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Imagining and reasoning : an attempt to define a clear conceptual distinction between two cognitive strategies available for the manipulation of informationWilliams, Bryn Rhys January 2000 (has links)
In this study, I attempt to identify a distinct role for the imagination in manipulating and organising information states. To this end, I begin with an exegesis of Aristotle's account of phantasia in De Anima. I argue against two established views of the nature of Aristotle's phantasia-the view that phantasia is merely a faculty for apprehending appearances, and the view that it is a special catch all faculty for having "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences". I then continue to argue that for Aristotle, phantasia was a distinct faculty that discriminates between experiences by virtue of recognition. Once I have established the plausibility of such a position, I move from consideration of Aristotle's idea of phantasia to an account of recent evidence provided by cognitive science for distinguishing a capacity for manipulating information which is recognition based, and conceptually distinct from reason, or "theory-driven" thought. To this end, I appeal to evidence concerning the nature of spatial reasoning, and provide an exhaustive account of the "Imagery Debate" as paradigmatic of non-theory driven cognitive capacities. Finally, I provide an account of the mechanisms that underlie the efficacy and domain of non-theory driven thought by appeal to two explanatory resources: Simulation theory, and idea of a "cognitive map".
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Not Ideas About the Thing But the Thing Itself: Thomas Reid's Epistemology in the Light of Artistotle's "De Anima"DeMoor, Michael 09 1900 (has links)
This thesis argues that, in spite of his explicit denunciation of Aristotle's theory of perception and thought, Thomas Reid's own theory of perception marks a return to the central themes of Aristotle's theory. It is argued, first, that Aristotle's 'De Anima' presents an account of sensation and thought in which the functions of the object of perception play the determining role with respect to the structure, order and intelligibility of the act of perception. Thomas Aquinas' and Descartes' transformation of Aristotle's account are then discussed, showing how the "apparatus" of Aristotle's theory remains while the ground of order and intelligibility is shifted from the functions of the object of perception to those of the perceiver as subject. The theories of the British empiricists are then shown to be continuous with this transformation of Aristotle's thought. Finally, it is argued that Reid returns to an objectivism by way of his rejection of the subjectivistic transformation wrought by Descartes et al. It is argued that this rejection is not---as Reid himself believes---a rejection of the crucial aspects of Aristotle's theory, but instead constitutes a return to its primary themes and theses.
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Aristotelian rationality of animals : phantasia as a commonality of human and animal cognitive processesWorkman-Davies, Bradley Wayne 03 1900 (has links)
This dissertation investigates Aristotle’s theory of phantasia as a cognitive
ability, in terms of which mental content is available to the mind of rational
beings. The focus is on Catherine Osborne’s extension of phantasia to nonhuman
animals in order to allow for and explain non-human animal
behaviour in terms of a rational paradigm, which de-emphasises, and does
not rely on, linguistic ability. This paradigm for understanding animal
behaviour as rational supports, and is supported by, modern theories of
cognitive ethology, and argues for the ability of animals to share in
conceptual thought. The recognition of rationality in animals by means of
this paradigm bears ethical consequences for the treatment of animals. / Classics and Modern European Languages / M.A. (Classical Studies)
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Aristotelian rationality of animals : phantasia as a commonality of human and animal cognitive processesWorkman-Davies, Bradley Wayne 03 1900 (has links)
This dissertation investigates Aristotle’s theory of phantasia as a cognitive
ability, in terms of which mental content is available to the mind of rational
beings. The focus is on Catherine Osborne’s extension of phantasia to nonhuman
animals in order to allow for and explain non-human animal
behaviour in terms of a rational paradigm, which de-emphasises, and does
not rely on, linguistic ability. This paradigm for understanding animal
behaviour as rational supports, and is supported by, modern theories of
cognitive ethology, and argues for the ability of animals to share in
conceptual thought. The recognition of rationality in animals by means of
this paradigm bears ethical consequences for the treatment of animals. / Classics and Modern European Languages / M.A. (Classical Studies)
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