Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T17:22:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo6076_1.pdf: 2825689 bytes, checksum: d1ce9b137020083cf37c5966c5ca3adc (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Constituindo-se um mecanismo político de interferência na garantia, modificação ou implementação de direitos da sociedade, todavia freqüentemente confundida com outras atitudes, a desobediência civil e neste trabalho toma-se como conceito o delineado por Hannah Arendt em seu ensaio Desobediência Civil - pode-se constituir também um instrumento no fortalecimento da cidadania. Na perspectiva deste trabalho, conceitua-se cidadania como uma prática conflituosa vinculada ao poder, que reflete questões como quem poderá dizer o quê, ao definir quais são os problemas comuns e como serão tratados, em especial nos espaços públicos criados ou mantidos pela sociedade civil. Exemplificamos com um estudo de caso de uma rádio comunitária, uma vez que as dificuldades existentes para legalização deste espaço nos apontam que a estrutura legal para validá-lo criada pelo Estado é inconsistente e inclinam à descaracterização das rádios comunitárias em suas finalidades e objetivos, e cujo fato tem lesado direitos e restringido o espaço público originário da sociedade civil. Observa-se que permanece a tensão entre representação e participação cidadã, quando a construção democrática requer ambos processos, uma vez que democracias baseadas em situações delegativas têm pela frente o enfraquecimento, diante do não contemplamento do implemento e desenvolvimento das formas de participação e controle pela sociedade civil. Desta forma, a desobediência civil pode ser um instrumento valioso uma vez que pode atuar na manutenção, ampliamento e criação de espaços de interferência, discussão e reivindicação política

Univ., Diss.--Stuttgart, 2007.

Univ., Diss.--Paris., 1996.

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Ahrens, Stefan: Legitimität und Gründung--Oldenburg, 2004.

Univ., Diss.--Wuppertal.

Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2004/2005

Zugl.: Würzburg, Univ., Diss., 2004

No description available.

This thesis considers contemporary education from a philosophical angle via the work of Hannah Arendt in light of education's key place a the intersection of responsibility for the past, empowerment to effect change in the present, and hope for the future. Chapter 1 sets out an understanding of human community as a chaotic system in the technical sense via Arendt's concept of natality, applying this understanding to the project of education as a way of helping educators facilitate students' ability to contribute something new without controlling students' potentially unique contributions. Chapter 2 questions in more detail the applicability of some of Arendt's philosophical and political ideas to multicultural education, addressing also the need for setting goals for action without assuming a deterministic, mathematically linear process. Chapter 3 examines Arendt's firm distinction between education and politics in the context of globalization and the possibility of continual renewal and transformation of our world.

My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between intersubjectivity and imagination in Hannah Arendt. The objective of my dissertation is to demonstrate that Arendt has a theory of imagination that provides a substratum to explain her key notions such as "action," "freedom" "beginning," "history," "power," "understanding," "appearance," "space of appearance," and "judgment." In other words, my dissertation shows that not only are these notions related, and not only do they characterize Arendt's account of the political life as fundamentally intersubjective, but they are also derived from her peculiar understanding of imagination that arises within the phenomenological legacy. <br> The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an analysis to suggest a strong relation between imagination and taste as an intersubjective phenomenon in Arendt's Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy (1992). Chapter 2 traces the "possible" nature of imagination in Arendt's notion of "action and "understanding" back through her various works, beginning with the essay "Understanding and Politics" (Difficulties of Understanding) (1954) and the last chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), the proceeding through further analyses in The Human Condition (1958). There is an intermediate section outlining the structure of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focuses on what Arendt calls "metaphysical fallacies" that are derived from thinking activity and the thinking ego in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Moreover, this chapter serves as a preparatory discussion and analysis for the following chapter, in addition to discussing how Arendt tries to reestablish a linkage between thinking and judgment based on intersubjectivity, echoing her encounter of Adolf Eichmann's "thoughtlessness." The last chapter demonstrates that these analyses of the "metaphysical fallacies," which Arendt points out in The Life of the Mind: Thinking, are her implicit criticism of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1973). Furthermore and finally, by pointing out several parallelisms between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Arendt's criticism, the chapter offers a way to reconstruct Arendt's account of intersubjectivity as her own phenomenological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination as reproductive imagination against the productive imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;