Armed, illegal non-state actors control small but important sectors of both Brazil and Colombia. In these two countries, traffickers and large gangs concentrated in urban (and, in Colombia's case, also rural) areas clash heavily with state security forces, dominate significant numbers of the urban poor, and play a large, threatening role in the public's imagination. Some vital research has been done on the political and sociological dynamics within the zones controlled by these actors, but there is less in the literature that deals with the specific activities of community media and their relations with the ruling gangs and with local residents. This dissertation focuses on two community media groups, one in Bogotá, and one in Rio de Janeiro, both of which operate in informal urban slums controlled by gangs. It argues that in both cases these groups provide some checks to manifestations of authoritarian aggression, the infliction of arbitrary violence on residents and the climate of fear promulgated by the armed actors in these communities. These community media groups are able to do this by capitalizing on community resistance, by building informal relations and networks with gang membership, and by mobilizing notions of political legitimacy. / acase@tulane.edu

Armed, illegal non-state actors control small but important sectors of both Brazil and Colombia. In these two countries, traffickers and large gangs concentrated in urban (and, in Colombia’s case, also rural) areas clash heavily with state security forces, dominate significant numbers of the urban poor, and play a large, threatening role in the public’s imagination. Some vital research has been done on the political and sociological dynamics within the zones controlled by these actors, but there is less in the literature that deals with the specific activities of community media and their relations with the ruling gangs and with local residents. This dissertation focuses on two community media groups, one in Bogotá, and one in Rio de Janeiro, both of which operate in informal urban slums controlled by gangs. It argues that in both cases these groups provide some checks to manifestations of authoritarian aggression, the infliction of arbitrary violence on residents and the climate of fear promulgated by the armed actors in these communities. These community media groups are able to do this by capitalizing on community resistance, by building informal relations and networks with gang membership, and by mobilizing notions of political legitimacy. / acase@tulane.edu

What conditions lead to confidence among civil war combatants that they will not face accountability for perpetrating sexual violence? This study investigates the causes of impunity for sexual violence among armed actors. It develops a theoretical framework which identifies three explanations for armed group impunity for sexual violence, namely (1) flawed prohibitions inside an armed group; (2) negligent enforcement by its authorities; and (3) pardons in the form of amnesties during the peace process. Adopting a two-pronged approach, the study first explores the associations between amnesties arising from concluding peace agreements and post-settlement levels of sexual violence in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and South Africa. A small-scale, events-based dataset of sexual violence by governments and rebel groups in the first three years after war was constructed. The second and main part of the study is a comparison between two rebel groups in Burundi’s civil war (1994-2008), CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy) and Palipehutu-FNL (Palipehutu-Forces for National Liberation) and their practices of prohibition and punishment of wartime sexual violence, taking into account also the possible influence of amnesties. Based on original data from 19 focus groups of ex-combatants from these rebel organisations, it is found that flawed prohibitions and negligent authorities are the main explanations for armed group impunity. The findings do not support amnesties as a cause of armed group impunity for sexual violence. Moreover, additional findings suggest that accountability for sexual violence is triggered by dependency on civilian support, while impunity is facilitated by an armed group’s ability to secure recruits, material and other resources without the help of local communities.

Le processus de paix ivoirien a débuté en 2002 et a fait intervenir divers acteurs. Dans le cadre de ce travail, nous nous sommes intéressés à un type d’acteurs en particulier : les organisations miliciennes. Pour ces acteurs armés non étatiques, il a été question de revenir sur leur inclusion et les mécanismes mis en place pour favoriser cette inclusion. Dans notre analyse, nous avançons que ces acteurs, en raison des dynamiques qui favorisent leur émergence et de leurs caractères dans le contexte Ivoirien, sont absents des négociations formelles. Toutefois, cette absence des négociations formelles ne signifie pas qu’ils sont totalement exclus du processus. Notre argument sert à montrer qu’ils ont été inclus au processus par le biais de mécanismes informels. Nous analysons cette inclusion informelle pour en faire ressortir les caractéristiques mais aussi les limites. / The Ivorian peace process began in 2002 and involved various actors. In this work, we are interested in one type of actor in particular: militia organizations. For these non-State armed actors, we wanted to understand their inclusion and the mechanisms put in place to promote this inclusion. In our analysis, we argue that these actors, because of the dynamics that favor their emergence and their characteristics in the Ivorian context, are absent from formal negotiations. However, this absence from formal negotiations does not mean that they are totally excluded from the process. Our argument shows that they were brought into the process through informal mechanisms. We analyze this informal inclusion to highlight its characteristics but also its limits.