Thesis advisor: Christopher Kelly / Hannah Arendt makes one of the most forceful cases for political life in the history of political thought. In doing so, she praises most prominent republican thinkers from Aristotle to Tocqueville. A unique exception to this praise is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to whom Arendt subjects to a blistering critique, a critique all the more surprising in light of their comparable concerns regarding science, technology, capitalism, and Christianity, a contrast fleshed out in Chapter I. Exploring Arendt’s explicit critique of Rousseau in On Revolution, however, fails to provide a satisfying answer as to why, despite their shared discontent with modernity, and despite their shared commitment to republicanism, they develop such starkly different conceptions of citizenship, primarily because Arendt confronts those who launched the Reign of Terror rather than Rousseau himself. More precisely, as Chapter II concludes, Arendt argues that Rousseau’s conception fails to meet her standards of political life without addressing the end for the sake of which Rousseau makes his case for citizenship. Their disagreement, therefore, can become of greater interest only once that end is brought to light, a task taken up in the next three chapters. After exploring Rousseau’s case for the weak form of public liberty in Chapter III, as well as the problems that arise from conceiving of citizenship in those terms with a view to the good life, Chapter IV discusses at length the apparently strong disagreement between Rousseau and Arendt over the importance and goodness of pursuing honor or glory in political life, primarily by way of Rousseau’s most vivid account of citizenship, Considerations on the Government of Poland and On Its Planned Reformation. Although Poland helps to demonstrate that, pace traditional interpretations of him, Rousseau has a positive case for satisfying amour-propre, the work also points to difficulties concerning whether Rousseau’s case for citizenship is primarily bound up with what is good for the community or what is good for the individual. Accordingly, Chapter V qualifies Poland’s surface case for honor by circumscribing its pursuit by the demands of happiness, which ultimately leads to a variety of ways in which an individual can experience being a citizen in Rousseau’s view, a set of possibilities quite consistent with the inegalitarian teaching of Rousseau’s oeuvre. With Rousseau’s horizon of happiness in place, Chapter VI explores Arendt’s case against happiness. Despite the many references to public happiness in On Revolution, The Human Condition quietly but clearly argues that citizens, properly speaking, are not concerned with being happy, which brings to light the most important and interesting disagreement between Rousseau and Arendt. Chapter VII thus concludes that comparing Rousseau and Arendt forces us to consider whether human beings should seek happiness or honor, rest or recognition. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (November 20, 2006) Vita. Includes bibliographical references

Diss.--Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2001. / Contient un resumé. Bibliogr. p. 155-162.

This thesis develops a theory of action, drawing chiefly on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. I begin with a discussion of some popular theories of action. As I argue, these theories tend to suffer from three problems: they do not distinguish action from everyday behaviour, they do not account for the way in which action transforms the identity of the actor, and they tend to neglect the innovative and initiatory character of action. In chapter two, I discuss Arendt’s theory of political action, which goes a long way toward redressing these problems. However, the value of Arend's work is limited by her characterisation of the public sphere as subsumed by a 'social' rather than political form of community. Accordingly, I follow Dana Villa and Bonnie Honig's suggestions that a broader understanding of action is required in order to overcome the weaknesses of Arendt's work. In chapters four and five, I demonstrate that a reading of Foucault can yield just such a broader understanding. I begin with an analysis of The History of Sexuality and the argument that the transformation of ethical subjectivity can function as a means of resistance to the normalising effects of power, before moving on to discuss the essay 'What Is Enlightenment?' I argue that these works are part of a 'transformative project,' in which Foucault aims to facilitate the transformation of subjectivity as a means of resistance to social normalisation. This transformative project can be adapted into a theory of action that locates action within contemporary society but shares some of the best aspects of Arendt's theory. Finally, drawing on the work of Foucault and Adriana Cavarero, these theoretical reflections are applied to a discussion of action in the context of small communities. Small-community models of action are an important consideration because they allow us to avoid the traditional dichotomy between action as a task for the individual who transgresses social norms and action as a project of social reform.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Litt. et civilisation germaniques--Toulouse 2, 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 172-214. Bibliogr. des oeuvres d'E. Arendt p. 165-172. Index.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Litt. et civilisation germaniques--Toulouse 2, 2001. / La couv. porte : "Tome 1" Contient des textes en français et en allemand. En appendice, fac-sim. de manuscrits d'E. Arendt.

Zugl.: Freiburg (Breisgau), Univ., Diss., 2008

This thesis develops a theory of action, drawing chiefly on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. I begin with a discussion of some popular theories of action. As I argue, these theories tend to suffer from three problems: they do not distinguish action from everyday behaviour, they do not account for the way in which action transforms the identity of the actor, and they tend to neglect the innovative and initiatory character of action. In chapter two, I discuss Arendt’s theory of political action, which goes a long way toward redressing these problems. However, the value of Arend's work is limited by her characterisation of the public sphere as subsumed by a 'social' rather than political form of community. Accordingly, I follow Dana Villa and Bonnie Honig's suggestions that a broader understanding of action is required in order to overcome the weaknesses of Arendt's work. In chapters four and five, I demonstrate that a reading of Foucault can yield just such a broader understanding. I begin with an analysis of The History of Sexuality and the argument that the transformation of ethical subjectivity can function as a means of resistance to the normalising effects of power, before moving on to discuss the essay 'What Is Enlightenment?' I argue that these works are part of a 'transformative project,' in which Foucault aims to facilitate the transformation of subjectivity as a means of resistance to social normalisation. This transformative project can be adapted into a theory of action that locates action within contemporary society but shares some of the best aspects of Arendt's theory. Finally, drawing on the work of Foucault and Adriana Cavarero, these theoretical reflections are applied to a discussion of action in the context of small communities. Small-community models of action are an important consideration because they allow us to avoid the traditional dichotomy between action as a task for the individual who transgresses social norms and action as a project of social reform.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2007--Konstanz. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 2006.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of European Studies, 2001. / Bibliography: leaves 276-298.