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This dissertation aims to examine The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the largest mechanism in the history of international arbitration, located in The Hague. The central thesis considered is the unique nature of the Tribunal as embodying elements of both conflict and cooperation at a time of considerable and ongoing hostility between Iran and the United States over various issues. Iran and America, following World War II, set up a unique relationship. This close cooperation resulted in antagonism after the Islamic Revolution in 1979; the American diplomats were taken hostage, and a number of multi-billion dollar contracts and transactions were terminated. Several avenues were sought to resolve the problem. Finally, the Algerian government stepped in as an intermediary to resolve the issue. Iran and the United States agreed to establish the Tribunal in 1981. The level of confrontation between Tehran and Washington was so strong that the Tribunal suspended its operation for months. The Tribunal not only managed to survive, but it also made it possible; as a safe haven, as a legitimate forum and as a joint embassy for the parties, to extend their day-to-day cooperation for almost thirty years. How and under what conditions have Iran and America, labelled by each other as the "Axis of Evil" and the "Great Satan" been able to cooperate in the absence of diplomatic relations? How do the Agents of an allegedly "World-devouring America" and the "Terrorist sponsoring Iran" meet face to face in an institution which itself is the product of severe enmity? All such questions could be answered by the unique nature of the Tribunal: its decisions are based upon "political exigency" and cultural expediency "rather than legal foundations." Two simultaneous forces of conflict and cooperation have been in process: at a time when the American navy was raiding the Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf, a big case amounting to billions of dollars was being negotiated at the Tribunal forum through an out-of court settlement process. At the time when this dissertation is produced, the same contending forces of discord and collaboration are in operation: on the one hand there exists Iran-US nuclear standoff on the international level, and on the other hand certain multi-billion dollar oil and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are decided at the Tribunal. The Tribunal premises have been used as a forum for "deliberation" on major legal and political disputes. It has been both praised and blackballed. At one extreme, it has been regarded as "a gold mine of information" and at the other extreme its rulings are not considered to be applicable in other financial disputes because of the "political compromise within the Tribunal." Iran and America have found it necessary, under the condition of uncertainty, to make concessions to ensure the integrity of the Tribunal and the latter in turn has equipped itself with a proper strategy of survival by establishing its own rules and procedures. Around four thousand cases have been brought before the Tribunal, with each case involving various conflicts of interest. In all of those issues, the forces of cooperation have prevailed. By resolving those cases, the Tribunal has achieved its fundamental objectives: conflict resolution by peaceful means. The Tribunal will cease to exist only when Iran and America open diplomatic relations.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1939. / Vita. Published also without thesis note. "Table of cases": p. 407-415. "Bibliography": p. 382-405.

Thesis: M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1975 / Bibliography: leaves 110-112. / M.S. / M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management

As the investment treaty arbitration regime matures, consensus is emerging as to the need for public interest considerations to be taken into account in resolving disputes under international investment agreements (IIAs). However, the question of how such considerations should be reflected remains contentious. This thesis proposes that the remedies stage of the process can, and should, play a role in taking account of public interest considerations and so in easing the tension between host state regulatory sovereignty and investment protection that lies at the heart of the investment treaty regime. Thus, this thesis argues that, while, on the one hand, there is a need to introduce an element of reciprocity into the investment treaty arbitration process in order to ensure continuing state co-operation and to reflect the broader underlying purposes of IIAs, on the other, the primary object of the system remains the protection of foreign investors. These competing imperatives can lead to difficulties in taking account of public interest considerations at the merits stage of the arbitration process. Therefore, in order to reconcile these competing imperatives and to achieve an optimal balance between host state regulatory sovereignty and investment protection, this thesis proposes that public interest considerations should be recognised at the remedies stage where such considerations cannot be taken into account either sufficiently or at all at the merits stage and identifies a number of situations in which this approach would be appropriate. Potential doctrinal bases for implementation of this approach are also examined and the conclusion reached that, given the significant degree of discretion afforded to tribunals in applying the full reparation principle and the role that equity can permissibly play in quantifying damages, this approach can, save in the case of lawful expropriations, be implemented within the parameters of existing legal principles.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Genève, 1938. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [103]-107) and index.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Genève, 1938. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [103]-107) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1930. / Published also without thesis note. Cover title: The technique of international conferences. Bibliography: p. 106-116.

Inaug.-diss.-Heidelberg. / Lebenslauf. Published in full in the Zeitschrift für deutschen civilprozess. "Literaturverzeichnis und abkurzungen": p. [8]-11.

This thesis examines the role of necessity, as a defence to State responsibility, in international law. Necessity provides a State with a defence to the responsibility that would otherwise arise from its breach of an international obligation where the only way that State can safeguard an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril is to breach an obligation owed to a less imperilled State. It is a defence that has generated a considerable body of jurisprudence in recent years and yet it continues to be plagued by a perception that States have abused it in the past and by fears that States will abuse it in the future - 'necessity', declared the German Chancellor on the eve of World War I, 'knows no law'. This thesis contends that this perception is flawed and these fears are unfounded. The main claim of this thesis is that necessity operates as a safety valve within the law of State responsibility that mediates between the binding quality of international obligations and the harsh consequences that may follow from requiring compliance with those obligations at all costs. This safety valve promotes the reasonable application of international law and it recognises that international law must sometimes bend so that it does not break. The thesis bears out this claim by contending that necessity has a stronger pedigree than is commonly appreciated and that it is solidly grounded in, and its contours are constrained by, customary international law. It charts those contours by first examining the scope of the obligations to which necessity may provide a defence, which includes examining how necessity relates to fields of law that contain their own safety valves regulating emergency situations. It then proceeds to examine the conditions that a State must satisfy in order to establish necessity and it finally examines the consequences of necessity, including for the stability of international law. The thesis concludes that any suggestion that 'necessity knows no law' has no place in international law today.