Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2007. / Thesis t.p. and abstract laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-263).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 224-268).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 199-227).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 234-246).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1990. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Donald Abenheim. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-63). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, October 2009.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). "February 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-237). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Adversarial agreements, such as the nuclear weapons treaties, disarmament zones, or conventional weapons limitations, vary considerably in the information sharing provisions they include. This dissertation investigates why adversarial states sometimes choose to cooperate by creating restraining institutions, and how their choices for the form of that cooperation are constrained and motivated. I argue that uncertainties arising out of domestic political volatility, which includes leadership changes or public unrest, make arms control agreements more likely because these moments create the possibility of foreign policy change. When states consider one another as relatively cooperative, increasing uncertainty about the adversary's security incentives leads them to hedge and pursue low monitoring agreements instead of relying on informal cooperation. Conversely, under highly competitive conditions, increased uncertainty makes states more willing risk cooperation and form agreements with intrusive information provisions where no agreements were previously possible. I show support for the theory through tests using an original data set of all adversarial cooperation agreements (1816-2007) and their provisions. Controlling for other determinants of arms control, I show that both types of domestic political volatility contribute to a higher likelihood of an agreement. As expected, the effect of volatility on types of information provisions is conditional on the prior relationship between the states. A detailed study of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (US-Soviet Union, 1987) traces how shifts created by Gorbachev's new leadership contributed to greater uncertainty among US policymakers about Soviet intentions, giving both sides the negotiating space to design an intrusively monitored treaty. I then demonstrate the generalizability of the theory across a wider range of cases by looking at the effects of domestic volatility on agreement outcomes for adversaries experiencing détente; for those engaged in post-conflict competition, and for asymmetric powers negotiating new weapons limitation. / Government

Pundits and policymakers often decry the inability of international law to keep pace with technological change. Political scientists expect technological innovation to grant revisionist states with both the means and motive to evade unfavorable legal commitments. In practice, however, only some militarily disruptive technologies are institutionally disruptive. Status quo powers sometimes decline to contest revisionist breakthroughs, and revisionists sometimes concede (or conceal) their innovations instead of leveraging them to contest or evade undesirable rules. When contestation does arise, it is not always resolved in favor of the materially stronger party. If international law is what powerful states say it is, why are some international legal institutions comparatively resilient to militarily impactful technological innovations? This dissertation presents evidence that linguistic nuance, negotiated in ignorance about what the future might bring, can handcuff states to materially disadvantageous interpretations about what technologies are "compliant." To advance this argument, I depart from longstanding assumptions about what makes institutions effective. Norm specificity -- conventionally understood to minimize noncompliance -- works well for known forms of deviations, but unanticipated forms are inevitable. As the technology frontier inexorably expands, specificity dampens the credibility of restrictive analogies, making norms hard but brittle. When this happens, states that care about preserving at least the veneer of legal credibility can be deterred from adopting policies that would otherwise improve their material security. The theory is tested with a mixed-method empirical strategy. Seven case studies, based on thousands of pages of declassified records, are paired with two theoretically-motivated randomized experiments. This evidence shows while that emerging technologies may present states with incentives to evade the rules, the cost of evasive action depends on the perceived credibility of evasive justifications, a function of commitment language. An important finding is that seemingly "ambiguous" language can actually make legal institutions more resilient. In a world where change is understood as the only constant; words are widely viewed as cheap talk; and law is subordinate to politics, these results help explain why technology contestation is not ubiquitous.