting on bipartisan state redistricting commissions? These issues possess considerable substantive importance. Some states have considered moving redistricting responsibility out of the legislature and into state commissions, while some political scientists and legal scholars have suggested more vigorous court involvement in the regulation of redistricting. Implicit in many of these arguments is the assumption that federal courts and state commissions will act as neutral arbiters. But, very little social science research exists on the behavior of these institutions. My investigation combines quantitative and qualitative evidence, using interviews I conducted of federal judges and redistricting commissioners across the country, together with statistical analyses of court decisions and commission votes. I have 138 court cases from 1981 to 2006, totaling 414 observations or judicial votes. I argue that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor partisan maximizers. Rather, federal judges act as constrained partisans. Judges do not necessarily favor their own party's plans in court cases anymore than they do plans created by both parties under divided government. But, when a federal judge reviews a redistricting plan drawn up by a different party, and where the judge's own party is the victim of partisan line-drawing, she will be more attuned to issues of unfairness in the process. Under circumstances where Supreme Court precedent is unclear, partisan cues become more salient for the judge, increasing the probability she will rely on partisan influences to declare the plan invalid. Interestingly enough, these partisan effects in judicial voting vanish in cases where the Supreme Court delineates unambiguous rules, such as litigation concerning 1 person 1 vote equal population claims. My analysis of state redistricting commissions, based on the votes of commissioners and in-depth interviews with them, illustrates that commissions, like courts, are also not immune to partisan decision-making. Partisan factors tend to be the overriding concern of commissioners. / text